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Martin Heidegger’s radical conception of the ‘subject’ as Dasein (the human being, 
whose essence is Existence) was meant to deconstruct traditional Cartesian 
conceptions of the subject based purely on consciousness in the name of retrieving a 
fundamental ontology. For Heidegger, Dasein is the only entity that can grasp primordial 
Being, which only becomes accessible in a breakdown of the world in anxiety (Angst). 
Although Heidegger contends that consciousness is irrelevant to Dasein’s experience of 
anxiety, I argue that consciousness remains crucial to the concept. While this discovery 
results in what Theodor W. Adorno calls a pseudo-concrete (abstract and individualistic) 
ontology, I approach anxiety through a materialist lens via Georg Lukács’s social 
ontology of the proletariat and Herbert Marcuse’s Heideggerian Marxism to argue that 
consciousness of social being may emerge out of anxiety, which may lead to 
revolutionary social action. In doing so, I underscore the emancipatory potential of 
anxiety.  
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Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time outlines a radical conception of the subject 
as Dasein (literally translated as being-there) in response to the philosophical tradition’s 
metaphysical understanding of the subject (the pure ego, or ‘I’, also known as the 
subjectum), whose Being is reduced to consciousness.1 According to Heidegger, the 
tradition’s emphasis on consciousness erroneously accords primacy to the subject, 
which has subsequently resulted in a reductionist account of Being as vorhanden 
(present-at-hand) - one that is derivative, distanced, and purely theoretical.2 Such 
present-at-hand orientations to Being remain on the ontic level, which merely refers to 
facts about entities that have Being.3 It is for this reason that Heidegger takes the 
tradition to task for its forgetfulness of Being (Seinsvergessenheit), where Being is 
understood to be universal, indefinable, and/or self-evident.4 Furthermore, this sustains a 
problematic subject-object dichotomy– subject is understood to exist independently of, 
and in opposition to, the object, or the objective world. For Heidegger, a proper 
understanding of Being requires a retrieval of a primordial, fundamental ontology, which 
necessitates a reconceptualized notion of the subject as Dasein, the human being and 
only entity that has access to Being because it has a relationship toward Being, which is 
grounded in its inextricable relation to the world.5 In asserting Dasein’s interdependence 
with the world, Heidegger rejects and even wishes to do away with the subject-object 
duality constitutive of the tradition. Consequently, Dasein is considered to be radical 
because its Being is not based on the consciousness of the pure ego, as this, in 
Heidegger’s view, covers over or conceals a genuine understanding of Being. Instead, 
Dasein’s Being is based upon how it exists in constant relationship with the world, which 
is meant to re-establish a primordial ontology in which Being is understood in a holistic, 
engaged, zuhanden (ready-to-hand) manner.6 
 
1 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1962), 33-35.  
2 Heidegger, Being and Time, 43;48.  
3 Heidegger, 31. 
4 Heidegger, 22-23.  
5 Heidegger, 31-32. 
6 Heidegger, 234; 245. 
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According to Heidegger, Dasein is not granted immediate access to Being. 
Rather, the structural whole of Being is opened to Dasein in a spontaneous moment of 
anxiety (Angst).7  Anxiety, as a state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit), makes manifest ‘how one 
is’.8 It causes a breakdown in which the significance of the world collapses for Dasein, 
which leads to feelings of uncanniness or not being at-home. However, in this collapse, 
there is a simultaneous revealing that the world matters to Dasein.9 It is here that 
Heidegger’s rejection of traditional subjectivity is highlighted, as he emphasizes Dasein’s 
most basic constitutive state, which is Being-in-the-world. However, in average 
everydayness (everyday life), ‘how to be’ is given to it by the “they” (das Man), the ‘One’ 
that structures Dasein’s  everyday existence by creating and maintaining social norms 
and conventions that provide Dasein with a sense of familiarity and tranquility.10 
Consequently, Dasein does not claim Being as its ownmost, as Dasein passively 
accepts the Being that is prescribed to it by the “they.” By default, then, Dasein is an 
inauthentic “they-self.”11It is only in anxiety that Dasein is freed for the possibility of 
attaining an authentic mode of Being - one that it can claim as its ownmost.12 Anxiety 
therefore brings about a recognition to Dasein of its two basic modes of Being as either 
inauthentic or authentic and reveals that Dasein’s self-interpretation is tied to its mode of 
Being.13 This ultimately paves the way for an understanding of the meaning of Being as 
temporality, which constitutes Dasein’s movement between its inauthentic and authentic 
modes of being.14A more concrete working out of Temporality is Dasein’s historicity 
(Geschichtlichkeit), or Dasein’s stretching between birth and death.15 A holistic 
understanding of Being (as Care, the unity of past-present-future) is therefore opened in 
anxiety. Not only does anxiety grant Dasein access to primordial Being, but it also gives 
rise to the two defining characteristics of Dasein: first, that the essence of Dasein is 
 
7 Heidegger, 227. 
8 Heidegger, 233 
9 Heidegger, 232. 
10 Heidegger, 233.  
11 Heidegger, 238. 
12 Heidegger, 232.  
13 Heidegger, 78.  
14 Heidegger, 377.  
15 Heidegger, 434.  
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Existence16 and second, “[t]hat Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is 
in each case mine” .17 The latter demonstrates Dasein’s mineness (Jemeinigkeit), which 
refers to the fact that “[i]n each case Dasein is its possibility, and it ‘has’ this possibility, 
but not just as a property [eigenschaftlich], as something present-at-hand would.18 As 
such, Dasein’s self-constancy is grounded in mineness, that is, in how Dasein interprets 
itself, which may only be realized after Dasein has experienced a moment of anxiety. 
Consequently, anxiety is understood to be a necessary and eternal part of human 
existence and is thus a defining phenomenon to Heidegger’s concept of the subject as 
Dasein.19 Dasein varies quite significantly from the philosophical tradition in which the 
essence of the subject is consciousness and the question of Being is forgotten. 
While Heidegger’s deconstruction of the traditional subject, reconceptualized as 
Dasein is convincing, his strictly ontological approach gives rise to significant limitations. 
Among the critiques that have been made against Heidegger is the claim that the subject 
as Dasein is too abstract, individualistic, and ultimately remains entangled within the 
tradition that Heidegger intends to abandon. The main purpose of my thesis is to 
demonstrate how Heidegger fails to escape aspects of the traditional formulation of the 
subject through an in-depth exploration of his concept of anxiety. I argue that 
consciousness, or the first-person perspective is crucial to Dasein’s experience of 
anxiety, contrary to Heidegger’s claim that consciousness plays little to no role for 
Dasein. I draw attention to Søren Kierkegaard’s influence on Heidegger by arguing that 
Dasein experiences Kierkegaardian inwardness, or a conscious, first-person self-
awareness in anxiety. Because anxiety plays a crucial role in opening Dasein to Being 
as a whole, it can therefore be argued that Heidegger relies on the philosophical 
tradition’s emphasis on consciousness for the supposed radicality of Dasein. I then turn 
the discussion to how Heidegger’s reliance on consciousness results in a false or 
pseudo-concrete philosophy, insofar as Heidegger fails to consider the materialist 
conception of history (historical materialism), in which the foundation of society is 
understood to be maintained by systems of material production that are constructed out 
 
16 Heidegger, 68.  
17 Heidegger, 67. 
18 Heidegger, 68. 
19 Heidegger, 234.  
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of social relations.20 I focus on critiques made by Theodor Adorno, who argues that 
Heidegger’s concept of history, as historicity, that is, in Dasein’s stretching between birth 
and death as it oscillates between inauthentic and authentic modes of Being, results in a 
purely individualistic ontology that does not consider material social reality. As such, 
Heidegger does not take into account the concrete social conditions that may affect 
Dasein’s experience of anxiety, both on an objective and subjective level. Instead, 
anxiety is accepted as an abstract ‘existential value’, or Absolute, in which material 
history does not play a role. In order to demonstrate how anxiety operates on a concrete 
level, I draw upon Georg Lukács’s social ontology of the proletariat in History and Class 
Consciousness and Herbert Marcuse’s early Heideggerian writings to argue that an 
experience of anxiety may give rise to consciousness of the fact that the entirety of 
society is reified, that is, treated as an abstract, identical, knowable entity, which 
sustains a subject-object dichotomy. Anxiety therefore gives rise to consciousness of 
social being, which may lead to revolutionary social action to unite subject and object 
and ultimately, to overcome reification.  
I begin by historically situating Heidegger’s project in relation to the philosophical 
tradition in Chapter 1, underscoring Heidegger’s critique and dismissal of the traditional 
subject that has been maintained by important philosophical figures such as René 
Descartes and in his view, by Edmund Husserl. I then detail Heidegger’s ontological 
rejection of these forms of traditional subjectivity by providing a more in-depth explication 
of Dasein, while also emphasizing the crucial role of anxiety in Dasein’s grasp of 
primordial Being. It is here that I introduce Dasein as what François Raffoul terms a 
‘non-subjective’ subject, that is, a subject that is not founded upon consciousness, but is 
rather grounded in Existence as Being-in-the-world. 21 
Throughout my overview of Heidegger’s rejection of the traditional, idealist 
subject in Chapter 1, I call attention to five important points. First, that Heidegger intends 
to take a general, neutral approach to ontology via Dasein, which results in an amoral, 
apolitical project because moral or political orientations remain on the ontic level and can 
never truly penetrate the ontological. Second, I highlight Heidegger’s rejection of the 
 
20 Karl Marx, The German Ideology (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1998), 61.  
21 François Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject (New Jersey: Humanities Press International,1998), 
147.  
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subject-object dichotomy (since Dasein is always already engaged with the world, which 
exists as an a priori) and along with that, his critique of consciousness as the essence of 
the subject. Third, I emphasize that for Heidegger, anxiety is required to open up the 
possibility of authenticity, which, by extension enables Dasein to grasp primordial Being 
as a whole. Therefore, anxiety is considered to be a necessary and eternal part of 
human existence. Fourth, I stress Heidegger’s assertion that anxiety is rare and is 
something that happens spontaneously to Dasein and cannot simply be willed. Lastly, I 
point to Heidegger’s notion of history, as historicity, which is based on Dasein’s 
individual, oscillation between inauthentic and authentic modes of Being in its stretching 
between birth and death. I continually refer back to these key ideas throughout the 
entirety of my thesis. 
After presenting a detailed explanation of Heidegger’s concept of Dasein in 
Chapter 1, I move to my main critique of Heidegger in Chapter 2, where I argue that 
remnants of the idealist subject, or the subjectum, may be found in his account of 
anxiety. Much of my discussion is centered upon Søren Kierkegaard’s influence on 
Heidegger. Throughout Kierkegaard’s various works (written under different 
pseudonyms), he draws attention to the single individual, who must attain a form of 
inwardness, or conscious self-awareness, in order to attain a genuine relationship with 
God, the Absolute. Consequently, in Kierkegaard’s concept of the subject, 
consciousness is emphasized, just as it is by Descartes and Husserl. Although 
Heidegger was highly critical of Kierkegaard, labelling the latter’s theological orientation 
as ontical,22 I highlight Vincent McCarthy’s argument that Kierkegaardian inwardness 
persists in Heideggerian anxiety.23 While McCarthy makes this important discovery, he 
does not present an in-depth discussion of how this undermines the supposed radicality 
of Heidegger’s subject as Dasein. As such, I bring in important points made by Steven 
Crowell and Yaron Senderowicz who uncover the existence of the subjectum in anxiety, 
whose defining characteristic is consciousness.24 Therefore, McCarthy, Crowell, and 
Senderowicz provide strong support for my argument that it is in Heideggerian anxiety 
 
22 Heidegger, Being and Time, 235niv; 278nvi; 387; 338n iii. 
23 Vincent McCarthy, “Martin Heidegger: Kierkegaard’s Influence Hidden and in Full View,” in 
Kierkegaard and Existentialism, ed. John Stewart (New York: Routledge, 2011), 112. 
24 Steven Crowell, Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 180; Yaron Senderowicz, “Anxiety and Identity: Beyond 
Husserl and Heidegger,” Contributions to Phenomenology 63, (2011): 153. 
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that aspects of traditional subjectivity may be found. Consequently, Heidegger’s 
philosophy remains entrapped within the philosophical framework that he explicitly 
dismisses.  
In Chapter 3, I highlight how the remnants of Kierkegaardian inwardness in 
Heideggerian anxiety provides additional support for claims already made against 
Heidegger, namely that he fails to fully abandon the philosophical tradition, which results 
in an abstract, individualistic ontology that is removed from concrete, objective reality. 
Here, I draw upon the works of Guenther Anders and Theodor Adorno who label 
Heideggerian philosophy as pseudo or falsely concrete. Much of my critique is grounded 
in Heidegger’s rejection of Marx’s materialist conception of history. Because Heidegger’s 
concept of history, as historicity is solely based upon Dasein’s stretching between birth 
and death as it oscillates between inauthentic and authentic modes of Being, the world is 
accepted as an a priori, that is, as something that is always already there to be taken 
over by Dasein. Because of Heidegger’s strictly ontological approach to history, which 
focuses on the existence of the individual Dasein, he does not place enough emphasis 
on how Dasein influences and is influenced by objective material reality. Therefore, in 
Dasein’s experience of anxiety, a strictly individualistic ontology is opened and there is 
no discussion of how anxiety may function on a social ontological level. As such, 
Heidegger breaks the important dialectical relationship between subject and object, 
which Anders and Adorno underscore in their critiques of Heidegger.25 Dialectics is of 
utmost importance, as it serves to unite subject and object through a process that 
unravels internal contradictions, and ultimately posits that the object can only be 
understood if its creation is realized to be connected to the subject that had produced 
it.26 I also emphasize Adorno’s assertion that anxiety should not be taken up as a mere 
’existential value’, or Absolute. And while I highlight that anxiety may play a historical 
role for Heidegger, his concept of historicity confines anxiety’s historical function to the 
individual ontology of Dasein and its own consciousness. 
 
25Theodor Adorno, “The Idea of Natural History,” Telos 1984, no. 60 (June 1984): 111-124; 
Guenther Stern Anders, “On the Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger’s Philosophy,” Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 8, no. 3 (March 1948): 337-371, 
http://www.jstror.org/stable/2103208.  
26 Lucien Goldmann, Lukács and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy, trans. William Q. 
Boelhower (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), xxi.  
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In Chapter 4, I set up the discussion of how anxiety can be understood in its 
historical (materialist) specificity by concretizing Heidegger’s historicity through the 
works of both Herbert Marcuse and Georg Lukács. I argue that Dasein’s historicity must 
include its social existence and I also emphasize the role of consciousness in the 
unfolding of history. To demonstrate how historicity may be concretized, I historicize the 
“they” by comparing its constitution before and after the rise of capitalism and emphasize 
that the “they” is characterized by reification specifically under capitalism. Reification is 
the process by which the entirety of society becomes treated as commodity: as an 
abstract, identical, timeless, and knowable entity.27 Not only is objective society reified 
under capitalism but consciousness is reified as well. As Richard Westerman argues, 
“[c]apitalism is distinct from previous societies because for the first time there is a 
‘formally-unified structure of [reified] consciousness for the whole of society.”28 Due to 
this, consciousness of one’s social being is concealed, resulting in a subject-object 
dichotomy in which the anxious, fragmented subject conceives of itself as a powerless 
entity that is separate and opposed to the objective ‘laws’ of society. Consequently, 
humans develop a forgetfulness of the world as an alienated product of its own activity. 
In Chapter 5, I unfold a specific example of how anxiety may be experienced 
under capitalist society by drawing upon Lukács’s social ontology of the proletariat. I 
argue that anxiety may be a means through which the unified structure of consciousness 
under capitalism is broken. While the connection of consciousness and anxiety would be 
rejected by Heidegger, since he does not acknowledge the consciousness of Dasein in 
Being and Time, my discovery of the subjectum in Heidegger’s Dasein, along with 
Heidegger’s connection to both Lukács and Kierkegaard (highlighted by Goldmann, 
McCarthy, and Westerman respectively), allows for an opening of this discussion. 
Drawing from Lukács, I argue that when the proletariat experiences a moment of 
anxiety, consciousness of social being is opened, as the ‘nothing’ that is disclosed to the 
proletariat is the de-reified world, which enables subject to understand its role in creating 
the objective world.  Not only is the dialectical relationship between subject and object 
restored, but the possibility of overcoming reification is also opened, since subject 
 
27 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: The 
Merlin Press, 1971), 6. 
28 Richard Westerman, Lukács’s Phenomenology of Capitalism: Reification Revalued (Cham: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 126. 
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recognizes that it is capable of transforming objective reality. This subsequently leads to 
a more concretized conception of authenticity: one that goes beyond the individual 
Dasein, and rather focuses on widespread social transformation through the 
revolutionary action of the proletariat. In this discussion, I also underscore the necessity 
of effective organization to truly allow for the construction of an ‘authentic’ humanity.29 
Not only do I undermine Heidegger’s claim that anxiety is an eternal part of human 
existence, but I also illuminate its emancipatory potential on the level of the social. 
I conclude my project by exploring some areas of my project that would benefit 
from further research. I then highlight how Heidegger’s philosophical failures are relevant 
today, as they may be reflected in contemporary forms of identity politics, which lays the 
foundation for important future research. 
 
29 Georg Lukács, Lenin A Study on the Unity of His Thought, trans. Nicholas Jacobs (London: New 
Left Books, 2009), 199;318.  
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Chapter 1. The Anxious Heideggerian Subject  
1.1. Introduction 
Heidegger’s Being and Time rejects the traditional conception of the subject 
(subjectum) which the metaphysical tradition presents as a pure, isolated Ego or ‘I’, 
whose being is based on substance (that which exists as a self-subsisting thing).30 His 
critique is rooted in his assertion that such notions of subjectivity, borne out of 
Descartes’s ego cogito (‘I think’), have erroneously become the starting point of all 
philosophically inquiry, as this has blocked access to a development of genuine 
ontology. The persistence of the Cartesian subject has sustained the subject-object 
dualism, which characterizes the subject as isolated from and opposed to the object, or 
objective world. Furthermore, Descartes and his successors (among them, Husserl) 
have posited that consciousness is not only crucial to subjectivity but that it captures the 
essence of existence.31 It is this traditional framework that Heidegger problematizes, as 
this has resulted in what he calls a forgetfulness of Being (Seinsvergessenheit), which 
structurally elides the ontological difference, that is, the difference between the ontic 
(facts about entities that have being) and the ontological (Being). According to 
Heidegger, traditional approaches to ontology have been confined to the efforts of the 
‘subject’, who seeks to understand Being from a distanced, theoretical, present-at-hand 
(vorhanden) perspective, thereby remaining in the ontic. However, Heidegger asserts 
that Being must be grasped in a more primordial, meaningfully engaged, ready-to-hand 
(zuhanden) way. It is for this reason that Heidegger develops a radically different 
conception of subjectivity by positing the ‘subject’ as Dasein, literally translated as 
Being-there. Dasein is the human being and it is the only entity that can access Being 
because “Being is an issue for it.”32  
What is particularly unique to Heidegger’s understanding of the subject as 
Dasein (at least in relation to Descartes and Husserl) is that primordial Being only 
becomes accessible to it in the state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) of anxiety (Angst). It is in 
 
30 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. and ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1996), 55:59. 
31 Descartes, Meditations, 59.  
32 Heidegger, Being and Time, 32. 
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anxiety that Dasein attains an understanding that its Being, by default, is merely given to 
it by the “They”, the ‘One’ that structures Dasein’s everyday Being, thereby lulling it into 
a passive, tranquil existence, in which Being is inauthentic, as it is not Dasein’s own.33 In 
anxiety, the “they” collapses and the world and its significance to Dasein completely 
disintegrates.34 Consequently Dasein is individualized as Being-in-the-world - it attains 
an understanding that the world matters to it and that its self-understanding is based 
upon how it interprets itself in its ongoing, meaningful engagement with entities (i.e. 
objects and other Daseins) in the world.35 In other words, Dasein recognizes that it has 
an inextricable relation to the world and that its self-interpretation is founded upon its 
particular mode of Being.36 Importantly, consciousness does not play a role in Dasein’s 
experience of anxiety. What Heidegger emphasizes is that anxiety opens up the 
possibility for Dasein to attain an authentic mode of Being – one that it can claim as its 
ownmost.37 It further paves the way for Dasein to grasp the structural whole of Being by 
illuminating the fact that its ‘essence’ is Existence and by also underscoring Dasein’s 
mineness – that Being always belongs to Dasein as a possibility as either inauthentic or 
authentic, or else it is modally undifferentiated.38 As such, Heidegger’s concept of 
Dasein is fundamentally different from the pure, isolated Cartesian subject (along with 
subsequent formulations of the subject that arise from the Cartesian cogito), in which 
existence is based on consciousness. Consequently, Heidegger rejects and even wishes 
to dispense with the distinction between, and categorization of subject and object that 
has been maintained by traditional philosophy.  
The purpose of this chapter is to both historically situate Heidegger’s Dasein (and 
by extension, his overall project in Being and Time) in relation to the philosophical 
tradition, and to provide an in-depth explication of Dasein, highlighting the significance of 
anxiety (in which consciousness plays no role), in Dasein’s retrieval of a fundamental 
ontology. I will begin by outlining traditional conceptions of the subject via Descartes and 
Husserl, who were both highly influential in developing the “philosophy of 
 
33 Heidegger, 164.  
34 Heidegger, 232.  
35 Heidegger, 81.  
36 Heidegger, 33.  
37 Heidegger, 232.  
38 Heidegger, 67-68.  
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consciousness.”39 I will then detail Heidegger’s Dasein as a response to the tradition, 
heavily drawing upon the non-subjective subjectivity that he intends to produce - that is, 
a subject that is decoupled from the traditional thought of Cartesian subjectivity. I also 
draw attention to Heidegger’s assertion that anxiety is an essential and eternal part of 
Dasein’s existence by calling attention to its indispensable role in unfolding a holistic 
understanding of Being to Dasein. Ultimately, this chapter serves as the foundation of 
my project, as Heidegger’s key ideas are outlined, which will be further explored and 
critiqued in latter chapters. 
1.2. Cartesian Subjectivity: the ego cogito 
In his highly influential Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes lays the 
groundwork for the traditional conception of the subject, whose ‘essence’ is 
consciousness. His aim was to construct a foundation for epistemology through the use 
of radical doubt. According to Descartes, while most everything can be doubted, what 
remains incontestable is the fact that ego sum cogito: I exist as a thinking thing.40 
Because of his focus on consciousness, Descartes calls attention to the primacy of the 
subject, as he states: “before I inquire whether any such things exist outside of me, I 
must consider the ideas of these things, insofar as they exist in my 
thought.”41Furthermore, because “I am merely a thinking thing [and]…I understand 
myself to be something quite single and complete”, Descartes emphasizes that the 
subject exists independently of, and in opposition to, the world or object.42 This subject-
object dichotomy is further illuminated by Descartes’s differentiation between humans as 
res cogitans (thinking thing) and objects as res extensa (extended thing).43 The subject 
is distinguished from object because “I am… in the strict sense only a thing that 
thinks.”44 In other words, it is consciousness that is the defining characteristic that 
differentiates subject from object. However, both subject and object are classified as 
 
39 Heidegger was also influenced by Henri Bergson, William Dilthey, Immanuel Kant, and others, 
however, for the purposes of this thesis, the discussion will largely be centred around Descartes’s 
and Husserl’s account of subjectivity. 
40 Descartes, Meditations, 59.  
41 Descartes, 44. 
42 Descartes, 59. 
43 Descartes, 30. 
44 Descartes, 17.  
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substance (independent existence), and it is substantiality that constitutes the Being of 
both of these entities.45Therefore, Being does not play a role in differentiating humans 
from other entities. The Cartesian subject is simply the ego cogito – it is worldless, 
reflects inward, and is grounded in consciousness. Subject and object are conceived to 
be distinct, opposing entities.  
1.3. Husserl’s Inheritance of the Cartesian Subject 
Husserl is an important figure to mention, not only because the legacy of 
Descartes’s cogito is present within his work, but he was Heidegger’s teacher and 
therefore influenced also influenced Heidegger’s project in Being and Time.46 Husserl 
used Descartes’s ego cogito as a starting point in his  attempt to develop a genuine 
phenomenology to grasp a deeper understanding of psychical phenomena (i.e. 
believing, judging, knowing, perceiving), which was previously analyzed through the lens 
of psychologism (which seeks to understand the cognitive structure of such phenomena 
through psychology).47 Through this methodology, Husserl builds upon the Cartesian 
notion of subjectivity, albeit develops it in significant ways. Similar to Descartes, Husserl 
calls for the suspension of judgment, however, rather than focusing on radical doubt to 
develop a premise for a metaphysical system, Husserl focuses on the phenomenological 
“epoché,” which involves the act of ‘bracketing’ one’s judgements and assumptions that 
are given in the immediacy of experience in order to uncover the deep structure of 
consciousness.48 Without such bracketing, we remain in the “natural attitude,” in which 
one is naively, or passively absorbed in the world, without in-depth reflection.49 
Furthermore, because the natural attitude does not involve any act or elaboration on 
how one develops a judgement about experience, subjectivity is taken for granted. It is 
 
45 Descartes, 30-31;51.  
46 Heidegger, Being and Time, xvii-xviii.  
47 It is acknowledged that there are important differences between the early Husserl of 1900-1901, 
when Logical Investigations was published, and the latter Husserl of 1913, where he underwent a 
transcendental turn with the publication of Ideas, as he realized that his purely descriptive 
phenomenology in Logical Investigations was limited and required the development of 
transcendental phenomenology (Zahavi 2003, 42). For the purposes of this chapter, however, this 
will not be discussed in detail.  
48 Edmund Husserl, The Paris Lectures trans. Peter Koestenbaum (Norwell: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1998), 8. 
49 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy trans. F. Kersten (Hingham: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1982), 51-52. 
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through the phenomenological epoché that “intentionality” is discovered, which reveals 
that “[c]onsciousness is always consciousness of something.”50 More deeply, 
intentionality discloses the object of my consciousness as something that is intended, 
where this object, regardless of whether or not it physically exists, is simply understood 
as what is ‘meant’.51 The essence of consciousness is thus disclosed in intentionality: 
intentionality is directional and is a vector that unites subject and object: “consciousness 
is subject-object encounter.”52 As such, Husserl, like Descartes, emphasizes 
consciousness but contrary to the latter, whose notion of consciousness is confined to 
the thinking subject alone, Husserl emphasizes that consciousness is representative of 
an inextricable relationship between subject and object. Therefore, Husserl expands 
upon the Cartesian notion of the subject, previously understood as ego cogito, to ego 
cogito cogitatum, where the cogitatum represents the object that is intended53. The 
phenomenological epoché acts as a means to synthesize the act (cogito) with the object 
(cogitatum) in the world.54 In this regard, Husserl moves beyond the Cartesian subject-
object dichotomy by binding subject and object together via intentionality. However, for 
Husserl, the world is not confined to the material realm since objects of intentionality are 
not always physical objects that are found in the surrounding, natural world. For 
example, there exists intentional acts which are directed toward theoretical systems, 
such as arithmetic.55 Nonetheless, Husserl, unlike Descartes, demonstrates the 
importance of the world in its connection to the subject, since the world is comprised of 
the totality of being, and as such, must be experienced holistically since intentionality 
enables the cohesion of the world.56 (This will, of course, be developed further in 
Husserl’s later work on the Crisis of the European Sciences, in particular, the concept of 
the life-world (Lebenswelt), which is  meant to distinguish between theoretical and 
pretheoretical attitudes (i.e. the natural attitude), but is also meant to demonstrate the 
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relationship between the two.57 The life-world is an ambiguous term and Husserl 
describes it as both pre-theoretical, immediate experience, but also the form of life of the 
cultural world, which enables an epistemological justification of how people belonging to 
a social group structure the world into objects.)58  
Consciousness and its connection to the world is further emphasized with 
Husserl’s discovery of the pure subject, referred to as the Transcendental Ego, 
Transcendental Subject, Pure Ego or ‘I’, or “I-Pole”, which emerges from the 
transcendental-phenomenological reduction.59 This reduction will not be elaborated for 
the purposes of this chapter, however, it is important to understand that it involves a 
series of successive bracketings until everything is bracketed and the transcendental 
Ego is revealed as “the source of being, of objectivity, or reality, and of truth.”60 Through 
this process of progressive reduction, the centre of the totality of experiences, which 
Husserl terms “transcendental consciousness,” is discovered: the “I-Pole” which is “a 
core from which all intentional streams of experience radiate.”61 This transcendental ego 
is not merely understood as an object in the world, as this is what merely constitutes the 
empirical ego, a “constituted and mundanized entity.”62 Rather, “[t]he transcendental 
Ego, … is not given as an object, but as the subject for which the object manifests itself. 
Consequently, the Ego is not a thing or residue of experience, but a ubiquitous single 
center or pole from which emanate the “radiations” of consciousness and 
intentionality.”63 The transcendental ego is the universal - it is the category of being and 
is therefore necessary and a priori.64 Thus, “Husserl claims that whereas it is possible to 
imagine the existence of a worldless subject, it is not possible to imagine the existence 
of a subjectless world” because the transcendental ego is always defined by a subjective 
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and objective pole, where the subject pole is unified into the transcendental ego and the 
objective pole to the intentional object. 65.  
Although it can be argued that Husserl’s emphasis on consciousness maintains 
the notion of an Absolute subject akin to the Cartesian cogito,66 Dan Zahavi argues that 
the absolute that is present in Husserlian thought is distinct because it is a 
phenomenological, rather than a metaphysical, absolute, where the explanation of 
consciousness is meant to demonstrate that object is dependent upon subjectivity in 
order to gain validity and meaning.67 More deeply, the “absoluteness that Husserl 
ascribes to subjectivity pertains to its manifestation. Subjectivity is for-itself, it is self-
manifesting or self-constituting, whereas this determination is something that all objects 
per definition lack.”68 In this regard, Husserl’s phenomenology also rejects existential 
solipsism, where knowledge solely belongs to the mind of the individual, and the mind is 
the only thing that is understood to exist with certainty. Thus, Husserl seems to reject the 
primacy of the subject upheld by Descartes.  
Husserl’s notion of intersubjectivity further demonstrates a departure from 
consciousness as a metaphysical absolute that prioritizes subjectivity. For Husserl, 
intersubjectivity demonstrates that “I experience the world not as my own private world, 
but as an intersubjective world, one that is given to all human beings and which contains 
objects accessible to all. In it others exist as others, as well as for each other, as being 
therefore anyone.”69 As such, my self-disclosure includes another transcendental 
subjectivity – a transcendental alter ego.70 The alter ego calls for empathy, which allows 
for the appearance of others who are ‘co-experienced’.71 In recognizing others in this 
manner, Husserl works against the idea of the subject as completely isolated or 
 
65 Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 47. 
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monadic, as he recognizes that engagement with others is a component of the 
transcendental subject. Reality transcendentally relies upon consciousness, though this 
transcendental idealism is not to be defined in the traditional philosophical sense, which 
is premised on the problem of how to move beyond the sphere of consciousness. For 
Husserl, this forgets the notion of intentionality and further presupposes that subject is 
an isolated, detached ego.72  
Husserl’s concept of intentionality and the transcendental ego represents an 
important departure from the isolated, worldless Cartesian subject. Although it can be 
argued that Husserl overcomes Descartes’s subject-object dichotomy, his success in 
doing so is dependent upon an understanding of the object as both immaterial (mentally 
produced/imagined) and material. Regardless, the categorization of subject (as 
consciousness) and object are still maintained, though they are not considered to be 
separate entities, as Descartes contends.   
1.4. The Tradition’s Forgetfulness of Being  
While Descartes and Husserl underscore consciousness as the defining 
characteristic of the subject, Heidegger’s ontological project in Being and Time 
constructs a completely different notion of the subject as Dasein, ‘essence’ is Existence 
or Being73.In doing so, Heidegger discredits the primacy of the subject (as 
consciousness), and, by extension, the subject-object dichotomy that emerged from 
traditional philosophy. The motivation behind Heidegger’s construction of Dasein is 
rooted in his assertion that the tradition has maintained a forgetfulness of Being 
(Seinsvergessenheit), as it has presupposed that Being is universal, indefinable, and/or 
self-evident, thereby failing to question Being in itself.74 Consequently, Being has and 
continues to be approached from a distanced, theoretical, present-at-hand (vorhanden) 
perspective, rather than from a primordial, meaningfully engaged ready-to-hand 
(zuhanden) way..75Ultimately, the tradition has passed over an understanding of the 
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“ontological difference,” that is, the difference between the ontic (facts about entities that 
have being) and the ontological (Being).76 
Heidegger’s criticisms of traditional philosophy are illuminated in his remarks on 
Descartes. He states,  
[w]ith the ‘cogito sum’, Descartes had claimed that he was putting 
philosophy on a new and firm footing. But what he left undetermined when 
he began in this ‘radical’ way, was the kind of Being which belongs to the 
res cogitans, or – more precisely – the meaning of the Being of the ‘sum’.77 
For Descartes, the Being of the cogito is substance, where the substance is a thinking 
thing (res cogita). However, according to Heidegger, the substantiality of the substance 
(thinking thing, the ‘sum’) remains unclarified. As such, the question of the meaning of 
Being in itself is not raised, which therefore results in a failure to differentiate between 
the ontic and the ontological.78 Consequently, something ontical is made to underlie the 
ontological, rendering Cartesian ontology as “hazily ontico-ontological.”79  
Heidegger similarly charges Husserlian phenomenology for its inability to develop 
a genuine ontology, despite Husserl’s notion of intentionality that binds subject to object. 
Even before the publication of Being and Time in 1927, Heidegger cites the limitations of 
Husserl’s thinking, specifically responding to intentionality in Prolegomena to a History of 
a Concept of Time, written in 1925. In this text, Heidegger charges Husserl for 
developing a crude interpretation of perception via intentionality. While Heidegger 
recognizes that Husserl establishes the important connection between subject and 
object (which he later appropriates in Being and Time), Husserl’s concept of 
intentionality involves “[a] coordination between reality of consciousness (the subject) 
and a reality outside of consciousness (the object)”, which upholds the notion that 
subject and object are distinct and separate entities.80 Further, Heidegger critiques 
Husserl’s notion of consciousness as an Absolute (as the Transcendental ego), as this 
erroneously affords primacy to the subject. Although Husserl contends that the subject 
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should not be understood as any other object because the transcendental ego contains 
the totality of beings (which falls in line with Heidegger’s critique of Descartes’s 
understanding of Being as substance that fails to account for the ontological difference), 
Husserl’s assertion that the transcendental ego is the ‘centre’ of all conscious activity 
continues to prioritize subject in Heidegger’s view. This further points to the immanence 
of consciousness that is  within Husserl’s thinking – that an understanding of the world 
and of the self resides within the subject and is directed inward.81 Therefore, while 
Husserl uncovers the important synthesis between subject and object, and also 
connects the problem of Being to the world, he continues to overemphasize subjectivity 
(as consciousness). Ultimately, Husserl’s emphasis on pure consciousness is “defined 
as ideal, that is, not real being”, which does not open up the question of Being in itself.82  
In response to Husserl’s claims, Heidegger calls for a more primordial 
understanding of intentionality by emphasizing the towards-which of perception, which 
anticipates his development of Dasein’s most basic constitutive state as Being-in-the-
world two years later, in Being and Time. In the 1925 text, Heidegger states, “[b]y 
intentionality we do not mean an objective relation which occasionally and subsequently 
takes place between a physical thing and a psychic process, but the structure of a 
comportment as comporting to, directing itself toward.83What should be emphasized is 
the “perceived as such” or that towards-which – the “perceived of … perception.”84 
Furthermore, by highlighting the towards-which, Heidegger develops a deeper relation 
between subject and object - one that is eternal, constant, and is taken for granted in the 
subject’s everyday existence in its engagement with the world.85 
Heidegger expands upon his critique of Husserlian phenomenology in Being and 
Time. For Heidegger, Being is the phenomenon of phenomenology.86 In other words, 
phenomenology is ontology.87 However, Husserl passes over this understanding 
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because his phenomenology merely provides a subjective description - that is, a 
phenomenology that is confined to immediate, subjective experience, which erroneously 
prioritizes consciousness.88 While Heidegger agrees that phenomenology (ontology) 
should be descriptive, it must provide a general description of the world as such.89 As 
such, Heidegger conceives of Husserian phenomenology as upholding the subject-
object dichotomy of the tradition. 
Ultimately, for Heidegger, Descartes and Husserl emphasize the self-presence of 
knowledge: that what I am conscious of is within my own subjectivity, or in other words, 
that consciousness is immanent.90 Seeking knowledge of the external world from such a 
reflective standpoint preserves the priority of the subject’s conscious activity, along with 
the notion that the world is separate and external to the subject. From this traditional 
standpoint, ontological questioning is confined to mere presence-at-hand 
(Vorhandenheit). Traditional philosophy is thus an ontology of Vorhandenheit. Heidegger 
intends to correct the ontological inadequacy of the tradition in Being and Time by 
presenting Dasein, or the Existential Analytic of Dasein, as the means to restore a 
fundamental ontology, that is, an ontology that is primordial, holistic and is grounded in 
the question of Being itself.  
1.5. Heidegger’s Dasein 
1.5.1. Being-in-the-world 
According to Heidegger, the only entity that can grasp primordial Being is Dasein. 
Literally translated as being-there, Dasein is meant to rectify the problematic, ontical 
approach to Being that ignores the ontological difference that is sustained by the 
tradition. Rather than using the cogito as the point of departure, the ‘sum’, via Dasein, is 
emphasized. 91 The sum is accessible in the Existential Analytic of Dasein because 
Dasein “is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being that Being is an issue 
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for it.”92 In other words, Dasein has a relationship toward Being and it is distinguished 
ontically because it is ontological. This demonstrates two characteristics. First, contrary 
to Descartes and Husserl, who maintain that the essence of the ‘subject’ is 
consciousness, the ‘essence’ of Dasein is existence itself.93 Second, “[t]hat Being which 
is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine.”94 The notion of Being as 
belonging to Dasein demonstrates Dasein’s mineness (Jemeinigkeit), which asserts that 
“[i]n each case Dasein is its possibility, and it ‘has’ this possibility, but not just as a 
property [eigenschaftlich], as something present-at-hand would.95 What mineness 
reveals is that the Being of Dasein is not to be conceived of as a thing, or object that 
Dasein possesses, rather, Dasein is always already in a mode of Being, and it is Being 
itself that maintains Dasein’s self-constancy rather than consciousness.  
What further differentiates Heidegger’s conception of the ‘subject’ or self from the 
traditional subjectum, is that its mineness is inextricably linked to its relationship with the 
world, therefore, the world is not to be conceived of as opposed to Dasein. However, it is 
important to understand that “subject and Object do not coincide with Dasein and the 
world.”96 For Heidegger, the world is not simply a supercontainer that contains a totality 
of objects that is external to and opposed to the subject as Descartes contends. Rather, 
Dasein and the world are inextricably linked because of its facticity - that the entities 
within the world matter to Dasein. More deeply, facticity demonstrates that Dasein is 
thrown into the world (one that it did not choose) and “has Being-in-the-world in such a 
way that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ with the Being of those 
entities which it encounters within its own world.”97 This is contrary to Descartes who 
argues that the worldless subject may exist. In addition, rather than basing the synthesis 
of subject and object in intentionality as Husserl does, whereby object appears for 
subject, Dasein, as subject, “resides alongside”  or is “familiar with “the entities within the 
world, where such entities include both objects and other Dasein’s that Dasein 
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encounters in the world.98 So while Heidegger follows Husserl’s phenomenological 
thought more closely, insofar as both establish that there is an important connection 
between ‘subject’ and ‘object’, Heidegger emphasizes Dasein’s dependence upon the 
world by highlighting Dasein’s most basic constitutive state as Being-in-the-world, unlike 
Husserl who basis this connection in consciousness and more specifically in 
intentionality, whereby object appears for subject .99 
While Husserlian intentionality establishes a phenomenology based on 
consciousness, Heidegger’s phenomenology (as ontology), is based on Dasein’s Being-
in-the-world, which purportedly overcomes the ontological inadequacy of Cartesian and 
Husserlian conceptions of subjectivity. According to Heidegger, factical Dasein is 
dispersed into definite ways of Being-in, which includes producing something, attending 
to something, undertaking something, considering something, and so on.100 “All these 
ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being.101 Thus, concernful engagement 
with entities such as tools or equipment within the world enables a more primordial 
engagement as ready-to-hand (zuhanden). In order to encounter the ready-to-hand, one 
must forget about the equipment as such sand manipulate it.102 This requires 
circumspection - a ‘knowing-how’, or knowing how to use equipment in an appropriate 
way.103 Circumspection is a form of present awareness that differs from a distanced, 
theoretical, present-at-hand approach, which prioritizes the subject. Circumspective 
concern discloses the Being of equipment as readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit).104 
Readiness-to-hand demonstrates that the engagement with equipment includes a 
towards-which, which is the work that is produced out of the equipment’s 
manipulation.105 Each equipment belongs to a totality of equipment (an in-order-to), and 
this totality has the character of reference.106 The “referential totality which constitutes 
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significance” or meaningfulness (the reason for the equipment, or relevance of things 
with each other) is called worldhood.107  
The world is thus understood as a totality of references/involvement, wherein 
Dasein understands itself in the mode of assigning itself to entities within this totality.108 
Therefore, the structure of the world, which exists as an a priori, may be manifested 
through an understanding of Zuhandenheit. However, it is only in a breakdown of this 
referential totality that readiness-to-hand may be discovered - when circumspection 
comes against a sort of emptiness when the equipment is deficient (which includes the 
modes of conspicuousness, obstrusiveness, and obstinacy). The wherein that this 
referring takes place is in the world, which demonstrates that Dasein’s self-
understanding is ultimately tied to an inextricable engagement with the world.109 
Therefore, in this disclosure of Dasein as belonging to the totality of references of the 
world, the ‘subject’, as Dasein, cannot be conceived of an isolated Cartesian cogito, nor 
can the synthesis of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ be based on Husserlian intentionality.  .  
Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world establishes the notion that is 
Dasein’s self-understanding cannot be separate from its on-going relations with entities 
(such as tools) that exist in the world, which is meant to dispel notions of the subject that 
are based on consciousness. Beyond this, Heidegger asserts that Dasein’s engagement 
with other Daseins also influences its interpretation of itself. According to Heidegger, 
other Daseins are not objects of concern, rather they are objects of solicitude or caring 
for.110 The world is one that Dasein always shares with others, thus, the world is a with 
world (Mitwelt) .111 Being-in is therefore also a Being-with others.112 While this may be 
comparable to Husserl’s notion of intersubjectivity, which acknowledges the existence of 
the alter ego who is co-experienced via empathy, the alter ego does not directly 
influence the ‘essence’ of the transcendental ego because it is perceived to be originary, 
pure, and can exist independently of other egos. For Heidegger, the with-world means 
that the way that Dasein comes up against others in average everydayness (in Dasein’s 
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everyday dealings in the world), affects Dasein’s self-understanding, and by extension, 
its mode of Being. By default, then, factical Dasein is always already up against other 
Daseins in the world.  
What should be emphasized is that “[t]hese Others … are not definite Others” – 
and while they ‘are there’, they are the “neuter” and constitute the “they” (das Man), the 
“one” who prescribes how Dasein should be. In everydayness,  
[w]e take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take pleasure; we 
read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise 
we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ 
what they find shocking. The “they”, which is nothing definite, and which all 
are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of 
everydayness.113 
Similar to equipment, whose Being, as readiness-to-hand, cannot be discovered 
by Dasein in its immediacy, Dasein, by default does not understand that its Being is 
given to it by the “they” because the “they” provides Dasein with structured existence in 
everydayness. As such, Dasein becomes absorbed in the “they” and falls. Falling is a 
kind of Being in average everydayness, which is characterized by Dasein’s movement of 
factical existence in its lostness in the “they.” When Dasein falls, Dasein is disburdened 
from choosing its being. In other words, Dasein moves away from itself in falling, as 
Dasein cannot authentically grasp its ownmost authentic potentiality-for-Being.114 
Consequently, “[t]he Self of everyday Dasein is the they-Self, which we distinguish from 
the authentic self – that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way.115 
It is important to note that Heidegger does not make any moral claims in Being and 
Time, and as such, the “they” isn’t necessarily bad – in fact, Heidegger claims that the 
“they”, as a category of Being (an existentiale), “belongs to Dasein’s positive 
constitution” because it provides a screen or background for Dasein’s existence in 
average everydayness.116 Thus, the “they” is essential to Dasein’s existence and it is 
impossible for Dasein to be rid of the “they.” 
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In a sense, Heidegger’s concept of the “they” may be compared to Husserl’s 
natural attitude, which similarly discloses a naïve absorption within the world, thus 
inhibiting access to the development of a genuine phenomenology.117 However, while 
Husserl asserts that the natural attitude may be overcome by suspending one’s 
judgment via the phenomenological epoché, for Heidegger, an understanding of the 
“they” as an existentiale may only be possible when Dasein is experiences a breakdown  
in anxiety.  
1.6. Anxiety as Dasein’s Access to its Essence as 
Existence 
Just as the readiness-to-hand of tools and equipment is taken for granted and 
only ‘shows-up’ in a breakdown when the tool loses its function (and significance), 
Dasein may only understand its Being, and by extension, an understanding of its self as 
Being-in-the-world when it similarly experiences a collapse. This collapse occurs when 
Dasein experiences the state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) of anxiety (Angst). In anxiety, a 
holistic understanding of Dasein as a ‘subject’, whose essence is existence is opened. 
Contrary to Descartes and Husserl, then, Dasein’s grasp of its ‘self’ does not involve 
consciousness, whether that be through a reflective, inward process that reveals the ego 
cogito for Descartes, or through intentionality, which reveals that consciousness is 
always consciousness of, thus revealing the ego cogito cogitatum. For Heidegger, it is 
only through anxiety that Dasein is opened to its essence as existence.  
As a state-of-mind, anxiety is ontically experienced but has an ontological 
function insofar as it discloses to Dasein that the world matters to it by “mak[ing] 
manifest ‘how one is’.”118 Anxiety has a tripartite structure which includes an in the face-
of-which (wovor), an about-which (worum), and Being-anxious. First, that which Dasein 
is-in-the-face-of when Dasein has anxiety is Being-in-the-World as such.119 As 
mentioned above, Dasein’s self-understanding is based on its ability to meaningfully 
assign itself to possibilities in the world. However, in a moment of anxiety, a breakdown 
occurs, as entities within-the-world lose their significance and Dasein is thus in-the-face-
 
117 Husserl, Ideas, 51-52. 
118 Heidegger, Being and Time, 233. 
119 Heidegger, 230.  
25 
of the world where nothing matters to it.120 Therefore,“[t]hat in the face of which one has 
anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is nowhere” - it is not clear to 
Dasein what it is anxious about, as that which is threatening is ‘nowhere’ .121 As such, 
the “nothing and nowhere becomes manifest.”122  
The about-which of anxiety, or that which Dasein is anxious about is “Being-in-
the-world itself.”123 In anxiety, Dasein’s possibility of understanding its Being is taken 
away, as it can no longer assign itself to any possibilities.124 Dasein falls and becomes 
absorbed by the “they”, however, at the same time, Dasein is also brought back onto 
that which it is anxious about – its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world.125 Thus, 
“anxiety discloses Dasein as Being possible” because it “individualizes Dasein for its 
ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself upon 
possibilities.”126 The individualizing function of anxiety is extremely significant. While 
some may conceive of this individuation as a process that isolates Dasein, which would 
signify the persistence of the worldless, Cartesian cogito, Raffoul explains that “[a]nxiety 
isolates Dasein, but as Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others. As an isolating mood, 
anxiety opens Dasein to its Being, making it free for beings.”127 In other words, the 
individualizing function of anxiety reveals to Dasein that Being always belongs to it as a 
possibility, and is an issue that it alone must face. More deeply, the individuation of 
Dasein in anxiety may be clarified in Heidegger’s account of death. According to 
Heidegger, “[a]nxiety in the face of death is anxiety ‘in the face of’ that potentiality-for-
Being which is one’s ownmost, nonrelational and not to be outstripped.128 Therefore, 
Dasein’s Being-towards-death must be characterized as Being towards a possibility.129 
Dasein can comport itself to a possibility by expecting it via anticipation.130 Because the 
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possibility of death is impending, Dasein is able to anticipate death. This anticipation 
discloses to Dasein that it is a they-self and brings the possibility of being itself through a 
“freedom towards death – a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the 
“they”, and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious.”131 In short, anxiety enables 
Dasein to understand its finitude and as Being-towards-death, its possibilities.  
The third component of the tripartite structure of anxiety is Being-anxious, where 
“the world as world is disclosed first and foremost,” as Dasein truly becomes aware of its 
Being-in-the-world for the first time.132 This results in a feeling of uncanniness 
(Unheimlichkeit), or a feeling of not being at-home for Dasein, as “everyday familiarity 
collapses.”133 In response to this breakdown of familiarity, Dasein loses itself to the 
“they.134 Therefore, Being-anxious manifests itself in a flight – in turning away from 
uncanniness by falling into the tranquilizing power of the “they.”135 Thus, “the 
everydayness of this fleeing shows phenomenally that anxiety … belongs to Dasein’s 
essential state of Being-in-the-world”, and while “[t]his uncanniness pursues Dasein 
constantly”, it is not made explicit to Dasein in everydayness.136 What this means is that 
Dasein is always already disposed as anxious, yet this anxiousness is covered over 
because Dasein falls into the “they.” As such, anxiety is conceived to be an eternal part 
of human existence. Though anxiety is latent in everydayness, it is possible for Dasein to 
anticipate a sudden, spontaneous moment of “real” anxiety, which, as mentioned above, 
grants Dasein access to an authentic mode of Being because in turning away and 
fleeing, it is possible for Dasein to grasp “that in the face of which Dasein flees” - its 
Being.137 For Dasein to experience this “real” anxiety, there must be an existentiell 
modification of the “they” – of the “they” as an essential existentiale [a category of 
Being].” 138 As mentioned above, Dasein cannot be rid of the “they” since it structures 
Dasein’s everyday existence. Instead, the “they” must be existentielly modified: rather 
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than accepting the “they” as a mere fact of existence, Dasein must attain an 
understanding that the “they” affects its self-interpretation and therefore affects its own 
mode of Being. 139 The existentiell modification of the “they” is opened in the call of 
conscience, which is a mode of understanding that has a specific disclosing power. “[I]t 
calls Dasein forth (and ‘forward’) into its ownmost possibilities, as a summons to its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self.”140 The call summons Dasein and makes known 
to itself that it has forgotten itself in the lostness of the “they.”141 The call can only be 
summoned if Dasein feels Guilty and it is this Guilt that Dasein hears from the call of 
conscience (which is revealed through a mode of keeping silent).142 Being-guilty means 
that I have no basis, so I have to be the ground. The existential meaning of Being-guilty 
means that I have a sense of responsibility to take over my existence, which is null.143 
Dasein’s thrownness into the world that it did not choose thus suggests the facticity of 
responsibility. As Being-guilty, Dasein has an ontological responsibility to the possibility 
of the self.144 Dasein must assume its own facticity, something that it had not chosen to 
be. Ontologically, throwness is an understanding that there is something withheld or 
denied to my being – as thrown, I constantly lag behind (I constantly “find myself” thrown 
on a ground which I didn’t lay but is out of which I have to be) - I am released to myself 
but not through myself as something that I have to take over. The disclosure of 
thrownness in the call of conscience demonstrates that mineness is a primordial 
responsibility. Therefore, anxiety enables Dasein to become free “for the freedom of 
choosing itself and taking hold of itself” - the possibility of an authentic mode of Being is 
opened.145  
Because anxiety plays a crucial role in Dasein’s resistance against falling into the 
“they”, and by extension, to Dasein understanding of itself in its fullness as a ‘subject’, 
anxiety is an essential component of Heidegger’s construction of Dasein as a non-
subjective subject. More specifically, the tripartite structure of anxiety reveals Dasein as 
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factically existing as Being-in-the-world,146 as it discloses “[t]he fundamental ontological 
characteristics of …[Dasein which] are existentiality [projection of possibilities], facticity 
[thrownness], and Being-fallen [Falling]”, which, taken together, are the three 
equiprimordial structures of care .147 Existentiality means that Dasein understands that 
Being is an issue for it, and it must understand or self-project “Being towards its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being” - that I have to be.148 Because Dasein is always 
projected towards its ownmost possibilities, Dasein is always “Being-ahead-of-itself”, 
which characterizes Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.149 In other words, Dasein is ahead-of-
itself-in-already-being-in-a-world - thus Dasein is not an isolated, worldless ‘subject’, 
which holds together a ‘world’ of present-at-hand objects. Because Dasein’s possibilities 
are tied to the referential totality of relations in the world, “[e]xistentially is essentially 
determined by facticity”, the other structure of care.150 While I have provided a short 
description of how facticity may be defined, it more deeply explains that Dasein exists as 
a “thrown potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world, and also demonstrates that it is absorbed in 
the world” – it is that which I am as thrown in the world.151 Such an absorption into the 
world means that Dasein, as Being-alongside, falls (the last structure of care) and flees 
“in the face of uncanniness”, either explicitly or implicitly.152  
More deeply, care includes the phenomenon of Selfhood because it reveals that 
Dasein’s self-constancy is rooted in existence itself, rather than consciousness. To fully 
understand how the care-structure includes the phenomenon of Selfhood, the meaning 
of care must be interpreted.153 According to Heidegger, the meaning154 of authentic care 
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is temporality. Temporality, should not be understood as a series of successive ‘now 
moments’ - this understanding is derivative and inauthentic.155 Rather, temporality is the 
movement that brings about the Being of Dasein as Existence by integrating the three 
moments of care: existence (thrownness), projection (of possibilities), and falling, which 
are unified in Dasein’s experience of anxiety.156 Each moment of care corresponds to the 
three ekstases157 of temporality: the future, having-been (the past) and the Present.158 
When Dasein experiences a moment of anxiety, that in the face of which Dasein has 
anxiety is Being in the world as such (fallenness/the past); the about which of anxiety is 
Being in the world itself (facticity/the Present) ; and that which Dasein has anxiety about 
is its potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world (existentiality/future). By emphasizing the 
ekstases of temporality, Heidegger emphasizes that existence, which defines the 
‘subject’, is a standing outside-of-itself. Unlike the subjectum, there is no reflection or 
inwardness of consciousness that is required for Dasein to attain an understanding of 
the self. As Heidegger states,  
Temporality is the primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself… [t]emporality is not, 
prior to this, an entity which first emerges from itself; its essence is a process of 
temporalizing in the unity of the ecstasies.159  
 
Therefore, self-becoming is tied to the movement of temporality and as Being-
ahead of itself, Dasein’s self- constancy is rooted in a futural projection of anticipatory 
resoluteness, which makes possible the authentic Being of Dasein as a whole because 
“when taken formally and existentially, without our constantly designating its full 
structural content, [anticipatory resoluteness] is Being towards one’s ownmost, 
distinctive potentiality-for-Being.”160 Furthermore, the way in which Dasein can disclose 
its own possibilities to itself as its ownmost is through anxious running-ahead, which is 
authentic disclosedness. In this way, Dasein can exist as its own self, not a they-self 
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because Dasein is able to free itself from the “they” and exist in the face of its 
potentiality-for-Being. Dasein is futural because Dasein is able to come toward itself in 
the ahead that it already is.161 In other words, I understand that I am my possibilities and 
that these possibilities affect me because I am finite. This occurs when Dasein is 
authentically Being-towards-death and is thus anticipatory resolute, in that Dasein 
understands its Being-guilty.162 Alreadiness (or the past) is grounded in an 
understanding of thrownness, of my facticity which is apriori (an understanding of 
presupposed factical conditions that I found myself in) so what I retrieve in authentic 
temporality is the apriori of my thrownness - I can find myself because I find myself.163 
“Having” been” arises from the future since Dasein, as authentically futural, comes back 
to one’s ownmost “been.”164 The fact that I understand that I can do that makes manifest 
to me, for the first time, that I am falling, and I am brought back from the lostness in the 
“they.” The past is thus not a historical past (of events) that I retrieve. Further, 
anticipatory resoluteness discloses the Present (situation) of the “there”, as it allows 
Dasein to encounter entities (as Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand) by making them 
present, which is an encounter that allows a forward-backward movement of existence 
that turns Dasein toward entities, letting those entities be what they are.165 Therefore, 
anticipatory resoluteness, as a mode of the authenticity of care, contains Dasein’s 
primordial Self-constancy and totality.”166 The temporalizing structure of temporality is 
the historicality of Dasein, and as such, “Dasein is historical” in that it stretches back and 
forth between inauthentic and authentic modes of Being.167 History must be disclosed to 
Dasein in a primordial manner, as historicity (Geschichtlichkeit), which is a more 
concrete working out of temporality, as it outlines Dasein’s ‘stretching’ between birth and 
death. 
 Thus, the meaning of Being as temporality allows for a deeper understanding of 
Dasein’s inextricable link to the world (along Heidegger’s rejection of the subject-object 
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duality) because for Heidegger,”[t]he world is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand, 
but temporalizes itself with regard to its Being as temporality, Dasein “is”, with the 
“outside-of-itself” of the ecstases, ‘there’. If no Dasein exists, no world is ‘there’ either.”168 
The world is grounded in temporality since temporality discloses the “there”, or the world, 
which constitutes the unity of significance.169 Thus, contrary to Husserl, who argued that 
the wordless subject may exist, the subjectless world is not possible for Heidegger 
because the world and the ‘subject’, as Dasein, cannot exist independent of one 
another. While some may argue that Heidegger’s conception of the world is ‘subjective’ 
in the traditional sense because his explanation of the world is grounded in an individual 
Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, Heidegger states that the world is ‘subjective’ to each 
Dasein because Being is grounded in each Dasein’s own temporal transcendence.170 
“But in that case, this ‘subjective’ world, as one that is temporally transcendent, is ‘more 
Objective’ than any possible ‘Object’.”171 Furthermore, Heidegger’s concept of 
transcendence differs from epistemology’s definition of the term, which describes 
transcendence as a process by which the subject crosses over from an inner to outer 
sphere, presupposing an encapsulated self or immanent consciousness.172 For 
Heidegger, “[t]he ‘problem of transcendence’ cannot be brought round to the question of 
how a subject comes out to an Object, where the aggregate of Objects is identified with 
the idea of the world.”173 Such notions of immanence as self-closure obstructs the 
fundamental constitution of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, preserving the primacy of the 
subject as consciousness. Rather, transcendence should be understood as an ekstatic 
openness to Being (as a standing outside of itself via the three ekstases of temporality), 
which is based on a projection-structure in which Dasein understands itself in terms of a 
possibility to itself.174 This does not mean that Dasein ‘projects’ itself toward a future idea 
of a self that it wishes to be. Instead, transcendence must be understood as a relation to 
the self, as stretched toward itself though not stretched inward, as this would revert to 
the preservation of an immanent consciousness. This relation to the self is based on 
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Dasein’s potentiality for being “a potentiality which understands, and for which its own 
Being is an issue. But this potentiality-for-Being, as one which is in each case mine is 
free either for authenticity or for in authenticity, or for a mode in which neither of these 
has been differentiated.”175 Mineness means that Dasein understands itself in terms of a 
possibility, which is characterized by freedom “to choose oneself in one’s Being, or to 
flee oneself.”176 Therefore, freedom is not something that is decided by the subject, 
rather, “the very Being of the self lies in freedom.”177 Existence is based on Dasein’s 
ability to comport itself to its Being in a way that it understands (as an opening to Being), 
grounded in freedom, or a liberation of Being, which is transcendence.178  
Therefore, Heidegger approaches “I”-hood and Selfhood existentially because . 
“In saying “I”, Dasein expresses itself as Being-in-the-world.”179 And though the 
expression of “I” in everydayness is an expression of the they-self, which evades 
Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being, it still constitutes a part of Dasein’s self-
constancy because selfhood is not just based solely upon the authentic self.180 “The 
constancy of the Self … is the authentic counter-possibility to the non-Self-constancy 
which is characteristic of irresolute falling.”181 The self is not a present-at-hand thing.182 
The Being of the “I” can only be interpreted correctly if Dasein’s questioning is oriented 
toward the question of the meaning of the Being of the authentic potentiality-for-Being-
one’s-Self.183  
1.7. Conclusion 
Ultimately, Heidegger’s project in Being and Time unfolds a conception of 
‘subjectivity’ as one that is rooted in Dasein’s openness to Being, which is contrary to the 
Cartesian and Husserlian subject whose Being is based upon consciousness. 
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Heidegger’s approach is grounded in a general, neutral ontology, which rejects the 
subject-object dichotomy of the tradition, and along with that, the primacy of subject that 
defines consciousness as an Absolute. Anxiety, a spontaneous, ontic phenomenon, is 
an eternal part of human existence, as it plays a crucial role in disclosing the ontological 
whole of Dasein as authentic care, whose tripartite structure is comprised of existence, 
facticity, and falling. These three moments of care are not held together by the 
subjectum (consciousness) rather, the structural unity of care is brought together by the 
Being of the “I.  
In interpreting the care structure,  the meaning of Being as temporality is 
revealed. The temporalizing structure of temporality as futural, having-been, and 
Present, demonstrates that Dasein is historical insofar as it stretches between 
inauthentic and authentic modes of Being, which is rooted in Dasein’s transcendence as 
an ektatic openness to Being through its freedom towards its ownmost potentialities-for-
Being (in the world). Historicity is a more concrete working out of temporality. Thus, 
freedom and mineness are significant for Dasein’s self-constancy because regardless of 
which state Dasein is in, Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being is in each case mine and is free 
for authenticity, inauthenticity or a modally undifferentiated state.184 The self, for 
Heidegger, is existence not consciousness- Dasein is Being-in-the-world. Thus, 
Heidegger breaks from the traditional subjectum, which has sustained an ontology of 
Vorhandenheit. Fundamental ontology uncovers an understanding of Dasein’s 
inextricable relation to the world beyond Husserl’s notion of intentionality, which 
obscures ontological questioning. Therefore, subjectivity is not based on the immanence 
of consciousness of a worldless subject, nor in Husserl’s transcendental ego. For 
Heidegger, subjectivity is nonsubjective because it is not based on consciousness but is 
rather rooted in Being, in that Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence 
in its constant relationship in the world. As such, Being and Time represents a 
monumental departure from traditional formulations of subjectivity. Despite the 
compelling arguments that Heidegger makesxw, it is important to uncover whether or not 
remnants of the subjectum remain within the Existential Analytic of Dasein. Afterall, 
Heidegger himself had later recognized that his project in Being and Time was actually 
subjectivistic in the traditional sense, which later led him to “the turn” (die Kehre, which 
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focused on de-subjectivizing access to Being. 185 In the following Chapter, I attempt to 
locate consciousness in Heidegger’s concept of anxiety to argue that aspects of the 
subjectum remain within Heidegger’s Dasein.  
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Chapter 2. The Hidden Subjectum in Heidegger’s 
Concept of Anxiety 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Heidegger’s project in Being and Time 
problematizes traditional notions of subjectivity as the subjectum, where Being is based 
on substance and primacy is placed on the subject’s consciousness. Such traditional 
orientations seek to grasp objects in the world through a derivative, present-at-hand 
(vorhanden) perspective. Heidegger takes issue with the subsequent rise of the subject-
object dualism, the categorization of, and opposition between, subject and object, which 
has resulted in a forgetfulness of Being (Seinsvergessenheit) and ignores the ontological 
difference. Therefore, he constructs a radical conception of the subject as Dasein, 
highlighting the role of anxiety in disclosing Being as a whole to Dasein, which 
necessarily includes Dasein’s inextricable, primordial relation to the world. This 
primordial orientation is the ready-to-hand (zuhanden), which demonstrates a more 
engaged, holistic approach to Being. Thus, for Heidegger, the Self is not based on pure 
consciousness, as this covers over Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Rather, the Self 
requires transcendence, or an ekstatic openness to Being (as a standing outside of itself 
via the three ekstases of temporality), based on Dasein’s relation to itself. As such, the 
Self, or Dasein’s ‘essence’, is existence, which is rooted in the inauthentic or authentic 
way that Dasein interprets itself in its engagement with the world. Heidegger therefore 
emphasizes Dasein’s mineness (Jemeinigkeit) - that Dasein has two fundamental modes 
of Being-mine (of relating to myself): it has the possibility of ‘choosing’ to be either 
authentic (owning myself) or inauthentic (disowning myself), which is inextricably linked 
to its Being-in-the-world.186 Anxiety plays a crucial role in disclosing the structural totality 
of Being to Dasein as either inauthentic or authentic. In this modally undifferentiated 
state, Dasein loses an understanding of itself, yet it also opens Dasein up to a proper 
understanding of Being. As such, the disclosure of Dasein’s ontological and temporal 
whole necessitates a moment of anxiety. 
Fundamental to Heidegger’s discussion of anxiety is that anxiety individualizes 
Dasein, in that it discloses to Dasein that its Being is an issue that it alone must face. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, Heidegger asserts that this individualization does not isolate 
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Dasein as a worldless subjectum but rather, it discloses Dasein as Being-in-the-word, 
where Dasein’s essence, as Existence (not consciousness), may be discovered. In this 
chapter, I explore this claim more deeply and argue that Heidegger unintentionally 
incorporates aspects of the subjectum in his account of anxiety, which was passed over 
due to his protest against the tradition. More specifically, it is consciousness that 
remains an important characterization of Dasein. As such, Heidegger stays closer to the 
tradition than he would like to admit. I will begin by providing a deeper explanation of 
Heidegger’s position, again drawing upon Francois Raffoul’s interpretation of Dasein as 
a “non-subjective subject”. I will then explore Heidegger’s philosophical relationship to 
Søren Kierkegaard, whom the former had rejected due to the latter’s ontical theological 
approach to Being, which focuses on the inwardness of subjectivity/immanence of 
consciousness. Although Heidegger was quick to dismiss Kierkegaard on these 
grounds, by comparing their respective lines of thinking, I argue that remnants of 
Kierkegaardian inwardness may be found in Heidegger’s concept of Dasein. This has 
important consequences for the supposed radicality of Dasein, which was meant to 
deconstruct traditional philosophy.   
I further these findings by bringing in arguments made by Steven Crowell (2013) 
and Yaron Senderowicz’s (2011) who argue that first-person awareness or subjectivity, 
as consciousness, is specifically found in Heidegger’s concept of anxiety. In my analysis, 
I demonstrate that although Heidegger maintains aspects of the subjectum in his 
account of Dasein, he does not revert to a pure Cartesian cogito. Rather, he is closer to 
more modest accounts of Cartesian subjectivity, such as those outlined by Husserl and 
Kierkegaard, where the consciousness of the subject is prioritized. This paves the way to 
the discussion in Chapter 3, where I explore the consequences of Heidegger’s 
inadvertent incorporation of consciousness in his concept of Dasein, as a persistent 
individualism prevails.  
2.1. The Individualizing Nature of Anxiety  
According to Heidegger, “in anxiety, there lies the possibility of a disclosure 
which is quite distinctive; for anxiety individualizes.”187 In other words, it is Dasein alone 
who may experience a spontaneous moment of anxiety, which opens up the possibility 
 
187 Heidegger, 235. 
37 
of an authentic existence since Dasein, as Being-guilty, realizes that its thrownness and 
death is something that it alone must face.188 
 Crucial to this individuation is the “nothing” that is disclosed to Dasein in anxiety. 
As discussed above, that in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world as 
such.189 This is because when Dasein experiences a moment of anxiety, the significance 
of the world collapses, as it is no longer able to assign itself to any possibilities and 
Dasein is consequently unable to pinpoint that which is threatening. What threatens is 
nowhere and Dasein is further anxious about nothing ready-to-hand in the world.190  
Heidegger elaborates upon the “nothing” that is revealed in anxiety in his 1929 
essay entitled “What is Metaphysics?.” In this essay, Heidegger argues that because the 
question of Being is central to metaphysics, the question of the nothing, through which 
Being reveals itself, embraces the entirety of metaphysics. 191Furthermore, the nothing is 
what is “dark and riddlesome” about existence but it is also the source of Dasein’s 
openness to being.192 As such, Dasein feels uncanny in anxiety because Dasein finds 
itself alongside the “nothing and nowhere.”193 Uncanniness can also be understood as 
an existential ‘mode’ of not-being-at-home.194 When Dasein falls it “flee[s] into the “at-
home” of publicness, [it] flee[s] in the face of the “not at home.”195 Therefore, it is 
Dasein’s task to interpret uncanniness in a more primordial manner because in 
everydayness, Dasein “understands” uncanniness “by turning away from it in falling; in 
this turning-away, the “not-at-home” gets ‘dimmed down’.”196 The uncanniness that 
pursues Dasein in everydayness is therefore understood as a threat to Dasein’s lostness 
in the “they.” However, Heidegger asserts that uncanniness must be embraced since 
anxiety belongs to Dasein’s essential state of Being-in-the-world, which is existential and 
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“is itself always in a mode of factical Being-there.”197 Thus, anxiety is eternal to existence 
- it is always already there, though remains latent in everydayness. In Being-anxious, the 
world as world is disclosed primordially and directly to Dasein.198 As such, that which 
anxiety is anxious about is Being-in-the-world itself, which “individualizes Dasein for its 
ownmost Being-in-the-world.” Subsequently Dasein is disclosed to itself as Being-
possible, or Being-free for choosing itself and taking hold of itself.199 Further,  
[t]his individualization brings Dasein back from its falling and makes 
manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its 
Being. These basic possibilities of Dasein (and Dasein is in each case 
mine) show themselves in anxiety as they are in themselves – undisguised 
by entities within-the-world, to which, proximally and for the most part, 
Dasein clings.200 
This is why anxiety enables the existentiell modification of the “they” – Dasein 
understands that it has been interpreting itself as a passive, inauthentic they-self in 
everydayness and Dasein is now disclosed to itself as Being-possible.201 This openness 
to Being would not have occurred had Dasein not been subject to the “nothing” in 
anxiety. It is important to note, however, that not all instances of anxiety lead to an 
authentic mode of Being because Dasein may still fall and submit to the familiarity and 
tranquility of the “they.” 
The crucial role of the “nothing” in individualizing and disclosing Dasein as Being-
possible may further be illuminated by Heidegger’s distinction of anxiety from fear 
(Furcht). Fear, which is often conflated with anxiety, “has been characterized as an 
inauthentic state-of-mind.”202 “Fear is anxiety, fallen into the “world”, inauthentic, and, as 
such, hidden from itself.”203 A crucial difference between the two states-of-mind is that 
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fear is manifested by an expectation of threat from a particular entity within the world, 
whereas anxiety is manifested by a feeling of uncanniness where the “threat itself is 
indefinite.”204 This points to the significance of the “indefinite threat” of anxiety – Dasein 
is anxious about ‘nothing’. Although there is a “complete negation of the totality of 
beings,” 205 beings are not entirely annihilated because “the nothing makes itself known 
with beings and in beings expressly as a slipping away of the whole.” 206 The nothing is 
encountered “at one with” beings that are slipping away, which discloses these beings 
as a whole.207 Therefore, the breakdown of anxiety and the disclosure of the nothing is 
essential for Dasein to grasp the possibility of an authentic mode of Being, and Dasein 
must anticipate anxiety in order for authenticity to be disclosed as a possibility. However, 
in fear, there is no breakdown because Dasein “backs away [from a definite threat 
within-the-world] in bewilderment”, which is based upon a forgetting.208“[B]ecause 
[Dasein] forgets itself …[Dasein] does not take hold of any definite possibility”, and as 
such, there is no possibility of grasping an authentic mode of being.209 Thus, the 
ontological whole of Dasein cannot be disclosed in fear because the ‘nothing’ is not 
revealed to Dasein. Consequently, mineness is hidden from Dasein in fear because 
Dasein forgets itself and does not take on any possibilities. Fear does not allow for a true 
understanding of the Self because it does not operate to individualize Dasein.  
As I briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, while some may argue that the individuation 
Dasein experiences in anxiety isolates and causes Dasein to reflect inward, thereby 
reverting to a traditional form of subjecthood, Heidegger suggests otherwise. The 
individualizing function of anxiety is not meant to be understood to isolate Dasein 
because although “Dasein has been individualized, [Dasein is] individualized as Being-
in-the-world.”210 Further, in individualizing Dasein, anxiety  
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thus discloses [Dasein] as ‘solus ipse’. But this existential ‘solipsism’ is so 
far from the displacement of putting an isolated subject-Thing into the 
innocuous emptiness of a worldless occurring, that in an extreme sense 
what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with its world as world, 
and thus bring it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world.211  
Therefore, there is an emphasis on how anxiety discloses the Self to Dasein, which is 
tied to its engagement with entities within the world, as Being-in-the-world. It is for this 
reason that Raffoul argues that there is a non-subjective subjectivity that is presented in 
Heidegger’s work, as the subject (as Dasein) “represents the disclosedness of a world in 
which entities are uncovered” - thus subjectivity is not based on consciousness, rather, it 
is grounded in its inextricable relation with the world.212 Therefore, in his explanation of 
the individualizing nature of anxiety (through which Dasein is face to face with the 
‘nothing’), Raffoul, via Heidegger argues that the ‘isolation’ that Dasein comes up 
against in anxiety is one that isolates Dasein as Being-in-the-world, which provides an 
ekstatic opening to Being.213 The individualizing function of anxiety does not push 
Dasein into isolation as a detached “I”, completely blocked off from the world because 
there is a crucial difference between Being-alone, which involves a lack of the other, and 
Being-with, which is important for Dasein’s solicitous Being-with.214 In this regard, 
Heidegger intends to redefine existential solipsism. Rather than defining solipsism as the 
isolated, worldless, self-enclosed subject à la Descartes, Heidegger’s solipsism opens 
Dasein up to the totality of Beings.215 Therefore, in Being and Time, “[w]e are dealing 
with a completely unprecedented kind of solipsism, the concept of which unites isolation, 
individuation, and opening to others and to the world.”216 Heidegger’s solipsism is more 
fundamental than egoicity, as it is focused on a self that is prior to any ego.217 As such, 
mineness should be regarded as a primordial form of individuation, as a non-subjectivist 
interpretation of what is “mine.”218 This is why Heidegger focuses on the self as a more 
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‘neutral’ Selfhood, which is intended to refer to Being in general.219 Therefore, “[t]he 
radical individuation of the self is no longer related to some subjective or individual ego-
pole, but to Being itself (the self being singular only through Being).”220 For Heidegger, 
there is no first-person I, or pure Ego that is present in Dasein. Dasein’s Self-constancy 
is rooted in Dasein’s Being and its fundamental characteristics of mineness and 
existence, which are meant to produce a more primordial existential solipsism. 
Therefore, the ‘nothing’ of anxiety does not bring Dasein into isolation, rather, it functions 
to individualize Dasein as Being-in-the-world and to disclose its possibilities to itself. 
2.2. The Legacy of Kierkegaard in Heidegger’s Thought  
Although Heidegger presents a compelling argument to suggest that the 
individualizing nature of anxiety does not isolate Dasein, as it opens Dasein up to Being-
in-the-world, and is thus a more primordial solipsism that is prior to any Ego, a more in-
depth analysis is required to determine whether or not there are traces of the traditional 
subject in Heideggerian thought. This may be done by bringing in the thought of Søren 
Kierkegaard, as he emphasizes singularity and the inwardness of subjectivity in order to 
attain truth, which posits the existence of the traditional subject, at least in respect to the 
emphasis on consciousness. 221 Despite Heidegger’s contentious relationship with 
Kierkegaard, including his explicit denial of Kierkegaard’s influence on his work, Vincent 
McCarthy argues that  
Heidegger’s lectures in the period both before and immediately after Being 
and Time contain passing references to Kierkegaard which, despite their 
brevity and critical intent, indicate a substantial engagement with 
Kierkegaard up to and immediately after the publication of Being and 
Time.222 
If continuity can be discerned between Kierkegaard and Heidegger’s philosophies, a 
significant flaw of Heidegger’s concept of Dasein may be illuminated. It is therefore 
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important to unravel the points of difference and similarity between Heidegger and 
Kierkegaard to establish whether or not Heidegger succeeds in his complete rejection of 
the traditional subject or if traces of the subjectum, whose essence is consciousness (as 
Kierkegaardian inwardness) remains. In my analysis, I will specifically focus on the 
individualism that arises from Kierkegaards formulation of the subject, in which 
consciousness is presented as an Absolute.  
The most important distinction between Kierkegaard and Heidegger is that the 
former grounds his ideas in religious faith and the latter focuses more broadly on 
phenomenology, or simply, a description of “how things are.” Due to Kierkegaard’s 
religious/theological orientation, Heidegger argues that he remains on the ontic level, 
never truly reaching the ontological because Kierkegaard writes from a position within 
faith, which results in a positioning that resides outside of philosophy.223 It is thus not 
surprising that Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard in a dismissive manner in Being and 
Time and in one particular footnote, 224 which is cited in Heidegger’s section on anxiety, 
Heidegger states,  
[t]he man who has gone farthest in analyzing the phenomenon of anxiety-
and again in the theological context of a 'psychological' exposition of the 
problem of original sin-is Søren Kierkegaard.225 
By highlighting Kierkegaard’s merely theological exposition of anxiety, Heidegger 
criticizes Kierkegaard for his inadequate, existentiell approach. Despite this, Heidegger 
still finds theoretical merit in Kierkegaard’s account of anxiety, and it is for this reason 
that McCarthy argues that Heidegger’s interpretation of anxiety is highly influenced by 
Kierkegaard. 226 
At first glance, it may seem that Kierkegaard and Heidegger’s accounts of 
anxiety are highly dissimilar. Kierkegaard develops his notion of anxiety most fully in The 
Concept of Anxiety, first published in 1844, written under the pseudonym Vigilius 
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Haufniensis.227 In contrast to Heidegger, who does not pinpoint the source of anxiety, 
Kierkegaard describes anxiety as that which is born out of Christian Original Sin. Original 
Sin is the belief that humanity exists in a state of sin following the Fall of man, which 
stems from Adam and Eve’s consumption of the forbidden fruit from the Tree of 
Knowledge in the Garden of Eden. According to Kierkegaard, the sin that is produced 
after Adam’s Original Sin is hereditary sin, and it is this hereditary sin can be attributed 
to the emergence of anxiety; anxiety, therefore, stems from the Fall.228 
Further, Kierkegaard develops two types of anxiety, objective anxiety and 
subjective anxiety, in contrast to Heidegger who develops a single, generalized account. 
For Kierkegaard’s Haufniensis, objective anxiety is “the effect of this sin on the 
nonhuman aspect of life [Tilvaerelse].”229 It is the anxiety that is related to the sin of each 
generation in the world and with each successive generation, the magnitude of anxiety 
increases.230 Unlike Heidegger, then, anxiety is more quantifiable for Kierkegaard, in that 
its level of intensity increases with each generation. Because Heidegger’s 
phenomenological approach is oriented towards creating a description of how things are, 
not why things are, he does not account for any external categories to explain how 
anxiety may increase or decrease in potency, as it is merely a given fact of life for the 
individual Dasein.231  
While objective anxiety belongs to the sin of each generation, subjective anxiety 
directly belongs to the individual, highlighting Kierkegaard’s orientation to singularity, 
which, by extension, upholds the primacy of the subject as consciousness that is 
characteristic of the Cartesian cogito.232 Although Heidegger focuses on the individual 
Dasein’s experience of anxiety, his denunciation of traditional subjectivity is meant to 
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dismantle the individuality that Kierkegaard adheres to, which posits and maintains the 
subjectum as pure consciousness. According to Kierkegaard, subjective anxiety is “the 
dizziness of freedom that emerges when spirit [the self, or human being] wants to posit 
the synthesis, and freedom now looks down into its own possibility and then grabs hold 
of finiteness to support itself.”233 Subjective anxiety is individually motivated and 
necessitates the attainment of sin-consciousness, which has been repressed: the 
individual must attain a recognition that one is not innocent but is actually guilty of sin. 
Further, Kierkegaard argues that “[t]he more profound the [subjective] anxiety, the 
greater the human being,” again calling attention to the quantifiable aspect of anxiety.234 
The individual must take a qualitative leap into sin, through which one goes from 
possessing no sin, to possessing sin and subsequently becoming guilty and anxious.235 
Such guilt and anxiety are necessary characteristics for the individual to become a 
genuine self and it is for this reason that anxiety is “the instant in the individual life”, 
which opens up the possibility of freedom.236 Although Heidegger also ties anxiety to 
guilt and freedom, albeit defined in a non-religious, amoral manner, Dasein’s guilt is 
understood in its relation to Dasein’s ability to recognize nullity as the ground of its 
existence. In Being-Guilty, however, Dasein must be anticipatory resolute and anxious, 
in order to become free for its potentiality-for-Being either authentic or inauthentic. 
Heidegger also emphasizes a moment of vision (Augenblick), which explains how 
authentic understanding, or resoluteness is possible.237 As McCarthy argues, 
Heidegger’s moment of vision can be said to be influenced by Kierkegaard, though 
Heidegger dismisses Kierkegaard’s moment, as it is rooted in an erroneous concept of 
time therefore remaining within the existentiell rather than the existential.238 Instead, 
Heidegger’s moment of vision, which is reliant upon, and requires a moment of anxiety, 
opens up the possibility of the instant, which runs ahead and discloses what is factically 
possible at the time so that Dasein can authentically project itself.239 Consciousness is 
 
233 Kierkegaard, 75. 
234 Kierkegaard, 1870 
235 Kierkegaard, 97. 
236 Kierkegaard, 99. 
237 Heidegger, Being and Time, 376. 
238 See Heidegger, 338n2 for Heidegger’s critique of Kierkegaard in his explanation of the moment 
of vision. 
239 Heidegger, Being and Time, 443-444. 
45 
not said to play any role, as the moment of vision is an unpresenting that allows for 
Dasein to resist the publicness of falling.240 Further, the temporality of resoluteness has 
the character of the moment of vision insofar as Dasein’s existence in the moment 
temporalizes itself in a way that is fatefully whole, as the authentic historical constancy of 
the Self.241 Therefore, Kierkegaard stresses the singular subject by stressing the 
individual’s inwardness, thereby maintaining the existence of a wordless (Cartesian) 
subject, in contrast to Heidegger’s Dasein, which seeks to understand Being via 
Existence. 
Although written under a different pseudonym, similar themes of individuality, 
which align with the Cartesian subjectum as consciousness, emerge out of 
Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. In this text, Kierkegaard’s Johannes de Silentio, 
outlines three stages of life that one must pass through in order to reach the true self: 
the esthetic, ethical, and religious.242 These stages, specifically the move from the 
ethical to the religious, is explained through Kierkegaard’s  analysis on the Story of 
Abraham in the Book of Genesis, where Abraham is called upon by God to sacrifice his 
son Isaac. In order to reach the highest immediacy of the religious, a qualitative leap is 
required. However, transition from the ethical to the religious poses a contradiction that 
rouses anxiety within the individual. For Abraham, “[t]he ethical expression for what 
Abraham did is that he meant to murder Isaac; the religious expression is that he meant 
to sacrifice Isaac - but precisely in this contradiction is the anxiety that can make a 
person sleepless, and yet without this anxiety Abraham is not who he is.”243 Thus, 
anxiety is required for Abraham to reach the religious and to become a man of faith. 
Furthermore, there is emphasis on the single individual in the movement of infinite 
resignation, which is focused specifically on the individual and their movement to make a 
qualitative leap. According to Kierkegaard’s de Silentio, “one who has infinitely resigned 
is sufficient to oneself.” Therefore, anxiety emerges from the single individual positing 
themselves as higher than the ethical universal via faith – this is what he calls “the 
teleological suspension of the ethical” wherein Abraham acts by virtue of the absurd 
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(acknowledging the contradiction between the ethical and the religious), all in the name 
of faith .244 Thus, the notion of singularity is again highlighted by Kierkegaard’s de 
Silentio in Fear and Trembling. The individual alone, must attain consciousness of the 
self for the teleological suspension of the ethical, which allows for the movement of 
infinite resignation to take a qualitative leap of faith. This is in contrast to Heidegger, the 
consequent primacy that is placed on individual consciousness, as this passes over the 
ontological difference and does not allow for a genuine understanding of Being. 
Despite the differences in Kierkegaard and Heidegger’s accounts of anxiety, 
there are important similarities that must be emphasized and further investigated, as 
Heidegger’s account of anxiety closely resembles and mirrors Kierkegaard’s  
explanation of subjective anxiety.245Kierkegaard describes subjective anxiety as 
ambiguous, having both a sympathetic and antipathetic character: there is a sense of 
freedom that emerges from envisioning infinite possibilities, yet this is also accompanied 
by a sense of paralysis. Similarly, for Heidegger, anxiety, reveals what is “dark and 
riddlesome” about existence, yet it also incites a “peculiar calm”, and opens up the 
possibility of Dasein attaining freedom.246 In addition, subjective anxiety for Kierkegaard 
is an eternal part of individual existence (not just of humanity as it is in objective anxiety) 
because “[e]ven if there is no anxiety in spiritlessness, because it is excluded just as is 
spirit, anxiety is still present except that it is waiting.”247 It is always already there, just as 
it is for Heidegger’s Dasein, as “anxiety is always latent in Being-in-the-world.248 
Furthermore, while Kierkegaard establishes a connection between anxiety and 
the Fall from a theological standpoint, Heidegger similarly describes Dasein’s fallenness 
in Being and Time, albeit removed from religious context. As mentioned above, everyday 
Dasein falls into the familiarity and tranquility of the inauthentic “they”, thereby inhibiting 
the possibility of attaining an authentic mode of Being. However, Dasein’s fallenness is 
understood as a mere fact of life, which structures everyday human existence, in 
contrast to Kierkegaard, where the possibility of salvation from the fall is posited. 
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Dasein’s fallenness into the “they” may also be said to be influenced by Kierkegaard’s 
The Lily of the Field and the Birds of the Air, which was published under his own 
name.249 In this text, Kierkegaard argues that the individual must let go of earthy desires 
and must resist  the “idle chatter”  of everyday existence, also referred to as ”social 
talkativeness”, as this distracts the individual from attaining the inwardness that is 
necessary to develop an unconditional, obedient relationship to God. This requires 
silence that ultimately leads one to joy, where one has learned how to be completely 
present to oneself.250 This can be learned by considering the lilies of the field and the 
birds of the air, as they are silent, patient, present, obedient teachers.251Kierkegaard 
therefore alludes to a sort of default inauthenticity in everyday existence, which is 
paralleled in Heidegger’s account of the “they.”  
Kierkegaard and Heidegger’s use of fallenness to demonstrate the inauthenticity 
of everyday existence lead them both to outline a process by which such fallenness can 
be overcome. For both thinkers, it is the “nothing” that is revealed in a moment of anxiety 
that is crucial. According to McCarthy, Kierkegaard’s account of the “nothing” or 
objectlessness of anxiety demonstrates Kierkegaard’s deepest influence on 
Heidegger.252 The essence of anxiety for both thinkers is objectlessness – this nothing 
for Kierkegaard, is the metaphysical nothing out of which God created the world (ex 
nihilo), whereas for Heidegger, the “nothing” enables a recognition of how distracted one 
is with entities within the world, allowing for a disclosure of the self.253 Furthermore, 
[a]nxiety for both Kierkegaard and Heidegger is …an experience of the self 
at its limits, the disclosure that arises from the nothing at the edge of one’s 
being – an experience of (current) limits and of (unactualized) possibility.254  
For Kierkegaard, the nothing, or the experience of pure objectlessness brings the 
individual progressively closer to the genuine self. However, this necessitates sin-
consciousness, which involves an active acknowledgement and embrace of the 
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unpleasant, paralyzing attacks of anxiety.255 Thus, anxiety is directly produced by the 
individual, and consciousness, as self-awareness, is key.256 Similarly, the ‘nothing’ for 
Heidegger enables Dasein to attain an understanding of itself that is its own - that is 
authentic. This requires an understanding of its primordial integration within the world (as 
everydayness collapses and that which is absent (totality of Beings) becomes 
recognized), thereby giving rise to a more holistic, authentic understanding of the Self, 
tied to mineness. However, because the grasping of Being as one’s ownmost requires 
an ekstatic opening to Being for Dasein, sin-consciousness (as an inward, reflective form 
of subjectivity) is not present in Heidegger’s thought.  
While Heidegger maintains that the subjectum is absent in his account of anxiety, 
in contrast to Kierkegaard whose single individual requires conscious awareness of the 
self in relation to God, McCarthy suggests otherwise, in that both Heidegger and 
Kierkegaard rely on an inner mode of self-awareness in their respective accounts of 
anxiety. As mentioned above, subjective anxiety, for Kierkegaard, is produced by the 
individual through the acknowledgement of repressed sin-consciousness. Crucially, 
emphasis is placed upon inwardness, which Kierkegaard explains in relation to 
earnestness, defined as a sincere and intense conviction.257 Inwardness is pure 
subjectivity and constitutes the eternal of the human being. If inwardness is lacking, a 
bad infinity results, as spirit becomes infinitized.258 Therefore, inwardness constitutes an 
essential part of the individual’s existence. This supports the primacy of the subject (as 
consciousness) that is upheld in Cartesian thought. Even though McCarthy does not see 
a direct parallel of sin-consciousness in Heidegger, he states, “for Heidegger anxiety 
does trigger a consciousness, namely, of Dasein’s being lost in “the they” (Das Man).”259 
Not only is Heidegger closer to Kierkegaard than the former admits but Kierkegaardian 
inwardness remains an important aspect of Heidegger’s non-subjective subject, in that 
conscious self-awareness plays a key role in giving Dasein the ability to recognize that 
its everydayness is dominated by the “they.” Further, McCarthy explains that both share 
“the perception of an eeriness in the self-alienated person, of the conflict between 
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wanting to change one’s condition and wanting to have the condition continue” in order 
to reach a deeper nature.260 This necessitates a mode of self-awareness because as 
McCarthy writes, “[i]n his discussion of being-unto-death, Heidegger is really talking 
about the effects of anxiety upon self-awareness and self-actualization through the 
unsettling disclosure of personal transiency.”261 By reflecting Kierkegaard’s sin-
consciousness in Heidegger, McCarthy highlights Heidegger’s failure to completely 
separate from traditional notions of the self, in which subject is prioritized and is based 
on consciousness. 
2.3. Heidegger’s Reversion to the Subjectum 
While McCarthy outlines important parallels between Kierkegaard and 
Heidegger, he takes the subject in a similar self-evidential manner for both theorists. 
This is problematic because it fails to account for the complexity of Heidegger’s Dasein, 
where selfhood is neutral, in the sense that it refers to Being in general. This undermines 
the argument that Kierkegaardian inwardness exists in Heideggerian thought, therefore, 
a deeper analysis is required. Steven Crowell and Yaron Senderowicz are important to 
bring into this discussion, as they both highlight the hidden aspects of the subjectum in 
Heidegger’s Dasein, rendering Heideggerian philosophy to be entrapped within the 
traditional framework of Cartesian subjectivity, in which consciousness is emphasized. 
This is not to say that Heidegger’s reverts to a pure, Cartesian subject. Rather, Dasein is 
closer to formulations subject that preserve aspects of the cogito as outlined by 
Kierkegaard and Husserl. As mentioned above, Kierkegaard’s subject is similar to the 
Cartesian cogito in that consciousness is required to grasp a sense of self, though he 
differs from Decartes in his religious orientation. And while Husserl went beyond the 
isolated Cartesian subject by posting the subject as ego cogito cogitatum in his account 
of intentionality, consciousness remains a defining characteristic of the subject.  
In Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger, Steven Crowell 
argues that unbeknownst to Heidegger, Division II of Being and Time, which focuses on 
authenticity, is an account of subjectivity as Kierkegaardian inwardness, or first-person 
 
260 McCarthy, 112-113. 
261 McCarthy, 114. 
50 
self-awareness.262 According to Crowell, this traditional subjectum is discovered and 
made known to Dasein in a moment of anxiety because it is in this breakdown that 
Dasein is no longer able to act, or assign itself to possibilities, and “it becomes 
ontologically apparent how I can be a “towards-which” that has no further 
involvement.”263 Therefore, Dasein acknowledges its own self-awareness in anxiety. 
Crowell argues that the discovery of such self-awareness does not mean that Dasein 
finds itself alone or isolated - rather subjectivity is realized because the possibility for 
Dasein to act in light of the norms that are handed down by the “they” is opened.264 To 
act against the “they” means that I grasp myself by comparing myself against the 
standards that are set up by the “they.”265 Since the “they” structures Dasein’s everyday 
existence, then, Dasein conceives of itself as “anyone” and sees itself in third person 
terms in everydayness .266 And while anxiety opens up the possibility for Dasein to grasp 
authenticity, the authentic self is not where the first-person authority is found because 
the “they” persists and is an eternal part of Dasein’s existence and is merely existentielly 
modified, in that Dasein understands that the “they” affects its own interpretation of 
Being.267 Therefore, it is only in anxiety, or in Dasein’s modally undifferentiated state (as 
neither authentic nor inauthentic) that the first-person subjectivity, as consciousness, is 
found. In this regard, Crowell, like McCarthy, demonstrates that Kierkegaard’s subjective 
anxiety, which focuses on inwardness, permeates Heidegger’s account of Dasein. 
Whereas anxiety opens up the discovery of subjectivity for Dasein, Crowell 
argues that “Heidegger’s phenomenology of conscience (Gewissen) is an account of 
first-person self-awareness, or the “subjectivity of the subject.”268 Recall that for 
Heidegger, the call of conscience summons Dasein for its “ownmost potentiality-for-
Being-its-Self.” 269 In the call, Dasein makes itself known to itself and further attains an 
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understanding that it has forgotten itself by being lost in the “they” in everydayness.270 
The call can only be summoned if Dasein feels Guilty, which is what is heard in the call, 
disclosed as a mode of keeping silent when Dasein is uncanny.271 In Being-guilty, 
Dasein must take over the nullity of its existence as its responsibility and must 
consequently understand its finitude and own death. While Raffoul asserts that 
conscience doesn’t come from “me” but rather falls upon me because the call is non-
subjective, Crowell suggests otherwise, for two main reasons.272 First, “in grasping my 
Self (subjectivity), I do so in an immediate, non-criterial, and non-inferential way. I am 
not, in other words, aware of myself as anything; nevertheless, I can identify myself.” 
Even though Dasein is unable to assign itself to any possibilities because the 
significance of the world collapses in anxiety, Dasein remains - this means that self-
identification or self-awareness must exist, even though it is not explicitly mentioned by 
Heidegger. Therefore, there is a sense of inwardness that is implicitly revealed in 
grasping the Self. Second: “the lack of such identifying descriptions does not make the 
identification less, but rather more, certain. Conscience, as a kind of first-person self-
reference, infallibly picks out its referent.”273 For Crowell, then, the call of conscience 
necessities the existence of subjectivity because in hearing the call, it is only “I” who is 
addressed and as such, the question as to whom the call is addressed does not make 
sense.274 In this regard, there is self-identification in Heidegger’s explanation of anxiety, 
which suggests that like Kierkegaard, there is an individualistic component to 
Heidegger’s anxiety, even though it may not be produced directly by the individual. 
Furthermore, understanding one’s finitude and by extension, death as one’s ownmost 
possibility, is essentially different from understanding other concrete practical identities. 
275Therefore, hidden behind the neutral Selfhood that Heidegger posits, which intends to 
do away with the notion of subjectivity that focuses on consciousness, there exists first-
person subjectivity.  
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More deeply, Crowell argues that the first-person authority is given in 
Heidegger’s description of being-guilty, rooted in responsibility, whereby a person who 
was previously grounded in social norms, must now transform that ground into an 
obligation. It is the individual alone who must give grounds, or reasons, and it is this 
possibility of grounding as reason-giving where first-person authority is given.276  To 
recognize that these norms or grounds are mere “givens” is to understand them as 
possibilities. While for Heidegger, understanding these grounds as possibilities is 
freedom, Crowell asserts that freedom is the difference between the third-person and 
first-person.277 Therefore, “subjectivity, conscience as Kierkegaardian inwardness, is the 
hidden condition of the world as a space of meaning.”278 This meaning requires the 
capacity for reason, necessitating conscience as first-person subjectivity .279 Like 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger accepts subjectivity as truth because “apart from all practical 
identity … I am a being through whom obligation – that is, first of all, self-responsibility – 
enters the world.”280 It is the subject, alone, who must appropriate its own existence. 
Therefore, Crowell highlights the crucial role that the subjectum plays in Heidegger’s 
Being and Time and successfully confirms that there is a hidden Kierkegaardian 
inwardness in Heidegger’s Dasein.  
While Crowell demonstrates that the first-person subjectivity is discovered in 
anxiety, Yaron Senderowicz (2011) specifically focuses on the individualizing nature of 
Heidegger’s anxiety and critiques its ability to uncover a more primordial solipsism. 
Senderowicz problematizes Heidegger’s use of “individuation”, rendering it ambiguous 
and arguing that it is not enough to simply state that anxiety individualizes Dasein as its 
authentic ability to be.281 Instead, like Crowell, Senderowicz asserts that anxiety must be 
understood as a mode of self-awareness. However, a problem emerges from this 
assertion: how could self-awareness individualize the individual who is already aware of 
themselves?.282 The only way to explain this is to argue that Heidegger unintentionally 
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maintains aspects of the subjectum, that is, a subject that is characterized by 
consciousness, which maintains the primacy of the subject, in his work. Therefore, 
Senderowicz, like Crowell, argues that Heidegger continues to operate within the realm 
of the transcendental tradition, despite his rejection of the pure Ego, or I.283 
Because Senderowicz conceives of the Heideggerian subject as a by-product of 
the tradition, he compares and sees parallels between the role of Husserl’s pure ‘I’ and 
the role of anxiety in Heideggerian philosophy.284 However, like Heidegger, Senderowicz 
criticizes Husserl’s pure ‘I’ for being groundless because although intentionality focuses 
on an interaction between subject and object, it is the object that appears for subject, 
which asserts the primacy of the subject, thereby denying an active relationship between 
subject and object.285 The pure ego therefore “leaves everything in the world as it is”, 
positing the existence of the worldless subject and preserving the subject-object 
dichotomy, in which the priority of the subject is maintained.286 Senderowicz believes 
that Heidegger’s concept of anxiety is a response to the failure of Husserl’s 
groundlessness of the pure ‘I’, as the ‘nothing and nowhere’ of anxiety discloses a mode 
of practical self-awareness to Dasein.287 
Like Crowell, Senderowicz argues that there must be remnants of Kierkegaardian 
inwardness, as self-awareness or identity in Dasein’s grasp of the Self. Since Dasein is 
always what it is “not-yet”, as it is essentially being-possible, Dasein’s attitude toward 
itself is not something that ‘is there’, rather, “[t]his mode of awareness involves the 
capacity to represent oneself as the selfsame individual of a manifold of possibilities that 
await one’s own resoluteness.”288 Such a representation of the self remains the same 
whether Dasein is a they-self or an authentic self .289 Therefore, there must be 
something that binds the authentic self and they-self together, which necessitates the 
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existence of first-person subjectivity in Heidegger’s project. Thus, as Senderowicz 
states,  
Anxiety reveals nothing, neither objective-like property, nor subjective 
property. But it cannot separate and individuate without involving the 
awareness of one’s own self as being anxious; resoluteness is inexplicable 
without self-awareness of taking responsibility. This type of self-awareness 
tacitly involves the awareness of self identity required for the self-evidence 
of ‘I am.’ This does not entail that one’s individuality can merely be based 
on self-awareness. But it is questionable whether selfhood and self-
awareness are possible without involving the binding function of the ‘I’.290 
Therefore, Heidegger’s account of anxiety involves self-awareness of one’s identity, 
which results in a failure to fully reject the subjectum.291 
2.4. Conclusion 
By tracing the legacy of Kierkegaard’s inwardness on Heidegger’s concept of 
anxiety, I have demonstrated that there are remnants of the traditional subject within 
Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, mainly that consciousness remains crucial to Dasein as 
subject. This is further emphasized by both Crowell and Senderowicz, who provide 
separate, though similar accounts of Heidegger’s inability to completely separate from 
the tradition by highlighting Heidegger’s inadvertent incorporation of the subjectum in 
anxiety. In doing so, they both underscore a significant limitation of Heidegger’s 
philosophy, in that he reverts back to and is even dependent upon an immanence of 
consciousness in order to fully elaborate upon the ‘radical’ subjectivity of Dasein, since 
anxiety, where inwardness is located, is necessary for Dasein to attain an authentic 
mode of being, and by extension, Being as a whole. In highlighting this flaw, both 
uncover a moment in which Dasein exists as an isolated subject. While Dasein seems to 
overcome such isolation in its concernful engagement with objects such as tools, such 
isolation persists in Dasein’s Being-with (others). This counters Heidegger’s, and by 
extension, Raffoul’s assertion that a more primordial existential solipsism exists in Being 
and Time. Thus, Raffoul’s claim that Heidegger outlines a nonsubjective subjectivity is 
inadequate due to the discovery of consciousness in Dasein’s experience of anxiety. As 
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such, Heidegger inadvertently preserves consciousness as a characteristic of the 
subject as Dasein.  
56 
Chapter 3. The False Concreteness of 
Heideggerian Anxiety  
3.1. Introduction  
In analyzing Heidegger’s concept of anxiety more deeply, I have uncovered 
consciousness as a characteristic of Dasein, and as such, I have provided evidence of 
Heidegger’s inability to properly deconstruct the philosophical tradition. Theorists such 
as Guenther Anders and Theodor Adorno have already critiqued Heideggerian 
philosophy for its failure to abandon the tradition, as they both argue that Heidegger’s 
thought reverts to an abstract, individualistic ontology akin to the tradition of 
transcendental idealism. Consequently, they both label Heideggerian philosophy as 
falsely or pseudo-concrete, arguing that it fails to account for the socio-historical material 
conditions that Dasein finds itself in, which ignores the dialectic relationship between 
subject and object. While both make this compelling argument, the role of anxiety has 
not been at the forefront of their respective critiques. In this chapter, I further underscore 
the false concreteness of Heidegger’s thought, specifically focusing on the 
consequences of Heidegger’s dependence on consciousness in his account of anxiety, 
which, as Anders and Adorno claim, reduces his project to an abstract, individual 
ontology. As such, while Heidegger demonstrates that Dasein overcomes isolation in the 
breakdown of its concernful engagement with objects such as tools (which reveals that 
Dasein is always already engaged in an on-going task), he does not fully succeed in 
doing so in his account of Being-with, since Dasein’s self-understanding is dependent 
upon a moment of anxiety, which requires inwardness and consciousness of the “I” in 
order to existentielly modify the “they.” My critique will be rooted in Heidegger’s 
inadequate definition of history, as the more primordial, historicity, which is confined to 
temporal Dasein’s movement between birth and death, as it oscillates between 
inauthentic and authentic modes of Being. I emphasize the fact that for Heidegger, 
anxiety plays a strictly ontological historical role because Dasein’s understanding of its 
historicity is dependent upon its self-disclosure of Being as a whole, which may only be 
opened in anxiety. Consequently, Heidegger passes over Marx’s materialist conception 
of history, where the foundation of society is understood to be constructed and 
maintained by systems of material production and reproduction, through which social 
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relations, such as human activity and social change, arise.292 As such, the material 
conditions, produced by humans, which may produce anxiety-inducing conditions for 
Dasein is ignored by Heidegger. These conditions are merely understood to constitute 
Dasein’s thrownness and facticity, which are always, already there. In doing so, 
Heidegger accepts the (social) world as an a priori, which elides the important fact that 
human activity plays a role in creating and sustaining the structures of the objective 
world (which are maintained by the “they”) and vice versa. In other words, the key 
historical dialectical relationship between subject and object is ignored because the 
subject, as Dasein, is not said to have any role in creating object. As such, individual 
Dasein is merely meant to assume and take over the pre-existing conditions of the 
objective world, rendering Dasein as a powerless entity, as it does not have any power 
in transforming or creating socio-historical material conditions. Not only does this create 
an abstract, individualistic ontology, but it sustains a moderate form of the Cartesian 
subject-object dichotomy since Dasein is not said to have any role in creating the object. 
Dasein must merely ‘assume’ or ‘take over’ its factical conditions, where Dasein does 
not play a role in creation of objective world. Heidegger’s project is thus extremely 
limited, insofar as it maintains an individualistic outlook.  
3.2. Heidegger’s Conception of Historicity 
(Geschichlichkeit)  
According to Heidegger, history must be understood in a primordial manner 
which means disclosed to Dasein as historicity (Geschichtlichkeit).293 Unlike other 
sciences that Heidegger rejects, historiology, the science of history, is valued because it 
is historicity - it is an existential science and is thus part of the Existential Analytic of 
Dasein.294 The existential source of historiology must be discovered by Dasein, which 
means that Dasein must also be historically disclosive. As such,   
historiology – or more precisely historicity – is possible as a kind of Being 
which the existing Dasein may possess, only because historicality is a 
determining characteristic for Dasein in the very basis of its Being. If this 
historicality remains hidden from Dasein, and as long as it so remains, 
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Dasein is also denied the possibility of historiological inquiry or the 
discovery of history.295 
Because Dasein’s everyday existence is dictated by the “they”, Dasein cannot 
grasp a proper understanding of historicity in everydayness. Instead, Dasein falls and 
understands history from the standpoint of the world-historical, as mere present-at-hand 
entities encountered within the world.296 Often, such an inauthentic understanding of 
history arises from four common misunderstandings of history. First, history as that 
which constitutes the past, or an earlier time, which is no longer present-at-hand or is 
still present-at-hand and does or does not have an effect on the present; second, history 
as a becoming where the future is determined in relation to the present (where history is 
comprised of and understood in relation to a context of events); third, history as a totality 
of entities that transform “in time”, with emphasis on humans and culture (as distinct 
from nature), which is not a happening but rather exists in the realm of entities, and 
finally, history as whatever has been handed down, and has been designated as 
“historical”, from the tradition.297 While these four definitions of history are inadequate for 
Heidegger, he highlights how they relate based on the fact that, in each case, Dasein is 
understood as the ‘subject of events’, which no longer exists, but not in the past, rather 
ontologically, as a “having-been-there” [da-gewesen].298 Dasein’s having-been-there can 
only be understood on the basis of its “coming-to-pass”, its historizing or factical 
happening (Geschehen).299 Thus, for Heidegger,  
The historizing of history is the historizing of Being-in-the-world. Dasein’s 
historicality is essentially the historicality of the world, which, on the basis 
of ecstatico-horizontal temporality, belong to the temporalizing of that 
temporality. In so far as Dasein exists factically, it already encounters that 
which has been discovered within-the-world. With the existence of 
historical Being-in-the-world, what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-
hand have already, in every case, been incorporated into the history of the 
world.300 
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Since the disclosure of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world is necessary to attain this 
primordial understanding of history, anxiety play a crucial role in opening such an 
understanding up to Dasein because anxiety opens Dasein up to the basic structural 
whole of Being as care, and ultimately, the meaning of Being as temporality. Therefore, 
anxiety plays a historical role (albeit an ontologically historical role) for Heidegger since it 
allows for Dasein’s discovery of historicity.  
This is further emphasized by the fact that history, for Heidegger, is related to 
Dasein’s Being-a-whole that is, in how Dasein stretches along between birth and death. 
This stretching along of factical Dasein (where this stretching is also understood as 
Dasein’s happening “in time”, also known as Dasein’s historizing), may be understood in 
relation to temporality, which can only be grasped once Dasein experiences anxiety, 
since anxiety also reveals Dasein’s finitude and Being-toward-death.301 Therefore, 
Dasein’s historicality is “just a more concrete working out of temporality” because to exist 
historically means to be able to take over the Situation (or factical ‘there’) by going back  
‘before’ my thrown existence and to go ‘beyond’ my death, so that I can deliver factical 
possibilities to myself and project them as possibilities to be taken over by others.302 The 
existential structure of Dasein’s factical happening is historicity, and it is historicity that 
explains how Dasein is historical and how Dasein can have history.303 History, for 
Heidegger, must only be understood in this ontological manner. 
Dasein’s primordial historizing, or in other words, Dasein’s authentic historicity is 
grounded in fate [Schicksals].304 Fate is Dasein’s authentic happening, where Dasein 
chooses its inherited Situation (the factical “there” that Dasein has taken over), which is 
not self-made, or imposed by another power, but is rather willingly chosen.305  
Fate is that powerless superior power which puts itself in readiness for 
adversities – the power of projecting oneself upon one’s own Being-guilty, 
and of doing so reticently, with readiness for anxiety. As such, fate requires 
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as the ontological condition for its possibility, the state of Being of care – 
that is to say, temporality.306  
Destiny [Geschick] is similar to fate but it is understood as the authentic 
happening of a larger group, or a community, which Dasein is part of.307 This is because 
“if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, its 
historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny [Geschick].308 Destiny 
is not merely the sum of individual fates, rather, it is guided in advance by Being-
together, where possibilities are handed down by the “they” to a people or a community, 
and it is this that makes up the full historizing of singular Dasein, where Dasein is not 
fully authentic until it belongs to a community.309 For Heidegger, “[o]nly in communicating 
and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein’s fateful destiny in and 
with its ‘generation’ goes to make up the full authentic historicizing of Dasein.”310 
Regardless, what is of utmost importance to underscore, is the fact that anxiety is 
Dasein’s entryway into its disclosure of historicity, and as such anxiety plays an 
ontological historical role in Heidegger’s project. 
3.3. A Materialist Critique of Heideggerian Historicity 
Because historicity is confined to the individual Dasein’s stretching between birth 
and death, the historical role of anxiety is limited to singular Dasein’s ontology, which 
more broadly ignores the concrete, material, social conditions that Dasein finds itself in. 
Furthermore, consciousness of social being is ignored, since Heidegger disregards 
consciousness altogether. However, this does not necessarily mean that Heidegger 
completely ignores socio-historical circumstances. He does acknowledge thrownness, or 
the world in which Dasein has been thrown into, as well as Dasein’s facticity, as thrown 
Dasein exists in a world where facts, such as entities (that constitute social meaning) 
matter for it.311 Further, Heidegger points to the significance of Dasein’s destiny as a co-
historicizing in its Being-together with others, which emphasizes social community. In 
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addition, material reality (and the specific social norms that are borne out of it) may be 
reflected by the constitution of the “they” and the norms that it produces. 
While Heidegger acknowledges the above social aspects of Dasein’s existence, 
his purely ontological definition of history falls short, as he does not fully consider how 
material reality influences and is influenced by Dasein. In other words, Heidegger 
dismisses Marx’s materialist conception of history, which 
explains the formation of ideas from material practice[;]…[and further 
explains] that all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved 
by mental criticism, by resolution into “self-consciousness” … but only by 
the practical overthrow of the actual social relations which gave rise to this 
idealistic humbug; that not criticism but revolution is the driving force of 
history.312 
As such, Heidegger does not consider the role of material production and reproduction 
on consciousness. Moreover, he does not consider how anxiety may be tied to 
consciousness and how it may be historically specific. Specifically, Heidegger does not 
discuss how the material circumstances that are unique to a historical epoch may 
influence Dasein’s experience of anxiety. This further leads to the question of whether or 
not anxiety is an eternal characteristic of human existence. By extension, Heidegger 
does not discuss how the norms that the “they” produce and maintain may vary 
depending upon the specific socio-historical conditions that Dasein finds itself in. This is 
because Dasein is understood to merely inherit possibilities that are handed or passed 
down by the “they”, where Dasein does not have control over creating such possibilities 
because Dasein must assume its thrownness by ‘taking over’ the factical “there” (or 
Situation), thereby maintaining existing societal conditions.313 And as mentioned above, 
Dasein’s fate means that Dasein willingly chooses its Situation, which is something that 
exists as an a priori and is neither self-made nor imposed upon Dasein by another 
power. Moreover, even though Heidegger stresses the importance of Dasein’s destiny, 
or authentic happening of the community, his discussion lacks depth, as he does not 
consider how cultural or social factors may affect the type of community that Dasein is 
“thrown” into. Consequently, Heidegger breaks the important dialectical relationship 
between subject and object, in the sense that Dasein’s Being-with does not overcome 
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the isolation of Dasein as subject, since Dasein is not said to influence the creation or 
transformation of objective material conditions maintained by the “they” . 
3.3.1. Heidegger’s False concreteness: Ahistorical Historicity 
Guenther Anders and Theodor W. Adorno have already critiqued Heidegger for 
the claims that I have made above: that Heideggerian philosophy is deficient due to its 
dismissal of Marx’s historical materialism, which consequently entraps Heidegger’s 
thought within the tradition that he purports to desert. More specifically, they claim that 
Heideggerian philosophy gives rise to an abstract, individualistic ontology that falls prey 
to Kierkegaardian inwardness. As a result, they both label Heidegger’s thinking as 
pseudo-concrete, as it is removed from material reality, and fails to account for the 
influence of socio-historical circumstances within which Dasein is located. Franz 
Neumann also uses the term ‘false concreteness’314 to define a historical situation that is 
misunderstood (also known as a ‘conspiracy theory of history’) in his social and 
psychoanalytic discussion of anxiety and its role in politics.315 Furthermore, Anders and 
Adorno both underscore the fact that while Marx, like Heidegger, argues that “[i]t is not 
the consciousness of men that determines their being”, what Heidegger fails to 
understand is that “social being .. determines [one’s] consciousness.” 316 This is due to 
Heidegger’s stubborn protest against, and separation from, the philosophy of 
consciousness of Descartes and his descendants, which would signify a return to the 
subjectivity of the transcendental tradition. What Anders and Adorno highlight is the fact 
that Heideggerian philosophy paradoxically remains entangled within this tradition, as 
they both call attention to Heidegger’s mistaken acceptance of the world as an a priori. 
This consequently results in the idea that Dasein must merely appropriate its own thrown 
existence within the existing circumstances of society, as Heidegger does not consider 
how historically specific social circumstances influence Dasein. This results in an 
individualistic ontology that does not have any emancipatory potential, as Heidegger’s 
neutral approach to the Self and Being results in a powerless, amoral, apolitical, socially 
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unaware Dasein who is unable to meaningfully create social change, because such 
matters remain on the ontic level.  
Anders calls attention to the individualistic orientation of Heideggerian philosophy 
by highlighting the fact that, “only [Dasein’s own] history … [is] recognize[d] [as] … 
history” – that is, Dasein’s oscillation between authentic and inauthentic modes of 
being.317 Consequently, “history imposed upon people, is totally suppressed.”318 This 
again demonstrates how Heidegger erroneously accepts the material socio-historical 
conditions of society as an a priori.319 Consequently, Anders considers Heidegger’s 
thought to be a “[p]hilosophy of life hostile to life.”320 Dasein is isolated from society and 
is damned to eternal misery because socially constructed norms are merely understood 
to be “there”, that is, extrahumanly created and sustained and is something that Dasein 
must merely assume and take over without critique or interrogation.321 Therefore, a 
moderate version of the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy persists in Heidegger’s 
concept of Dasein as subject, insofar as Dasein succumbs to a form of isolation, as it is 
understood to be separate from the creation of the objective, material world.  
Anders further calls attention to the powerlessness of Dasein by illuminating the 
fact that for Dasein, it is impossible to overcome the “they”, since the “they” belongs to 
Dasein’s positive constitution and must merely be existentielly modified. As a result, “life 
itself [is presented] as a sort of suicide. By voluntarily and incessantly shouldering its 
death, Heidegger’s “existence” commits lifelong suicide, a pitiful death.”322 The possibility 
of changing the world is completely blocked off - Dasein has no control over objective 
societal conditions.323 As a result, ““Dasein” does not know how to master this world, 
although it is man-made.”324 . As mentioned above, Heidegger does seem to overcome 
the isolation of the Dasein in his account of the Dasein’s engagement with objects of 
concern, since Dasein is always already engaged in an ongoing task with such entities. 
 
317 Anders, “Pseudo-Concreteness”, 359.  
318 Anders, 230.  
319 Anders, 359-360. 
320 Anders, 362 emphasis removed.  
321 Anders, 365.  
322 Anders, 355.  
323 Anders, 365. 
324 Anders, 360. 
64 
However, Anders demonstrates that this is not the case for Dasein’s engagement with 
the “they”, because the “they” must be merely existentielly modified. This arrests the 
dialectical relationship between subject and object and preserves an individualistic 
orientation. More deeply, Anders argues that Heidegger fails to account for the fact that 
the embodied subject is hungry - it wants and depends upon the world and therefore has 
an essential impact on the objective world, which is created by humans, influences 
humans, and can be transformed by humans. Therefore, Heidegger’s purely ontological 
definition of history is ahistorical in comparison to the materialist counterpart, since it 
merely focuses on singular Dasein’s historicity, which conflates history with ontology.325 
This ultimately ignores how material production influences the social aspects of thrown 
Dasein’s existence. 
Despite Heidegger’s attempt to overcome the isolation that persists in traditional 
forms of subjectivity, he fails to account for the influence that the subject as Dasein, has 
on the conditions of objective society and vice-versa. Like Kierkegaard, he ends up 
“focusing only on the influence of the crisis of the individual” because Dasein “still suffers 
from the Christian bad conscience”, which necessitates a mode of consciousness that is 
directed inward.326 Consequently, the object is erroneously understood to be produced 
and maintained independently of subject, which actually has played a crucial role in the 
creation of object. 
The false concreteness of Heidegger’s philosophy, rooted in Heidegger’s 
defective concept of history, is further problematized by Adorno. In “The Idea of Natural 
History”, Adorno argues that post-Husserlian ontology, including Heidegger’s Being and 
Time, have erased the essential antithesis between Being and history.327 This is 
because  
[t]he question of being no longer has the significance of the Platonic 
question of the extent of the static and qualitatively different ideas that 
stand in contrast to the existing, the empirical, in a normative relationship 
or in a relationship of tension. Rather, the tension disappears; the existing 
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itself becomes meaning and a grounding of being beyond history is 
replaced by a project (Entwurf) of being as historicity328  
The reduction of history to historicity, which is an essential component of Dasein’s 
existence, again equates ontology with history, and merely emphasizes the individual 
experience of a socio-historical epoch, overlooking the actual, material circumstances 
that we find ourselves within and that are produced by human activity329. As such, “[t]he 
problem of historical contingency cannot be mastered by the category of historicity”, as 
the facticity of historical events (i.e. the French Revolution) do not fit into an ontological 
category and merely become defined as an “accidental” phenomenon.330 Therefore, 
according to Adorno, historicity is nothing more than a subjective category, where “Being 
is to conform to the categories with which historicity stamps it.”331 Again, this draws 
attention to the fact that the world is taken as an a priori for Heidegger, which 
erroneously reinforces the separation of subject and object and further renders Dasein 
as a helpless entity in the face of socio-historical circumstances, which it must merely 
‘take-over’.332 This leads to a failure to acknowledge that Dasein has played a role in 
creating (producing) and perpetuating specific socio-historical circumstances and that 
such conditions can be changed. Furthermore, Heidegger’s project as a hermeneutic 
circle can only be clarified through identity thinking, which is “a new camouflage of the 
old classical thesis of subject and object.333 Marx has already made similar claims. He 
states,  
[Humans] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they 
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, 
but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from 
the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare 
on the brain of the living.334 
While Marx seems to point to the importance of acknowledging one’s thrown existence, 
or facticity that must be assumed by Dasein, Marx ultimately recognizes that production 
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“not only creates an object for the subject, but also a subject for the object.”335 Marx, like 
Adorno (and Anders), focuses on the restoration of the dialectical relationship between 
subject and object, which is lost in Heideggerian thought because historicity is ultimately 
“a produce of, and internally related to, the starting point of the idealist ratio.”336 
Heidegger’s philosophy is entrapped within the traditional framework that is focused on 
the subjectum. Andrew Feenberg makes a similar claim: 
Heidegger’s Dasein has no concrete social identity despite the attempt to 
fill it out with traditional and national content at the end of Being and Time. 
In this respect it is as abstract as the cogito it replaces.337 
Not only does Adorno problematize Heidegger’s conflation of history with 
ontology, but he goes further and directly pinpoints the problematic historical process 
that continue to separate subject from object. 338 For Adorno, the lost dialectic 
relationship between subject and object is a consequence of the domination of exchange 
value, as reification (thingification), a process through which society as a whole becomes 
treated as a commodity: as abstract, identical, timeless, and knowable entities. 339 
Subsequently, subject gains primacy because “[o]nce radically separated from the 
object, subject reduces the object to itself, subject swallows object, forgetting how much 
it is object itself.”340 This leads Adorno to the assertion that it is necessary to restore the 
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primacy of the object.341 As such, contrary to Husserl, Adorno believes that object can 
exist without subject, but not vice versa.342 Asserting the primacy of the object would re-
establish the dialectical relationship between subject and object because object would 
no longer be understood as opposed to subject. For Adorno, this allows for the 
emergence of the non-identical, which can only occur from a standpoint of non-idealist 
dialectics, and ultimately uncovers the necessary antithesis between the universal and 
particular.343 This is a fundamental weakness that he sees in Heidegger’s project in 
Being and Time and further undermines Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.  
Furthermore, in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno attribute the 
lost dialectical relationship between subject and object to the Enlightenment and the 
human desire to manipulate and control nature, which has resulted in a highly 
rationalized and calculable society devoid of meaning.344 Scientific thought “aimed at 
liberating human being from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the wholly 
enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity.”345 While the Enlightenment was 
supposed to free individuals, it now rules over everyone and everything. We are 
entrapped in a Weberian Iron Cage, subject to the rigid, scientific ‘laws’ of society. 
Consequently, humans are transformed into abstractions and the self is eradicated.346 
The subject maintains its separation from object; a slave to the objective ‘laws’ of 
society. Horkeheimer and Adorno thus highlight the social circumstances that preserves 
the isolation of the subject from object, which Heidegger failed to grasp. 
3.3.2. Anxiety as an Existential Value 
As mentioned above, anxiety plays a strictly ontological historical role for 
Heidegger, as it focuses on the individual Dasein’s openness to Being. Adorno further 
criticizes Heidegger’s understanding of anxiety from a purely ontological standpoint in 
The Jargon of Authenticity, which was meant to be a chapter in Adorno’s Negative 
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Dialectics. First published in 1973, this text served as an extension of Adorno’s short 
essay “On Kierkegaard’s Doctrine of Love.” In his remarks against Kierkegaard’s Works 
of Love, Adorno charges Kierkegaard for asserting that subjectivity is truth and for 
regarding love as pure inwardness.347 This results in an abstract, object-less, notion of 
love that denies its reified character.348 Again, the forgotten dialectical relationship 
between subject and object is highlighted by Adorno. Kierkegaard therefore falls prey to 
an idealistic objectivism, which loses the historical element of the subject. Adorno 
expands upon these claims that are made against Kierkegaard in The Jargon, In this 
text, Adorno reflects Marx’s critique of German Idealism more broadly to German 
existentialism. Similar to Marx’s attack on the Young Hegelians for believing that 
consciousness and abstract ideas have an independent existence that has the power to 
shape society, Adorno charges German existentialists for creating a jargon where words 
become laced with an aura that exaggerates and concretizes language, failing to 
consider the role of history 349 Adorno underscores that “[t]he dialectic is broken off: the 
dialectic between word and thing as well as the dialectic, within language, between the 
individual words and their relations. Without judgment, without having been thought, the 
word is to leave its meaning behind.”350 Such existential jargon depletes the mediation of 
language through subject, resulting in a false concreteness.351 Consequently, German 
philosophers such as Heidegger bombastically inflate specific words such as anxiety, 
which become fetishized and transformed into “existential values.” For Adorno, 
[a]ngst, busily distinguished from innerworldly, empirical fear, need by no 
means be an existential value. Since it is historical, it appears in fact that 
those who are yoked into a society which is societized, but contradictory to 
the deepest core, constantly feel threatened by what sustains them. They 
feel threatened without ever being able in specific instances to concretize 
this threat from the whole of society.352 
As such, the historical specificity of anxiety is lost in Heidegger’s ontological description 
of the term, which fails to account for the concrete, material conditions that influence and 
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are influenced by the subject’s experience of anxiety. Instead, anxiety, as an existential 
value, becomes treated and fixed as an Absolute, that is, as a necessary and eternal 
part of existence.353 The emergence and persistence of concepts such as anxiety into an 
existential value is an expression of what Adorno terms the “ontological need” in 
Negative Dialectics. The ontological need’s  
most urgent need today appears to be the need for something solid. This 
need inspires the ontology; it is what they adjust to. Its right lies in the will 
of people to be safe from being buried by a historical dynamics they feel 
helpless against. The immovable is to conserve the old and condemned. 
The more hopeless this longing, blocked by the extant forms of society, the 
more irresistible the trend of desperate self-preservation to a philosophy 
that is to be both in one: desperate and self preserving354  
Again, Adorno calls attention to how transcendental idealism is preserved in Heidegger’s 
ontology, as the need for solidity preserves abstract philosophical Absolutes, such as 
anxiety as an existential value. 
Because Heidegger remains entangled within transcendental philosophy, which 
recoils into abstraction, he does not pinpoint how material reality may affect Dasein’s 
experience of anxiety. This is because Heidegger’s phenomenological orientation “does 
not allow the introduction of any external categories that try to explain why things are the 
way they are and that might thus influence the perception and interpretation of how 
things are.”355 He fails to understand that  
 [l]anguage is as old as consciousness, language is practical, real 
consciousness that exists for other men as well, and only therefore does it 
also exist for me; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, 
the necessity of intercourse with other men.356  
Without this recognition, the jargon, which includes anxiety as an existential value, 
remains completely subjectivistic.357 Not only is there a lack of discussion of how anxiety 
may be induced by objective social conditions, but Heidegger also demonstrates that it is 
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impossible to overcome anxiety, as it is always already there for Dasein, either latent or 
real - it remains an Absolute. 
Like Anders then, Adorno asserts that Heidegger’s individualistic orientation 
produces an abstract ontology that is “filled with disdainful inwardness” because “nothing 
more is hidden than the fact that Dasein is consciousness.”358 It is this inwardness that 
has contributed to the perpetuation of reification and has also maintained a form of 
individualism wherein the subject paradoxically becomes systemically disempowered. 
This is because critiques against inwardness have pushed it into abstraction and the 
more abstract inwardness has become, the greater the “temptation for inwardness to 
proclaim itself and through itself onto the same market by which it is terrified.”359 As 
Horkheimer and Adorno further highlight in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, “[w]hat 
appears as the triumph of subjectivity, the subjection of all existing things to logical 
formalism is brought with the obedient subordination of reason to what is immediately at 
hand.”360 The advancement of thought, which was meant to afford freedom, has 
paralyzed the subject, as it is forced to conform to the rigid objective ‘laws’ that appear to 
govern society. Subjectivity is sacrificed for the sake of preserving the system. 
Consequently, the subject becomes reified in itself because it “chooses itself as its own 
possession.”361 Contrary to Heidegger, then, who asserts that Dasein’s mineness, or its 
possibilities of inauthenticity or authenticity “fall upon” Dasein and should not be treated 
as a present-at-hand thing or property, Adorno argues these possibilities are reified into 
a thing to be objectively discovered by Dasein.362 As such, “[t]his displacement robs the 
subject of its moment of freedom and spontaneity: it completely freezes, like the 
Heideggerian states of mind, into something like an attribute of the substance 
“existence.””363 Therefore, according to Adorno, the subject becomes de-societalized 
and “holds on to himself his extreme abstractness as the last, the supposedly unlosable 
possession.”364 
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The belief in such eternal ‘laws’ that govern society maintains the notion that the 
world exists as an a priori, that is, accepted as a given that the subject has no control 
over. The subject is prioritized, in the sense that it gains primacy as an individual, yet it is 
also isolated and powerless. Furthermore, Dasein does not need to take responsibility 
for anything, including harmful and/or negative socially constructed circumstances, 
under the dominion of the “they.”365 As such, “the They becomes a cloudy mixture of 
elements which are merely ideological products of the exchange relationship”, which 
again draws attention to the problematic reified framework that Heidegger fails to 
interrogate.366 As such, the subject conforms to the norms that the “they” maintain 
without question, as the subject feel powerless under the “they”’s dominion. 
Consequently, Heidegger does not discuss how socio-historically specific conditions 
may induce anxiety for Dasein. As Adorno crucially highlights, anxiety may be triggered 
empirically.367 Heideggerian thought therefore results in a grasping of that which is 
falsely concrete further entangling Heidegger within the transcendental tradition. Anxiety 
remains an abstract concept due to the ontological need for solidity. In other words,  
the jargon is neither able nor willing to concretize the elements which 
condemns it to abstractness. The jargon turns into a circle. It wants to be 
immediately concrete without sliding into mere facticity. It is consequently 
forced into secret abstraction, which is the same formalism against which 
Heidegger’s own school, that of phenomenology, once strongly spoke 
out.368 
3.4. Conclusion 
 Although anxiety plays a historical role for Heidegger, in that it opens Dasein up 
to discover historicity, Heidegger’s strictly ontological orientation and consequent 
dismissal of the materialist conception of history is extremely troubling. Not only does it 
result in the construction of an abstract, individualistic ontology, but anxiety becomes 
accepted as an existential value, or Absolute, which is removed from material reality. As 
such, the human production of objective social conditions that may influence how anxiety 
is experienced is not discussed because the world is merely accepted as an a priori for 
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Heidegger. Therefore, Dasein need not interrogate the conditions that it finds itself in, as 
it must merely take over or assume its facticity. The subject is sacrificed for the sake of 
preserving ‘eternal, objective laws’ that govern society. Therefore, in addition to the 
discovery of the hidden aspects of the subjectum in Heidegger’s account of anxiety, 
which entraps Heidegger’s thinking within the traditional philosophical framework he 
wishes to abandon, I have further illuminated how Heidegger does not take into account 
the historical (materialist) specificity of anxiety, which leads to a powerless, isolated 
Dasein, who must embrace anxious conditions at any cost. As such, Heidegger’s project 
remains entangled within the philosophical tradition that he sought to abandon. Anxiety 
should not be conceived of as a static, eternal, Absolute – rather, it must be understood 
as something that influences and is influenced by both subject and object. In this way, 
the dialectical relationship between subject and object may be restored. 
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Chapter 4. Concretizing Historicity  
4.1. Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I emphasize how Heidegger’s concept of historicity falls 
prey to a false concreteness, since it merely explains history from a purely ontological 
standpoint, which is blind to material conditions. Because it is in anxiety that Dasein may 
grasp primordial historicity, anxiety plays a strictly ontological historical role. As such, 
Heidegger does not take into account how the historically specific material conditions of 
a society may affect Dasein’s experience of anxiety. Instead, anxiety is considered to be 
a spontaneous occurrence that is both a necessary and eternal part of human existence. 
Adorno had already made a connection between historical materialism and anxiety in his 
critique of Heidegger and the latter’s transformation of the concept into an existential 
value that is untouched by concrete, socio-historical processes, such as reification. In 
order to deepen Adorno’s claim that anxiety is induced by material conditions, it is first 
necessary to explore and deepen existing connections that have been made between 
Heideggerian philosophy and Marxism (dialectical materialism). In this way, the 
possibility of concretizing historicity and anxiety may be opened. This chapter will focus 
on the former, as I aim to solidify Heidegger’s concept of historicity through the works of 
Georg Lukács and Herbert Marcuse. Lukács is an important figure to draw upon not only 
because Lucien Goldmann has already made important comparisons between Lukács 
and Heidegger (as he believes that Being and Time is a response to History and Class 
Consciousness), but Lukács also coined the term reification (Verdinglichung), which I 
argue is the source of inauthenticity for Dasein under capitalism. Furthermore, Lukács’s 
Theory of the Novel, which outlines how different historical epochs give rise to different 
forms of literature (that reflect the social norms of each period), demonstrates how the 
“they” may be characterized differently in pre-capitalist versus capitalist society.369 This 
is crucial to demonstrate how different variations of the “they” may influence Dasein’s 
(in)ability to experience anxiety. Herbert Marcuse’s early proto-Heideggerian writings are 
also significant, as he synthesized elements of Heideggerian phenomenology with 
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dialectical materialism in his attempt to concretize historicity through a Marxist lens. For 
Marcuse, Dasein’s discovery of historicity opens up the possibility of radical, 
transformative action.370 What is of significance is that consciousness plays a crucial role 
in this concretized conception of historicity, contrary to Heidegger who rejects 
consciousness as a characteristic of Dasein as subject. However, as I outline in Chapter 
2, unbeknownst to Heidegger himself, he relies on consciousness in his account of 
anxiety. Ultimately, it is through Lukács and Marcuse’s works that the pathway toward 
understanding anxiety as a historically specific occurrence may be opened, which will 
later be explained in detail in Chapter 5.  
4.2. From Adorno to Lukács and Marcuse 
I have already outlined Adorno’s critique of Heidegger’s conception of historicity 
in his essay “The Idea of Natural History” in Chapter 3. Because Adorno charges 
Heidegger with conflating history with ontology, he argues that one must go beyond 
Heideggerian historicity, which requires the “retransformation of concrete history into 
dialectical nature …[as] … natural-history.”371 For Adorno, the origin of natural history is 
a synthesis of both Georg Lukács’s and Walter Benjamin’s works .372 As this chapter is 
largely centered upon Lukács’s connection with Heidegger, I will only focus on Adorno’s 
discussion of Lukács.373 
According to Adorno, Lukács’s concept of “second nature,” which was introduced 
in Theory of the Novel (written between 1914-1915) is an important starting point that 
guides us to a proper understanding of natural-history.374 Second nature, for Lukács, is 
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the alienated world of convention where humans have forgotten their role in constructing 
and creating the world, which consequently results in a lack of meaning for the subject. It 
is a “petrified estranged complex of meaning that is no longer able to awaken 
inwardness; it is a charnel-house of rotted interiorities”375. In constructing this concept of 
second nature, Lukács brings to light the question of how to interpret the “alienated, 
reified, dead world.”376 This is crucial to understanding natural-history because “[n]atural-
history is not a synthesis of natural and historical methods, but a change of perspective”, 
which requires an experience of shock.377 For Lukács, the acknowledgment of second 
nature may only be attained via a shock that rouses a metaphysical, spiritual awakening 
inward that opens up an image of an earlier or ideal existence.378 This strictly theologtical 
resurrection is not sufficient for what Adorno has in mind in understanding natural 
history, as it is too focused on a subjective intention.379 Rather, natural history requires a 
re-establishment of the antithesis between Being and history, and what must be 
emphasized is that history is discontinuous and cannot be transformed into a structural 
whole.380 History is dynamic and has a dialectical form: subject and object are 
inextricably linked and impact one another.381 
While Adorno ultimately dismisses Lukács’s idealist explanation of how the 
subject comes to acknowledge problematic second nature, he does also see some merit 
in Lukács’s thought, in that Adorno commends the latter for recognizing that we must 
first question how to interpret the alienated world, which breaks from the purely 
ontological understanding of natural history. I argue that it is important to further analyze 
and bring in Lukácsian thought into the discussion for two main reasons. First, Adorno is 
too quick to dismiss Lukács on the basis of his ideas in Theory of the Novel. 382 This 
earlier Lukács was still oriented toward transcendental idealism and existentialism 
(“romantic anti-capitalism”), which fails to account for the role of history that Lukács 
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emphasized in History and Class Consciousness (1923) after he converted to 
Marxism.383 Furthermore, the ‘shock’ that fosters a ‘spiritual awakening’ that enables an 
opening to an ideal existence in Theory of the Novel may be comparable to 
Heideggerian anxiety. And because there may be continuity in the earlier and latter 
Lukács, it is important to explore whether such anxiety may be found in Lukács’s social 
ontology of the proletariat in History and Class Consciousness. This leads to my aim of 
uncovering the historical specificity of anxiety in Chapter 5. Second, Lucien Goldmann 
has already made important comparisons between Lukács and Heidegger in Lukács and 
Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy, where he emphasizes the role of history in both 
theorists’ work.384 While Goldmann calls attention to this crucial similarity he ultimately 
dismisses Heidegger on the same grounds as Anders and Adorno, who problematize 
historicity’s false concreteness. However, by bringing in the insight of the earlier Herbert 
Marcuse, who was highly influenced by Heidegger, a more concretized conception of 
historicity may emerge. What is of utmost significance is the crucial role of 
consciousness in Lukács’s (and Marcuse’s) thought in restoring an authentic 
understanding of history. Therefore, Lukács is an important figure to draw upon (along 
with Marcuse), not only to reject anxiety as a strictly existential value, but to demonstrate 
how consciousness plays a role in Heidegger’s concept of anxiety and more specifically, 
how such consciousness may operate on a social level.  
4.3. Lukács & Heidegger: Meaning and History 
I have already described how primordial historicity is not accessible to Dasein in 
its immediate, thrown existence since its Being is inauthentic and given to it by the “they” 
in everydayness. Lucien Goldmann similarly demonstrates how Lukács, like Heidegger, 
problematizes the ‘inauthentic’ understanding of history that is given in the immediacy of 
existence. Goldmann makes this connection on the basis that for both theorists,   
[man] is not opposite the world which he tries to understand and upon 
which he acts, but within this world which he is a part of, and there is no 
radical break between the meaning he is trying to find or introduce into the 
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universe and that which he is trying to find or introduce into his own 
existence. This meaning, common to both individual and collective life, 
common as much to humanity as, ultimately, to the universe, is called 
history”385  
For both Lukács and Heidegger, history is tied to the ‘subject’s’ meaningful, inextricable 
relationship with the world, which leads both thinkers to reject the subject-object duality, 
as this inhibits the subject’s ability to historically engage with the world in a meaningful 
manner. “Meaning and its discovery have an eminently historical character and, for both 
Lukács and Heidegger, authenticity is situated in relation to history.”386 
For Heidegger, meaning (Sinn) as an existential (category of Being) belongs to 
Dasein. It maintains the intelligibility of something and is the “ “upon-which” of a 
projection  in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something.”387 In other 
words, meaning is the basis of intelligibility so that any act of understanding388 (or 
interpretation) is performed (as projection) on the basis of meaning.389 This also includes 
the act of Dasein’s self-understanding. It is the condition of the possibility of 
understanding and is not a property that belongs to an entity. Such meaning only 
becomes accessible to Dasein when Dasein grasps primordial historicity, which requires 
a moment of in anxiety. Because meaning is to be discovered by Dasein in its authentic 
historicizing, thrown inauthentic Dasein cannot “have” meaning, it must come to 
understand the meaning of Being as temporality. 
While meaning is to be discovered by individual Dasein in its authentic 
historicizing for Heidegger, for Lukács, meaning is tied to objective possibility - that is, 
the transformation of objective, social conditions through the collective, revolutionary 
action of the historical subject, the proletariat, which allows for an ‘authentic’ 
understanding of history as a unified process. Although Lukács does not outline formal 
existential structures of inauthenticity and authenticity as Heidegger does, Goldmann 
 
385 Goldmann, 6.  
386 Goldmann, Lukács and Heidegger, 41.  
387 Heidegger, Being and Time, 193.  
388 Understanding (Verständnis) is one of the three existentials (categories of Being) of 
disclosedness (the others being state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit), and discourse (Rede). To be, to exist 
is to understand. The act of understanding discloses the world and its significance to Dasein. In 
other words, what is disclosed in understanding is projection (that I have to be) – that is, Dasein’s 
potentiality-for-Being, or  being-free for its ownmost possibilities (Heidegger 1962, 120).  
389 Heidegger, Being and Time,138.  
78 
draws parallels between Heideggerian inauthenticity and authenticity in Lukács’s works. 
According to Goldmann, Lukács first mentioned inauthenticity in his earlier, idealist 
writings, specifically in Soul and Form, published in 1911.390 In this text, Lukács 
questions the authenticity of forms and the psychic structures that emerge as a result.391 
More specifically, in the “Metaphysics of Tragedy” essay, Lukács explains that humans 
have two possibilities of living: they either live inauthentically or authentically, which, 
according to Goldmann, are described in ways that are comparable to their 
Heideggerian counterparts.392 Lukács describes that empirical life is an inauthentic life 
(das leben or the Life) because it is meaningless, sterile, and can only be experienced 
peripherally.393 It is a life that “is an anarchy of light and dark: nothing is ever completely 
fulfilled in [the inauthentic] life.”394 This bears similarity to Heideggerian inauthenticity, in 
which Dasein experiences a passive existence, since Dasein merely conforms to the 
inauthentic “they”, who merely “gives” Dasein its Being, as Being is not grasped as its 
ownmost. Goldmann further argues Lukács’s conception of inauthenticity in Soul and 
Form persists after Lukács’s conversion to Marxism, where the terms took on a more 
materialist definition that accounts for the influence of objective, material reality on the 
subject.395. For Lukács, history must be understood as a single, unified process,396 
“which is not immediately given and is “to be made’ in science and praxis.397 This 
authentic understanding of history requires consciousness of the historical situation, 
attained through the dialectical method, which ultimately leads to totality - an 
understanding of reality as a social process or cohesive social system or integrated 
whole, in which all elements are dialectically interrelated and determine one another.398 
However, the default understanding of history is ‘inauthentic’ because of reification, 
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which does not allow for the possibility of praxis.399 Reification synthesizes Marx’s 
concept of commodity fetishism, which describes the emergence of the commodity as a 
‘mystical’ object, yielding power of its own, as the social relations underlying its 
production are elided by the predominance of its exchange-value (establishing 
equivalence between unequal things) with Max Weber’s theory of instrumental 
rationalization, which emphasizes predictable, calculable action under modernity. The 
dialectical relationship between subject and object is arrested by reification, which 
inhibits the unification of theory and praxis to overcome such conditions. The subject is 
unable to engage meaningfully with the object, as the two remain separate and opposed 
to one another. For Lukács, it is thus important to acknowledge the influence of material 
conditions on human existence and vice versa, since “[c]oncrete totality is, … the 
category that governs reality.400  
Although Goldmann makes these important comparisons between Heideggerian 
historicity and Lukács’s materialist conception of history, he ultimately takes issue with 
Heidegger’s purely ontological definition. He states,  
Heidegger, who is not of course interested in the different historically and 
socially localized aspects of the variations of consciousness and 
recognizes only radical dualisms (authentic/inauthentic, science/ontology, 
Vorhandenheit/Zuhandenheit etc.), will only tell us that the spontaneous 
consciousness tends to understand ‘Being-there’ (man) on the basis of the 
world as Vorhanden, which is none other than the Marxist and Lukácsian 
analysis which tells us that, in reification, human reality and social facts are 
understood as things. Needless to say, Heidegger does not look for any 
historical basis for this illusion.401  
Thus, for Goldmann, as it is for Adorno and Anders, Heidegger does not place enough 
emphasis on material reality because he focuses on a two-dimensional concept of 
history as it is related to Dasein’s Being, that is, to Dasein’s oscillation between authentic 
and inauthentic modes of Being.402 Heidegger merely focuses on Dasein’s experience 
within a certain socio-historical period and ignores the fact that Dasein may influence the 
structure of the world. This is because Heidegger is too preoccupied with retrieving a 
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supposedly forgotten Being and instead solely focuses on illuminating the ontological 
difference, which has been overlooked by the tradition of Western metaphysics.  
Furthermore, the source of inauthentic historical existence, which may be 
pinpointed to the norms that the “they” continually uphold is not mentioned by Heidegger 
because the “they” belongs to Dasein’s positive constitution, as it provides Dasein with a 
structured existence in everydayness. 403 The “they” cannot be overcome and rather 
exists as an eternal part of human existence: always already there to be merely 
existentielly modified by Dasein. Not only is this problematic because it upholds the idea 
that object cannot be transformed by subject, which sustains a subject-object dichotomy 
(though not strictly Cartesian in formulation), but Dasein must also simply assume its 
facticity in its thrown existence without questioning the what of the “they.” As a result, 
there is little discussion of what constitutes the “they” or how the “they” may vary 
depending upon specific social circumstances because attention is placed upon 
individual Dasein’s ability to take hold of its Situation by accepting the existing factical 
conditions without question. Furthermore, Heidegger’s inattention to the consciousness 
of Dasein (due to his rejection of the traditional subjectum) dismisses the historical role 
that consciousness may play. 
4.4. Marcuse: Concrete Historicity 
While Goldmann attempts to connect aspects of Heideggerian and Lukácsian 
thought, his ultimate dismissal of the Heideggerian conception of historicity, which is 
central to Dasein’s access to authentic Being, makes it difficult to conceive of any ways 
that the two modes of thought may be synthesized. It is here that I turn to the insight of 
the early Herbert Marcuse, who fuses Heideggerian ontology and dialectical materialism 
in his attempt to concretize historicity. Unlike Adorno, who explicitly rejects the concept 
of historicity, Marcuse argues that Heideggerian historicity may be concretized by 
acknowledging that Dasein’s concrete existence is a “happening” that is tied to its 
material, historical existence in the world. For Marcuse, as it is for Heidegger, Dasein’s 
existence is always related to its historical movement.404 And while Marcuse underscores 
Heidegger’s assertion that it is only Dasein who can understand historicity since it 
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expresses itself in a historical situation and the object of knowledge “lives with him”, 
which emphasizes Dasein’s mineness, - that “[i]n each case Dasein is its possibility, and 
it ‘has’ this possibility, but not just as a property [eigenschaftlich], as something present-
at-hand would”405, he differs from Heidegger by calling attention to Dasein’s historical 
possibilities from a social standpoint.406 Regardless, as Feenberg argues, Marcuse, like 
Heidegger (and Lukács), focuses on breaking from the positivist, objectivist standpoint, 
to go” back to the things themselves.”407 Marcuse highlights this in his discussion of 
concrete philosophy:  
philosophy can only impact the individual in his existence when it grasps 
him not as an abstract subject, but rather in the fullness of his unique 
historical determinacy: when it impacts and grasps together with him a 
contemporaneous shared and surrounding world, a social being.408  
As such, Marcuse acknowledges that while a strictly ontological, Heideggerian 
definition of historicity is limited, if synthesized with elements of dialectical materialism, a 
more concretized notion of the term, which includes facets of Dasein’s material, social 
existence, may be conceived.409 In this way, individuality must be made possible again. 
This is because  
[s]ociety is neither a determinately existing [daseiendes] subject alongside 
the individual nor the sum of individuals rather, society is in a very concrete 
sense each and every individual, it is the concrete-historical mode of 
individual Dasein. Thus, it is precisely when philosophy intends to become 
serious about its concern for the individual that I must not lose sight of the 
world in which the individual’s Dasein realizes itself. The individual exists 
as an individual only in a particular situation of the surrounding and shared 
world, in a particular situation of social being.410  
A concretized notion of historicity includes Dasein’s historical existence, which includes 
the economic, social, and political facets of life.411 Furthermore, Marcuse highlights that  
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the concrete historical unity that is, in every case, a society…. To attempt 
to explain ideology out of materiality in the case of an individual person 
would be a completely unjustified transgression of the phenomenological 
self-evidence of historicity.412  
History is tied to Dasein’s social existence - it cannot be confined to the individual 
ontology of Dasein as it stretches between birth and death. And while Lukács asserts 
that “[h]istory is ontologically fundamental”, he is referring to social ontology, “ insofar as 
[Dasein’s] world, everything [Dasein] can now and touch, is historical.”413Like Lukács, 
Marcuse, directly connects the inauthentic understanding of history to the concrete, 
material, historical conditions that produce social norms the “they” continually promote 
and sustain, which arrests the historical, dialectical relationship between subject and 
object. Inauthentic historicity is thus tied to Dasein’s misunderstanding of the historical 
situation, which, for Heidegger is maintained by the “they”. 
4.5. The Reified “They”  
Marcuse argues that the source of Dasein’s inauthentic, unhistorical existence, is 
the “they”, which under capitalist society 
necessarily thrusts Dasein into the provisioned environment and helps 
render the environment independent, transforming it into a rigid world of 
mere things, a world that holds Dasein captive within with the inescapability 
of a law of nature and dictates Dasein’s relation to it.414  
Under this materialist framework, Marcuse transforms Heidegger’s concept of the “they” 
to the social level, as the “they” may be described as the “One” that prescribes reified 
social Being to Dasein under capitalism. Reification does not allow for a genuine 
understanding of history as a unified process because the dialectical relationship 
between subject and object is blocked. As Lukács states,   
rational objectification conceals above all the immediate – qualitative and 
material – character of things as things. When use-values appear 
universally as commodities they acquire a new objectivity, a new 
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substantiality which they did not possess in an age of episodic exchange 
and which destroys their original and authentic substantiality.415 
Consequently, humanity has developed a forgetfulness that the world is an alienated 
product of its own activity. 
Because reification is a specific product of capitalism, it is only under capitalist 
conditions that “they” is characterized by reification. And since Heidegger asserts that 
“[t]he extent to which [the “they”’s] dominion becomes compelling and explicit may 
change in the course of history” (though historicity here is understood in a purely 
ontological manner), if approached through a materialist lens, it is possible to argue that 
the specific material conditions of a given society impact how the “they” is characterized 
since the “they” reflects the social norms of a given historical epoch.416 As such, I argue 
that the pervasiveness of the “they” varies depending upon social context, which affects 
Dasein’s facticity and historizing, and ultimately, Dasein’s experience of anxiety. It is 
thus necessary to historicize the “they”, as this allows for the historicization of anxiety.  
Lukács's Theory of the Novel is an important text to draw upon in historicizing the 
“they” because the text traces the rise of the epic and the novel, which correspond to 
different historical periods, which, by extension, correspond to different constitutions of 
the “they.” Prior to the rise of capitalism, epics were prevalent in society and outlined the 
“destiny of the community.”417 This reflected social reality, insofar as a concrete totality 
was given - there was a sense of cohesion among all members in society. Community 
was thus essential, grounded in the domination of meaningful, value-rational actions, or 
actions pursued “for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, [or] religious [purpose].”418 
As such, Dasein was disburdened from choosing its possibilities because it was guided 
by the rigid, overarching ethical norms of society. In this regard, Dasein was more likely 
to fall victim to the lostness of the “they”, since the “they” encouraged conformity 
because it offered a strong sense of belonging, preventing the possibility of anxiety. As 
such, when epics were prevalent, the “they” had a powerful influence over Dasein, as 
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the sense of community that it had offered lulled Dasein into strong feelings of familiarity 
and tranquility. 
While the “they” during the time of epics promoted feelings of at-homeness for 
Dasein, as social norms were oriented toward maintaining a meaningful sense of 
cohesion, novels, which have become prevalent in modern, capitalist society, outline the 
“they” under a completely different context. According to Lukács, “the objective structure 
of the world of the novel shows a heterogeneous totality”, which demonstrates that social 
reality had become fragmented under modern capitalism.419 Thus, contrary to the epic, 
where a concrete, meaningful totality was given, totality is paradoxically presented as a 
whole in the novel.420 This is due to the rise of reification under capitalism. Reification 
has produced social norms that not only create and sustain a “pseudo-totality” (since 
unity is arbitrarily produced by reification), but that also deprive the world of meaning. 
Value-rational actions have become replaced by instrumentally rational actions, or action 
that is calculable and oriented toward maximum efficiency.421 As such, capitalist society 
can be characterized as cold, scientific, and calculable. Furthermore, as mentioned 
above, meaning, for Lukács, is inextricably tied to a historical action produced out of a 
dialectical process. However, reification sustains an inauthentic historical situation, as it 
creates and maintains a subject-object opposition, which blocks the dialectical 
relationship between subject and object. In addition, the emergence of the division of 
labour plays a crucial role in creating and maintaining the fragmentation of society, as it 
has “disrupt[ed] every organically unified process of work and life.” 422 For example, time 
becomes reified due to the construction of abstract (as opposed to concrete) labour or 
capitalist time, which can be characterized by discrete, quantifiable units of working 
hours. As such, time loses its free-flowing, meaningful, qualitative characteristic.423 In 
addition, as Horkheimer and Adorno state in Dialectic of Enlightenment, “[t]he division of 
labor, through which power manifests itself socially, serves the self-preservation of the 
dominated whole.”424 Again, this highlights how the subject-object dichotomy is 
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maintained, as scientific progress, which was meant to allow for the subject to act freely 
becomes paradoxically unfree to preserve the commodity form’s pervasive power over 
society Therefore, under modern capitalism, the “they” is characterized in a different way 
since reification produces distinct social norms that result in the fragmentation of society. 
Consequently, the “they” no longer fosters feelings of security as the allure of a 
meaningful, cohesive community, which was prevalent during the time of epics, has 
disappeared. Instead, the meaningless, reified structures of modern capitalism have 
fragmented objective social reality, and as such, no concrete totality is presented. Thus, 
under capitalism, the “they” provides a backdrop for the individual that is unfamiliar due 
to the loss of a meaningful whole.  
4.6. Consciousness and the “They” 
In comparing the constitution of the they before and after capitalism, I suggest 
that the the “they” fostered “favourable” conditions for the subject prior to the rise of 
capitalism, as social norms were rooted in value-rational action and instilled a sense of 
meaning and social cohesion for the individual. Consequently, individuals actively chose 
to adhere to social norms, as Dasein was largely driven by the a priori, ethical goals 
outlined by the “they.” However, the norms that constitute the “they” under modern 
capitalism are driven by the processes of rationalization and reification which have 
contributed to the construction of a meaningless society where the individual has 
become isolated, which has led to an existence that no longer feels tranquil or familiar. 
However, the individual still succumbs to the “they”, and much of this can be attributed to 
the form of consciousness that is taken up in everydayness under capitalism. It is 
therefore necessary to explore how the reified subject experiences its immediate, 
unhistorical existence, and how this ultimately affects consciousness.  
4.6.1. Reified Social Existence 
Before delving into a discussion of how anxiety and consciousness may be 
connected, it is first important to highlight how the reification of objective society entails 
the reification of the subject, which influences social existence and consciousness. 
Reification has created an abstract, commodified, depersonalized, subject.425A specific 
 
425 Lukács, History, 89.  
86 
example of an individual experience of reification may be found in Lukács’s account of 
the worker under capitalism. According to Lukács, reification reduces the worker to an 
abstract commodity, as they are forced to sell their labour power, which is their only 
possession under capitalism. Consequently, “the personality can do no more than look 
on helplessly while its own existence is reduced to an isolated particle and fed into an 
alien system.”426 Such depersonalizing, reified conditions therefore imprisons, isolates 
and confines the worker to a meaningless existence, where they are unable to establish 
a meaningful relationship with the world.  
A deeper account of the worker’s reified existence may be illuminated with 
Marcuse’s discussion of Dasein’s labour in “On the Philosophical Foundations of the 
Concept of Labour in Economics.” In this essay, Marcuse argues that the concept of 
labor has been confined to the economic realm, but as Hegel outlines, labor “appears as 
a fundamental happening of human Dasein, as a happening that constantly and 
continually penetrates the entirety of man’s being, during which something also happens 
to man’s “world.””427 Therefore, Marcuse asserts that labor is human activity as such and 
it is through laboring that Dasein becomes historical.428 What must be acknowledged is 
that there is a relationship between labor and the objective world, again highlighting the 
crucial dialectical relationship between subject and object that must be restored. 
However, since Dasein is oriented towards the object to achieve a certain goal, which is 
imposed, rather than freely chosen, such a dialectical relationship remains obscured or 
elided.429 In other words, the instrumental-rational actions that dictate Dasein’s existence 
in capitalist society do not allow for the authentic laboring of Dasein - Dasein leads a 
sterile, meaningless existence. For Marcuse, Dasein’s inability to happen immediately in 
labor signifies that laboring Dasein can never satisfy its needs under capitalist society, 
which leads to a primordial ‘lack’.430 This is problematic because “labor is a specifically 
historical category, a category of human Dasein as historical Dasein. Labor presupposes 
a well-determined relation to time that thoroughly penetrates Dasein and guides its 
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praxis.”431 It is not an end-in-itself - it is lacking; is negative, directed at something that is 
not yet there; the goal of labor is the realization of Dasein itself.432 Ultimately, “Labor is in 
its very essence and meaning related to the happening of Dasein in its totality, that is, to 
praxis in both dimensions (necessity and freedom).433 True labour is authentic activity. 
As Feenberg asserts, “[f]or Marcuse, authenticity is not the return of the individual to 
himself from out of alienation in the crowd, but reflects the social character of existence, 
the fact that the world is a shared creation.”434There is thus a forgetfulness that the world 
is a product of human activity in Dasein’s immediate, reified existence.  
Frederic Jameson also demonstrates how reified existence results in an a 
passive, meaningless existence under capitalist conditions (albeit under late capitalism), 
as the subject experiences extreme fragmentation due to the disorienting conditions 
produced out of the capitalistic enterprise. There is a radical separation of subject and 
object – the subject lags behind the development of object, causing extreme dislocation 
and an inability to understand oneself from a coherent perspective because of a lack of a 
unifying signifier that may bind the self together.435 This de-centering of subjectivity is 
due to the death of the subject as an autonomous, individual ego.436 Furthermore, “our 
psychic experience, our cultural languages, are today dominated by categories of space 
rather than by categories of time, as in the preceding period of high modernism.”437 
Because there is this focus on space, the object has developed faster than the subject 
can – and the subject cannot keep up. This further feeds into the splintering of 
subjectivity: 
If, indeed, the subject has lost its capacity actively to extend its pro-tensions 
and re-tensions across the temporal manifold and to organize its past and 
future into coherent experience, it becomes difficult enough to see how the 
cultural productions of such a subject could result in anything but “heaps of 
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fragments” an in a practice of the randomly heterogeneous and 
fragmentary and the aleatory.438 
Ultimately, one experiences the hysterical sublime, where the subject experiences 
euphoria and is anxious, confused, and lost within a global framework that lacks a single 
unifying idea that binds everything together. This gives rise to feelings of extreme 
powerlessness and again demonstrates the radical separation of subject and object 
under capitalism. As Jameson states:  
the breakdown of temporality suddenly releases this present of time from 
all the activities and intentionalities that might focus it and make it a space 
of praxis; thereby isolated, that present suddenly engulfs the subject with 
indescribable vividness, a materiality of perception properly overwhelming, 
which effectively dramatizes the power of the material – or better still, the 
literal – signifier in isolation. This present of the world or material signifier 
comes before the subject with heightened intensity, bearing a mysterious 
change of affect, here described in the negative terms of anxiety and loss 
of reality, but which one could just as well imagine in the positive terms of 
euphoria, a high, an intoxicatory or hallucinogenic intensity.439  
4.6.2. The Reification of Consciousness  
Not only is social existence reified, but reification more deeply permeates the 
consciousness of the individual worker under capitalist society. Because the worker is 
pushed into a sterile existence, in which their labor power becomes their only 
possession, “[their] qualities and abilities are no longer an organic part of [their] 
personality, they are things which he can ‘own’ or ‘dispose of’ like the various objects of 
the external world.” 440 As such, the worker adopts a contemplative attitude, in which 
they passively submit to the ‘fixed’ laws of capitalist society.441 For Lukács,  
[t]he contemplative stance adopted towards a process mechanically 
conforming to fixed laws and enacted independently of man’s 
consciousness and impervious to human intervention, i.e. a perfectly 
closed system, must likewise transform the basic categories of man’s 
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immediate attitude to the world: it reduces space and time to a common 
denominator and degrades time to the dimension of space. 442 
The worker loses their autonomy, as their reified consciousness produces a 
contemplative attitude in which their identity and existence becomes reduced to their 
speed and efficacy in the production process, that is, their performance as a worker.”443 
Horkheimer and Adorno reiterate the reification of consciousness in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, as they problematize how “[t]hought is reified as an autonomous and 
automatic process, aping the machine it has itself produced, so that it can finally be 
replaced by the machine.”444 Meaning cannot be produced by the subject because 
reification has permeated the subject’s psyche so deeply that it misunderstands the 
historical situation as one that it is opposed to and powerless against.  
The loss of subjective autonomy and its relation to reified consciousness may be 
explained in more detail by drawing upon the influence of Kierkegaard on Lukács.445 
Westerman argues that, like Kierkegaard, the later Lukács is concerned with a 
consciousness of suffering in the immediacy of reality that arises from a misrelation to 
the self.446  
For Lukács and Kierkegaard, despair or the sense of powerlessness 
caused by reification are symptoms of misrelation to the self…[t]he subject, 
whether religious individual or proletariat, suffers from being divided in and 
from itself; it suffers because it seems to have lost that which makes it 
essentially itself.447 
This is further emphasized by Feenberg who argues that Lukács’s concept of totality is 
constructed as a means to restore “the lost unity of self and world for which modern 
consciousness longs.”448 And while for Kierkegaard this misrelation is a result of a lack of 
constant relation with God, which leads to despair, Lukács is concerned with suffering 
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under capitalism449 as the self develops a stance toward existence that conceals the 
fundamental social relations between people due to the predominance of exchange 
value, which reduces the individual to an unfree abstract commodity leading to 
alienation.450 Crucially, the mis-relation of the self under capitalism reinforces the 
subject-object dichotomy and occludes a correct understanding of history. This is 
because the consciousness of suffering is not understood in the immediacy of reality, as 
reification has permeated the individual’s consciousness so deeply that it goes 
unrecognized.  
The reified structure of consciousness therefore inhibits the subject from 
authentic labouring, as the individual is pushed into a fragmented, meaningless 
existence. The worker merely takes up a passive, contemplative stance toward the 
world, where the objective world is understood to be out of human control.451 Due to this 
separation of subject from object, the subject becomes dislocated, and its Being-in-the-
World cannot be grasped. The reified “they” creates a cold, mechanical existence for the 
worker that leads to the adoption of a contemplative attitude, which symbolizes a 
passive lostness in the “they”, in contrast to pre-reified society, in which the individuals 
chose to actively adhere to the norms of society due to the sense of cohesion it had 
fostered. And as I mention above, Goldmann recognizes that Heidegger “will only tell us 
that the spontaneous consciousness tends to understand ‘Being-there’ (man) on the 
basis of the world as Vorhanden.”452 While Heidegger would deny Goldmann’s use of the 
term consciousness, what is important to highlight in this quotation is that Goldmann 
implies that Dasein spontaneously, or randomly, accepts a form of consciousness in 
everydayness that leads to a Vorhanden approach to Being in everydayness. By 
bringing in the thought of Lukács, the default acceptance of a Vorhanden approach to 
Being may be explained by the way that consciousness is reified under capitalism. 
Modernity has thus caused the individual to become “tired of life” - they no longer belong 
to an “organic life cycle”, where they were fulfilled by meaning and had “enough” of 
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life.453 Instead, the objective transformation of social reality as reified has fragmented 
Dasein’s objective world, which is now experienced as “a prison instead of a parental 
home.”454 The individual becomes powerless and has slips into apathy. This is reflected 
in Lukács’s The Theory of the Novel, where he outlines how the hero of the novel, who 
represents the individual in capitalist society, experiences transcendental homelessness 
often because they experience “the peak of absurdity” and “lack of direction of life as a 
whole.”455 
Not only is the consciousness of the individual subject affected, but the 
consciousness of society as a whole is also impacted. As Richard Westerman argues in 
Lukács’s Phenomenology of Capitalism: Reification Revalued, “for the first time there is 
a ‘formally-unified structure of consciousness for the whole of society” under capitalism, 
which is produced out of reification.456 Westerman explains this by describing one’s 
experience of immediate reality as an ontic reality, 457 or the historically specific “daily 
social reality experienced by those living in a given society.”458This ontic reality, through 
which categories and laws become valid and real is rooted in an ontological foundation, 
which, under capitalism, is the commodity form.459 The commodity form sets up the 
intentional structure of society insofar as social being as a whole is determined by its 
logic where objects become socially related on the basis of exchange value.460 Because 
of this, Westerman emphasizes that Lukács “does not see the social existence of objects 
as mere misperceptions: the meaning of an object is its social being” and consciousness 
is therefore generated by this phenomenological social form.461 Furthermore, 
[t]he meaning of social objects is thus defined relationally: what an object 
is, and the kinds of intentional practices that follow therefrom, is defined in 
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mutual relation to other entities and agents; no social object can be defined 
in isolation from its interactions with others.462 
Therefore, “[t]here is no subject existing ‘before’ or ‘producing’ social relations; it 
is, rather, interpellated by the structure of society, that shapes consciousness. 463 
Westerman applies this Althusserian language to Lukács because “Lukács treats 
subjectivity as a structurally defined intentional stance within conscious social reality, in 
which the relation between the first-person perspective and objective reality is governed 
by a historically variable principle that structures the whole. ”  464 He further argues that 
Lukács goes beyond Althusser because his phenomenological orientation allows for the 
incorporation of the first-person perspective, rather than merely relying on a structuralist 
definition. Thus, there is no pure objectivity that is detached from the subject, rather 
there exists a subject-object totality.” It is necessary to break this unified structure of 
reified social consciousness to re-establish the subject-object totality which opens up an 
understanding of authentic history as a unified process.465 
What is further problematic is that Bourgeois philosophy continually reproduces 
the unified reified structure of consciousness in capitalist society. Bourgeois thinking 
does not seek to understand society in a holistic manner due to the rise and subsequent 
preservation of the Kantian thing-in-itself (noumena), which poses a barrier to human 
cognition, as the noumena posits that the ‘essence’ of objects are out of human grasp.466 
As Lukacs states,  
The transcendental dialectic with its sharp distinction between phenomena 
[thing as it appears] and noumena repudiates all attempts by ‘our’ reason 
to obtain knowledge of the second group of objects.467  
This has led the bourgeoisie to “naively equat[e] its own forms of thought, the forms in 
which it saw the world in accordance with its own existence in society, with reality and 
 
462 Westerman, 127.  
463 Westerman, 174.  
It is acknowledged that applying Althusssserin language to Lukács may seem bizarre, as Althusser 
criticizes Lukács for humanism, and Althusser solely relies on a definition of subjectivity from a 
structuralist point of view (that the subject is nothing more than its position in a system) 
464 Westerman, 176.  
465 Westerman, 176.   
466 Lukács, History, 114.  
467 Lukács, 115.  
93 
with existence as such.”468 Thus, the world retains its inauthentic commodity character 
because idea of the Kantian thing-in-itself is preserved, which maintains the subject-
object dichotomy. This further feeds into the erroneous idea that the world is an a priori 
and can simply be understood as ‘facticity’, which leads to a failure to acknowledge the 
culture of bourgeois society that has created reification in the first place.469 Further, with  
the separation of the subject and object, the movement toward totality is blocked off. As 
such, the reified consciousness that bourgeois thought maintains misunderstands the 
historical situation. History as a dynamic, unified process cannot be understood, blocking 
the dialectical process between subject and object. Consciousness of one’s social being 
is suppressed by the “they”, and because the subject loses its autonomy and adopts a 
contemplative attitude, the subject lives a passive existence in which the unfamiliar 
reified conditions of society go unnoticed since, as Goldmann states, Dasein 
spontaneously accepts a form of consciousness that leads to a Vorhandenheit 
orientation. It is thus evident that the reified objective conditions of society, promote and 
sustain reified subjective experience under capitalism, due to the pervasiveness of the 
unified structure of reified consciousness under capitalism. This does not allow for the 
authentic historicizing of Dasein.  
4.7. Conclusion  
I have highlighted how Heidegger’s account of history as historicity may be 
concretized by bringing in the dialectical materialism of Lukács, along with Marcuse’s 
synthesis of Heideggerian phenomenology with Marxism. In doing so, I have 
demonstrated how the “they” may be characterized differently depending upon socio-
historical circumstances. Specifically under capitalism, the “they” reproduces a reified 
society, which inhibits a proper understanding of history. Much of this is rooted in the 
unified structure of reified consciousness that has emerged under capitalist society. I 
have also briefly discussed how the reification that the “they” upholds fragments 
subjectivity, which leads to a passive, contemplative existence. While I have specifically 
focused on a discussion of consciousness as it relates to Lukács, the connection of 
consciousness to Heideggerian philosophy will be explained in more detail in the next 
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chapter, as I move to a concretization of anxiety as it is experienced under the 
historically specific conditions of capitalism. I have already uncovered Heidegger’s 
dependence on consciousness, albeit the individual consciousness of Dasein, in his 
account of anxiety and in the next chapter, I return to this important discovery to 
demonstrate how anxiety and social consciousness may be connected. 
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Chapter 5. The Historical Specificity of Anxiety  
5.1. Introduction 
In concretizing historicity, I have demonstrated how the “they” is characterized by 
reification specifically under capitalism, which not only creates objective reified 
conditions, but has also resulted in a unified structure of reified consciousness on both 
the individual and social level. The question then arises as to how break through the 
reification of consciousness. In this chapter, I argue that an experience of anxiety under 
capitalism results in a breakdown that opens up consciousness of the reified conditions 
of society, which has to potential to rouse revolutionary social action and transformation. 
I have already unfolded the role of consciousness, as self-awareness in Dasein’s 
experience of anxiety in Chapter 2. By synthesizing elements of Heidegger and Lukács 
and using Lukács’s social ontology of the proletariat as a specific example, I argue that a 
social consciousness may emerge from anxiety. This social consciousness is necessary 
for the authentic historizing of the proletariat, who emerges as “the identical subject-
object of history whose praxis will change reality.”470 Crucial to this discussion is the 
‘nothing’ that is revealed in a moment of anxiety, which, in purely Heideggerian terms, 
reveals the “world as world” to Dasein for the first time.471  I argue that the ‘nothing’ that 
is revealed to the proletarian subject in a moment of anxiety is the de-reified world, 
which gives rise to a social consciousness of the human construction of the world and its 
norms, and along with that, the possibility that reification (inauthenticity) can be 
overcome. In other words, the proletariat becomes conscious of its social being in 
anxiety, thereby opening up the possibility of praxis, which is a step toward re-
establishing the dialectical relationship between subject and object. This then leads to 
the subject’s authentic historizing. Not only does this disclose the historical specificity to 
Heidegger’s concept of anxiety in this analysis (by drawing attention to  the conditions 
produced by reification giving rise to anxiety, which is specific product of capitalism) but I 
also suggest that anxiety may actually be overcome (due to its historical specificity), 
contrary to Heidegger who believes that it is an eternal characteristic of human 
existence. There is thus an emancipatory potential in anxiety as it may give rise to wide-
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spread social transformation. It is important to note that it is not my contention that 
anxiety is something that can be willed. Like Heidegger, I suggest that anxiety is 
something that happens spontaneously.472 Further, it is important to stress that anxiety is 
only one way in which social consciousness may be attained for revolutionary action and 
that I use the social ontology of the proletariat as a specific example. Revolution may be 
motivated by anger, fear, or humiliation. I also acknowledge that there is danger in using 
anxiety as the foundation for a collective project, as this can easily turn into fascism. This 
important counterargument will be explained in greater detail in the concluding chapter. 
5.2. The Proletariat as the Historical Subject 
For Lukács, the historical subject is the proletariat - the collective subject that 
exists as the identical subject-object of history.473 The proletariat is  
the conscious subject of total social reality. But the conscious subject is not 
defined here as in Kant where ‘subject’ is defined as that which can never 
be an object. The ‘subject’ here is not a detached spectator of the process. 
The proletariat is more than just the active and passive part of this process: 
the rise and evolution of its knowledge and its actual rise and evolution in 
the course of history are just the two different sides of the same real 
process.474 
Unlike Heidegger, then, who focuses on the individual Dasein as the ‘historical’ 
subject, “[t]he subject [for Lukács] is transindividual, plural, or collective, and at the same 
time it is an object. The subject and the object are identical in the totality from whence 
they come: the group is born of the actions which it generates.”475 Subjectivity is not 
confined to an isolated Dasein that exists independently of the objective world. And 
while, like Heidegger, Lukács rejects the subject-object dichotomy, he calls for the re-
establishment of their dialectical relation via the proletariat, unlike Heidegger who rejects 
the subject object categorization altogether. 
 Furthermore, like Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, the proletariat is historical, 
though Lukács emphasizes the role that consciousness plays in the authentic historizing 
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of the proletariat This is because “the self-understanding of the proletariat is … 
simultaneously the objective understanding of the nature of society.”476 In addition, the 
proletariat’s “social existence…is more powerfully affected by the dialectical character of 
the historical process in which the mediated character of every factor receives the 
imprint of truth and authentic objectivity only in the mediated totality.”477 This mediation is 
essential because it  
is a level with which to overcome the mere immediacy of the empirical world and 
as such is not something (subjective) foisted on to the objects from outside, it is 
no value-judgement or ‘ought’ opposed to their ‘is’. It is rather the manifestation 
of their authentic objective structure.478  
It is the proletariat which may attain consciousness of reified society and mediation is 
necessary to manifest collective action (as a moral and historical necessity) to the create 
an “authentic humanity” “liberated from the false, mechanising forms of society: 
…[which] has inwardly overcome, or is in the process of overcoming, the dichotomies of 
theory and practice ..[and] freedom and necessity are identical. 479 
Marcuse makes similar claims as he argues that it is only when the possibility of 
revolutionary praxis is known (as authentic historicity, that is, when a transforming act 
may be disclosed to Dasein in order to understand its fallenness and to overcome its 
thrownness) that the fulfilment of historical necessity may occur.480 The driving force of 
history is class, where the bearer of the radical act is the proletariat, condemned to 
action due to its historical existence, as it is the only class that may become conscious of 
its historical situation. It must become the identical subject-object of history. 
It is important to note that Lukács argues that “the standpoint of the proletariat 
does not give it an advantage in possessing greater knowledge of the way in which 
objective social structure exists; rather, the proletariat’s existence can lead to 
consciousness of how the contradictory, reified structures of society gain validity”, which 
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breaks through the unified structure of consciousness that is rooted in the commodity 
form .481The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, arrests the historical, dialectical relationship 
between subject and object, because as mentioned above, the bourgeoise conflates its 
existence for existence as such, which maintains a reified consciousness that 
misunderstands the historical situation.482 And although the bourgeoisie and proletariat 
share the same social existence, it is their differential class interests that “keep the 
bourgeoisie imprisoned within …[the] immediacy [of the subject-object dualism] while 
forcing the proletariat to go beyond it.”483 Much of this is a result of a mistaken 
understanding of social reality as mere facticity, which leads the bourgeoisie to 
understand the world as an a priori, that is out of human control and exists 
independently of human activity.484 Consequently, reified consciousness prevails. And as 
Marcuse states, 
[t]o regard the ontological historicity of Dasein as mere facticity or 
something like it would not only mean overlooking the actual life-sphere of 
Dasein at the very outset of the philosophical undertaking, but would also 
contravene the findings of phenomenology, which alone may serve to guide 
it.485  
Philosophy must intervene in the public realm to grasp the social problems that have 
arisen under capitalism and must “propel existence forward in accordance with its 
historical possibilities.”486 For Marcuse, “[h]istorical necessity realizes itself through 
human action. Mankind can miss its opportunities for action – recent history has been 
full of such botched revolutionary situations – and human beings can degrade 
themselves, can cease to be subjects and become objects of history.” I therefore 
suggest that anxiety can act as a catalyst to bring about proletarian class 
consciousness.  
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5.3. Proletarian Consciousness 
The emergence of the proletariat as the identical subject-object of history is 
dependent upon its consciousness of the default, unified structure of reified 
consciousness under capitalism - it must become aware that its consciousness and 
more broadly, that its existence has been reified. The proletariat must attain 
consciousness that the everyday self is a “they-self” – that that is forced into the 
immediacy of a bourgeois-influenced existence, in which the historical situation is 
misunderstood.487 As Marcuse states, “[k]nowledge of one’s own historicity and 
conscious historical existence becomes possible at the moment when existence itself 
breaks through reification.”488 It is in anxiety that a breakdown of the reified world/reified 
consciousness occurs.  
In the previous chapter, I mention that Goldmann uses the term ‘spontaneous 
consciousness’ to describe the consciousness that Dasein randomly takes up in 
everydayness, which orients Dasein to a Vorhanden approach to Being, which is none 
other than the Marxist and Lukácsian analysis which tells us that, in reification, human 
reality and social facts are understood as things.” 489 And as McCarthy argues (and as I 
argue in Chapter 2), while there is no direct parallel of Kierkegaardian sin-consciousness 
in Being and Time, “for Heidegger anxiety does trigger a consciousness, namely, of 
Dasein’s being lost in “the they” (Das Man).”490 Therefore, in addition to my discovery of 
Dasein’s own  consciousness in a moment of anxiety (the subject matter of Chapter 2), 
the possibly of attaining consciousness of one’s social existence, which is one’s 
ownmost and not spontaneously taken up,  may also be opened in anxiety since 
awareness of being lost in the “they” means that one is conscious of the norms that the 
“they” reflect, which, by extension, entails that an understanding of social existence is 
opened. As such, the “they” may be existentielly modified. This opens up the argument 
that anxiety has emancipatory potential. Therefore, consciousness cannot be ignored as 
a component of subjectivity because as Marx states: “It is not the consciousness of men 
that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their 
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consciousness.”491 Attaining consciousness of one’s social existence allows one to 
attribute the root of anxiety to the societal  process of reification that produces and 
maintains anxiety on both the subjective and objective level. In this regard, the historical 
role of anxiety may be illuminated, as it may lead to the restoration of the dialectical 
relationship between subject and object in the historical process. In addition, 
Heidegger’s claim that anxiety is manifested by an indefinite threat may be undermined, 
as the empirical cause of anxiety is uncovered. Therefore, as Adorno contends, anxiety 
should not be conceived of as a mere existential value or Absolute. Anxiety must be 
interpreted in a way that also understands the historical situation. 
5.4. Anxiety: Breaking Through Reified Consciousness 
According to Marcuse, an understanding of historicity “becomes possible at the 
moment when existence itself breaks through reification.”492 Here, Lukács’s influence on 
Marcuse may be highlighted, as Feenberg states,  
Lukács’s interpretation of Marxism launched the Hegelianizing approach to 
revolution that Marcuse combined with Heidegger’s fundamental ontology 
in his early works. The crucial link is the notion that there exists a form of 
self-consciousness which is both the revelation of a world and that 
transformation of that world493 
Therefore, a breakdown of reified consciousness enables the world to become fully 
intelligible to the subject in its self-consciousness.494 It is my contention that such 
consciousness may arise when the proletariat experiences a moment of anxiety, which 
opens up a revolutionary situation that entails a radical opening or fluidity of the social.  
 The “nothing” that the proletariat may experience in anxiety under capitalism is 
important to underscore. Recall that for Heidegger, Dasein is in the face of the “nothing 
and nowhere” in anxiety, as the “world as world” is disclosed to Dasein for the first time 
because the significance of the world collapses.495 The essence of the nothing is 
nihilation, which is a gesture in which the whole of beings retreats and it is in this retreat 
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that beings are disclosed as a whole.496 As such, that which is absent (Being) is 
disclosed to Dasein.  
 Approached through a Lukácsian lens, when the proletariat experiences a 
moment of anxiety, the ‘nothing’ negates reified society. The ‘nothing’ is encountered “at 
one with” the de-reified world as a whole that is also slipping away. In this regard, the 
‘nothing’ opens up a consciousness of the de-reified world. In other words, the ‘nothing’ 
of anxiety, the world presents itself to Dasein in a de-reified manner and consciousness 
of the reified structure of the social world is simultaneously disclosed. The proletariat 
gains consciousness of how it has been objectified as a commodity, as “[t]he worker … 
becomes aware of himself as a commodity … as a pure, naked object into the 
production process… [where] the worker recognizes himself and his own relations with 
capital.”497In this regard, the reified “they” becomes existentielly modified. Recall that in 
Being-anxious, Dasein feels uncanny due to the breakdown of familiarity, thus causing 
Dasein to flee and fall into the “they.” For Heidegger, “[t]his uncanniness pursues Dasein 
constantly” and as such, anxiety is always already there in everydayness, though it is not 
recognizable to Dasein. 498 It is only when Dasein experiences a “real” moment of 
anxiety that the “they” may be existentielly modified so that Dasein may become aware 
that it is a “they-self” in everydayness. Specifically for the proletariat, a “real” moment of 
anxiety existentielly modifies the “they”, by opening up consciousness that the reified 
“they” gives the proletariat its social being in everydayness. The proletariat thus gains an 
awareness of its fallenness into the passive, contemplative, meaningless existence that 
is upheld by the “they” in its daily life. Anxiety further gives rise to the consciousness that 
its everyday existence is actually rife with anxiety-inducing conditions, as reification 
splinters subjectivity and leads to a meaningless existence. However, these anxious 
conditions are just not recognized in immediacy because of the pervasive power of the 
“they” that infiltrates the consciousness of the proletariat, leading to a contemplative 
existence.  
In short, anxiety enables the proletariat to gain consciousness that its everyday 
self is a “they-self” – one that is forced into the immediacy of a bourgeois-influenced 
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existence.499 It is in this instance that proletariat recognizes that “the ‘eternal laws’ of 
capitalist economics fail”500 - that the seemingly fixed ‘laws’ that govern society are a 
product of human activity and can therefore be transformed. This restores subjective 
agency to the proletariat re-establishing the important dialectic between subject and 
object: that subject has an effect on the way in which object is structured and vice versa. 
It further reveals how the objective structures of society are produced by subject and 
may therefore be changed.  
Drawing from Marcuse, then, “authenticity is not the return of the individual to 
himself from out of alienation in the crowd, but reflects the social character of existence, 
the fact that the world is a shared creation.”501 The disclosure of the “nothing” as de-
reified society specifically under capitalism gives rise to the conscious awareness of 
human produced structures society and the history of objectified, dead labour. It is for 
this reason that I argue that anxiety has emancipatory potential on the social level, as it 
is able to foster proletarian self-consciousness, which is “nothing but the expression of 
historical necessity.”502  
The connection between Lukács and Heidegger via Kierkegaard is also important 
to mention in this discussion, more specifically, in how anxiety and the disclosure of the 
“nothing” leads to “the instant.” For Kierkegaard, the “instant” is that which occurs in the 
present, though goes beyond time, as it is the point at which time and eternity meet, 
enabling the individual to choose and create itself. This bears similarity to Heidegger’s 
moment of vision (Augenblick), which explains how authentic understanding, or 
resoluteness is possible as Dasein resists falling into the “they.”503Westerman argues 
that while Heidegger’s conception of the moment is ontological in nature, both 
Kierkegaard and Lukacs “ stressed the importance of the moment of decision with their 
account of the present as the locus of decision based on an objective situation created 
by past subjective action, and with the possibility of shaping the future.”504 And whereas 
Kierkegaard focuses on the moment as an element of eternity, Lukács’s ‘moment’, is 
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conceived to be an element of totality, which suggests that the “instant plays an 
essential role in restoring the dialectical relationship between subject and object.505 
Therefore, it is the moment or instant (Øieblikket) that must be realized by the proletariat, 
which I suggest may be opened in anxiety. Anxiety allows for possibility of the proletariat 
to exist historically so it may take over the Situation (or factical ‘there’, that is, of 
capitalist society) by going back ‘before’ its thrown (reified) existence and to go ‘beyond’ 
its death in order to deliver factical possibilities to itself (via revolutionary action) and 
project them as possibilities to be taken over by others.506 Therefore, in Lukács’s 
moment or instant consciousness of the social, rather than the individual is emphasized 
because Lukács demonstrates how social existence is determined by “I” as relation 
between personal experience and the social world disclosed in consciousness. This 
highlights the importance of social consciousness in the proletariat’s experience of 
anxiety and disclosure of the instant.  
5.5. Beyond Consciousness: Concrete Action  
While de-reification requires that “subjects must be consciously interpellated as 
co-creator of their determinate social being”, necessary action must be taken, which 
requires subjective agency.507 Self-consciousness for Lukács entails not just awareness 
of the correct relation to the self, but also concrete action.508Because different ontic 
realities produce different subjectivities and the ontic reality produced out of  a moment 
of anxiety reveals de-reified society, the worker becomes interpellated in a different way, 
in that they now have a conscious awareness of their agency and can therefore direct 
this anxiety toward social transformation.509 The subjective agency that Lukács highlights 
is not a Fichtean subjectivity, in which the subject is understood as being capable of 
completely free action and self-expression to spontaneously create society .510 As 
Westerman highlights via Andrew Feenberg, “Lukács is not looking for a subject capable 
of acting with absolute freedom in a world that no longer resists it, but for one that 
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recognizes objectivity and difference in its practice.”511 For Lukács, there is no powerful 
subject that can change objective conditions at will. Lukács  
explains both objective social reality and the first-person perspective of the 
subject in ways that do not reduce either subject or object to one another, 
and that steer clear of a naïve overestimation of the subject. He shows how 
experience, identity, and agency can be shaped by society, while still 
leaving scope for the subject to act in society in turn. While objective social 
forms may determine the rules of the game, they do not dictate the exact 
moves one makes 512  
Marcuse refers to the concrete action of the proletariat as the “radical act” in his 
synthesis of Heidegger and Marx, which is “an act that should clear the way for a new 
and necessary reality as it brings about the actualization of the whole person.513 This 
enables the possibility of authentic praxis to transform given society. The radical act 
occurs in the “life-space” (Lebensrawum) of Dasein, which every historical Dasein 
occupies, where the possibility for Dasein to take hold of its inherited situation and 
create its own possibilities resides.514 While Heidegger perceives the Situation in which 
Dasein is thrown into as something that must merely be “taken over” by Dasein, he does 
not consider how Dasein may alter or create its own facticity and consequently accepts 
the world as an a priori that Dasein has no control over transforming. Therefore, crucial 
to Marcuse’s reformulation of Heidegger is that he accentuates the concrete, material, 
objective reality that affects Dasein’s existence as subject. Further, because the radical 
act is founded on the revolutionary action of the subject, Marcuse stresses the ability of 
the subject to transform objective society. Thus, like Lukacs, Marcuse emphasizes how 
Dasein must not forget that the world is the alienated product of its own activity – that 
subject has an effect on object and vice versa. Therefore, historical Dasein can 
“reshape[] society according to its historical existence and can, therefore, also reshape 
the worlds of meaning (ideologies) founded on this existence.”515 As Marcuse states, 
present reality should not be accepted as a mere given and that the formulation of a 
‘new existence’ requires a repudiation and movement beyond present existence.516 
 
511 Weterman, 161.  
512 Westerman, 155.  
513 Marcuse, Heideggerian Marxism,5;3.  
514 Angus, “Review”, 121; Marcuse, Heideggerian Marxism 25.  
515 Marcuse, Heideggerian Marxism, 30.  
516 Marcuse 33.  
105 
Otherwise, Dasein remains entrapped within a reified framework. In addition, Marcuse 
presents a more solidified understanding of Dasein’s destiny (which Heidegger defines 
as the authentic happening of the community) by emphasizing the radical act as “a mode 
of collective becoming”, rooted in the proletariat’s revolutionary action.517  
The radical act is not only a historical necessity, but it is also a moral imperative 
because reified society is deemed as ‘inauthentic’ and inherently ‘bad’. As such, there is 
a moral dimension to the radical act, in that it is politically driven to overcome the 
damaging effects of reification, which goes beyond Heidegger’s neutral, apolitical project 
in Being and Time. Westerman attributes the moral demand to act to Kierkegaard’s 
influence on Lukács.518 Much of this is a result of the way in which the subject is 
interpellated:  “instead of a passive performer of unalterable actions, [the proletariat] 
become[s] responsible for the constant reproduction of these social forms.”519 This is 
because anxiety breaks the worker’s contemplative attitude and is interpellated in a way 
in which their existence appears contradictory because of their position in society, which 
makes them responsible for taking revolutionary action to overthrow the reified 
conditions of society. This demand to act is produced out of the specific socio-historical 
structures at a given time.520 One way in which the demand to act is produced is through 
a moment of anxiety, which may afford freedom to the proletariat, as the possibility of 
de-reifying society is opened. The proletariat’s freedom is shaped by the ‘instant’, as it is 
for Kierkegaard:  
“[t]he reified consciousness that leads us to relate to ourselves as the 
passive victims of naturalistic forces beyond our control is shattered; we 
now see both past and future as undetermined, and so relate to ourselves 
as free.”521 It is only then that the proletariat can orient itself toward 
concrete action – to take a historically necessary Kierkegaardian leap of 
faith in order to move toward an absolute, which is totality for Lukacs.522 
However, the proletariat must exist as a party to exist rationally and consciously, 
as it gains validity through self-organization, rather than existing merely as a free floating 
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“shapeless unity.”523 Crucially, effective party organization is essential, which requires 
active participation and solidarity among members. It is further required to allow for the 
mediation between theory and praxis, as this leads to revolutionary actualization, 
resulting in the concrete mediation between man and history.524 “[E]very dialectical 
relationship, the terms of the relation only acquire concreteness and reality in and by 
virtue of this mediation.”525This mediation allows for collective action toward “authentic 
humanity,” which “has inwardly overcome, or is in the process of overcoming, the 
dichotomies of theory and practice ..[and] freedom and necessity are identical.”526 
Therefore, authenticity, for Lukacs, leads to the unfolding of the dialectical historical 
process that allows for the objective possibility of totality – a fully integrated, holistic 
social system in which all elements are dialectically related. Unlike Heidegger, Lukacs 
asserts that the inauthentic, reified world may be reduced by the proletariat.527 
Furthermore for Lukács, “there is in general no structure of ‘inauthentic’ or ideological 
consciousness. The falseness or truth of consciousness, its ideological or non-
ideological character, are determined by its relation to production returns, by its 
possibility of access and its proximity to the totality of social life.”528 Thus, “[r]adical 
action is, according to its essence, necessary, for both the actor and for the environment 
in which it is performed.”529 Concrete historicity requires the restoration of the dialectical 
relationship between subject and object so that subject can meaningfully engage with 
the objective world. This goes beyond the abstract, individualistic orientation of Dasein’s 
historizing.  
5.6. Conclusion 
I have demonstrated the historical specificity of anxiety by outlining a specific 
example of how anxiety may operate under capitalist conditions for the proletariat. What 
is unique to proletarian anxiety is that it may open up a consciousness of social being, 
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which breaks through the unified structure of consciousness under capitalism. It further 
reveals that reified society produces an anxious existence, though this remains latent in 
everydayness. This then propels the proletariat to a movement toward the ‘radical act’, 
which is politically and morally driven to move beyond the ‘inauthentic’ reified 
consciousness and structures of society, as the possibility of Dasein’s authentic 
historizing is opened. As such, anxiety may have emancipatory potential, and it may 
actually be overcome via revolutionary action. In this sense, anxiety should not be 
considered to be solely an existential value.  However, it important to note that anxiety is 
only one way in which such consciousness may emerge. In the past, consciousness 
raising groups were essential to the mobilization of the social movements like the 
feminist movement. It is also important to understand that not all instances of anxiety 
may result in consciousness and may instead lead to fascism (which will be detailed in 
the concluding chapter below). What I have outlined above is simple one example of 
how anxiety may operate to foster emancipatory social action for the proletariat.  
108 
Conclusion  
Throughout this thesis, I have both critiqued and reoriented Heideggerian thought 
to a more materialist project, focusing specifically on Heidegger’s concept of anxiety. 
The significant flaw that I have uncovered is that Heidegger inadvertently relies on 
consciousness in the Existential Analytic of Dasein, which signifies his inability to 
completely abandon the philosophical tradition. This finding provides further support for 
both Anders’s and Adorno’s claim that Heideggerian philosophy is falsely concrete. This 
consequently maintains an abstract, individualistic ontology, which upholds a form of the 
subject-object dichotomy, in which the dialectical relationship between subject and 
object is broken. The root of Heidegger’s failure can be pinpointed to his concept of 
history, as historicity, which is confined to individual Dasein’s stretching between birth 
and death from inauthentic to authentic modes of Being. This results in the acceptance 
of the world as an a priori, and subject is separated from object in the sense that Dasein 
must merely ‘take over’ or assume its factical conditions without question. Consequently, 
not only is the role of humans in producing and reproducing the material conditions of 
social reality passed over, but the historical role of consciousness is also deemed 
irrelevant.  
I have thus argued that the materialist conception of history is important to 
maintain, as it underscores the fact that humans are not isolated from the world - 
humans play a key role in constructing the social norms that constitutes Dasein’s thrown 
existence in the world. Heidegger’s concept of historicity may be concretized by bringing 
in the thought of early Marcuse, who argues that historicity is a “happening” that is 
inextricably linked to Dasein’s material, historical existence in the world. Through 
Lukács, I have also underscored how consciousness plays an important role in the 
concretized notion of historicity. By demonstrating this concretized conception of 
historicity, it is possible to demonstrate how anxiety may function beyond the individual 
ontology of Dasein and how it may actually operate on the social level. This makes it 
possible to open up a discussion of the historically specificity of anxiety, providing further 
support for Adorno’s claim that anxiety should not be conceived of as a mere existential 
value. To highlight how anxiety may function under specific socio-historical 
circumstances, I outline an example of how the world is experienced by the worker 
under capitalism, where such experience is informed by the “they”, which is 
109 
characterized by reification, a specific product of capitalist society. Reification has 
fragmented objective reality and has further resulted in a unified structure of reified 
consciousness for the whole of society. Subjectively, the individual adopts a 
contemplative attitude, as they exist as a passive, isolated, fragmented subject, who is 
pushed into a meaningless existence. Because the “they” is experienced in this 
particular manner under capitalism, there is also a specificity to how one may experience 
a moment of anxiety. By using the proletariat as an example, I have argued that anxiety 
may function to open up a consciousness of social being, as the ‘nothing’ in anxiety 
reveals the world as de-reified. I have argued that it is in anxiety that the reified “they” 
becomes existentielly modified on the level of the social, as the proletariat gains 
consciousness that the so-called ‘laws’ that govern society are actually constructed by 
humans and as such, are also subject to change. Therefore, anxiety functions to break 
through the unified structure of consciousness under capitalism and may restore the 
dialectical relationship between subject and object. Furthermore, anxiety may pave the 
way to concrete action, though effective organization is also needed to truly rouse social 
change. For Lukács this leads to an ‘authentic’ humanity and movement toward totality, 
in which the dialectical relationship between subject and object may be restored.  
Further Research 
I have mentioned numerous theorists who have philosophical relationships with 
Heidegger throughout the course of my project, though the limited scope of my project 
does not allow for an elaboration of these associations. For example, I do not explore 
Goldmann’s claim that the entirety of Being and Time is a criticism and response to 
Lukács due to Heidegger’s placement and reference to reification on the last page of 
Being and Time,530 where Heidegger problematizes the notion of a “reifying 
consciousness.”531Many theorists have similarly argued that Heidegger’s project is, in 
some way, related to Lukács, though such claims are not made as strongly as 
Goldmann.532 While it can be argued that Heidegger does respond to a type of reification 
in Being and Time, as his explanation of Vorhanden may be understood as a critique of 
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reification since such an orientation seeks to understand Being as a mere object or thing 
to be analyzed from a distance, it is unclear as to whether or not it is a direct response to 
Lukács. There is a suggestion that Heidegger may actually be referring to Husserl, not 
Lukács, when he mentions a “reified consciousness.” In Philosophy as a Rigorous 
Science, Husserl states:  
To follow the model of the natural sciences almost inevitably means to reify 
consciousness – something that from the very beginning leads us into 
absurdity, whence stems the constantly renewed tendency toward the 
absurd problematizing and the false orientations of the investigation533  
For Husserl, a reified consciousness is a reversion to the naivety of natural sciences, 
whereby nature is accepted as a given, which inhibits an understanding of knowledge 
that arises cognitively, out of consciousness, where a genuine phenomenological 
understanding may emerge.534 Westerman also attributes the rise of reification resulting 
from the emergence and predominance of the instrumental, scientific outlook to Husserl, 
not Lukács.535 Furthermore, in an interview with the latter Marcuse published in 1977, 
Marcuse states 
[I]t is still open to question whether Heidegger ever really read Marx 
whether Heidegger ever read Lukács, as Lucien Goldmann maintains. I 
tend not to believe it. He may have had a look at Marx after or during the 
Second World War, but I don’t think that he in any way studied Marx536  
Therefore, there is ambiguity as to whether or not Heidegger was indeed responding to 
Lukács in Being and Time and more research is required to explore this contentious 
argument. If Goldmann’s claims can be undermined, this then brings the question as to 
how this may impact my findings, since Goldmann is one of the key figures that I use to 
develop the link between Lukács and Heidegger. 
Furthermore, Marcuse’s relationship to Heidegger can be deepened because 
throughout this thesis, I have solely focused on the early Marcuse when he identified as 
a Heideggerian. However, Marcuse repudiated his Heideggerianism later on, as he 
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quickly re-evaluated Heidegger’s ideas after Heidegger’s wilful support of Nazism 
became public.537 While Marcuse first conceived of Heidegger’s focus on human 
existence as concrete, he “soon realized that Heidegger’s concreteness was to a great 
extent a phony, a false concreteness, and that in fact [Heidegger’s] philosophy was just 
as abstract and just as removed from reality, even avoiding reality.”538 Similar to Adorno, 
then, Marcuse saw historicity as “the same false or fake concreteness because actually 
none of the concrete material and cultural, none of the concrete social and political, 
conditions which make history have any place in Being and Time. History too is 
subjected to neutralization.”539 In addition, Marcuse argues that Das Man cannot be 
conceived of as a substitution for social reality - what is required is an analysis of 
historicity that includes how the individual sees themselves in the context of 
capitalism540. Here Marcuse calls attention to Heidegger’s inability to understand that the 
embodied subject both influences and is influenced by the material, objective world. 
More problematic is that Das Man is conceived of as an eternal part of existence and 
thus cannot be overthrown, at least according to Heidegger. The latter Marcuse thus 
defined Heidegger’s philosophy as highly oppressive, “a joyless existence: 
overshadowed by death and anxiety; human material for the authoritarian personality”, 
echoing both Adorno and Anders’s critiques of Heideggerian philosophy as hostile to life, 
which renders Dasein as a helpless entity in the face of the world.541 Further, Marcuse 
argues that Heidegger’s ‘neutral’ approach to Being leads to a problematic lack of 
interest in making any moral claims, insofar as the social, empirical context of the 
decision and of its consequences is “bracketed.”542 Ultimately, Marcuse found what he 
was seeking in Heidegger in the publication of Marx’s Economic and Political 
manuscripts in 1932, where Marx’s concept of alienation reflected Marcuse’s existential 
questions.543 Marcuse’s rejection of Heidegger therefore calls into question the validity of 
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my claims, since I also rely on Marcuse’s concretized concept of historicity to tie 
elements of Heidegger with Lukács.  
And while Marcuse explicitly rejected Heidegger, Andrew Feenberg makes a 
compelling argument to suggest that traces of Heidegger can be found throughout 
Marcuse’s latter writings, which may give my project redemptive potential. Feenberg, 
whose focus is largely centered around technology (as he compares Heidegger’s “The 
Question Concerning Technology” and Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man), argues that 
Heidegger’s reliance on technology as techne, that is, as a mode of revealing, may be 
found in Marcuse’s latter works. 544 For Heidegger, techne, which is related to production 
is considered ontologically, as it is related to Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, which is meant 
to transcend the antinomies between subject and object.545 Feenberg argues,  
Like the early Heidegger, the later Marcuse rejects naturalism and a purely 
cognitive concept of subjectivity in favor of an active and needy subject that 
encounters a world correlated with its powers. Implicit in both Heidegger’s 
and Marcuse’s critiques of technology is a reference to Aristotle, interpreted 
phenomenologically. Both were concerned with the implications of the 
breakdown of Greek essentialism for modern technology and for the “pre-
ontological” understanding of the world that accompanies it.546  
Furthermore, Feenberg argues that the influence of Heidegger’s existential politics 
remain within Marcuse’s latter writings, though he drops Heidegger’s categories of 
existence, and instead turns to Marx and Freud. More specifically, Feenberg argues that 
Marcuse’s theory of two dimensional society resembles Heidegger’s argument in “The 
Question Concerning Technology”, as both philosophers similarly outline a “history of 
being.” 547  
Not only can Heidegger’s philosophical relationship to the above theorists be 
further explored, but it is also important to highlight some of the main critiques that can 
be made against my project and areas that may warrant additional research. Among 
them is the claim that the proletariat is no longer, and perhaps never was, the subject 
that can overcome reification. Lukács himself had critiqued his over reliance on the 
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proletariat in the 1962 preface of History and Class Consciousness and even refers to 
himself as a messianic utopian because of his overemphasis on praxis, which led to “a 
relapse into idealistic contemplation.”548 Furthermore, despite Goldmann’s 
commendation of Lukács, he similarly argues that Lukács relies too much on the 
proletariat for its revolutionary potential: 549  
No proletarian revolution has occurred anywhere, no section of the 
proletariat has spontaneously oriented itself toward conflict with all the 
other social groups which it should have wanted to eliminate from power in 
order to create a classless society in which it itself would disappear, and 
no section of the proletariat’s evolution has been spontaneously 
revolutionary550  
This raises the question as to whether or not a unified subject may be constructed under 
our current social circumstances: can the antinomies between subject and object truly be 
reconciled? Who is the historical subject, if any, that can lead to revolutionary action to 
overcome reification?  
The emancipatory potential of anxiety must also be questioned and explored in 
greater detail.It can be argued that under the current sociohistorical conditions, the 
fragmented, reified “they” creates and sustains anxiety-inducing social circumstances, 
which therefore provokes more instances of anxiety for the subject. This falls in line with 
Kierkegaard’s assertion that the magnitude of anxiety may increase with each 
successive generation.551 If this is the case, then following my argument, more instances 
of anxiety results in an increased consciousness of social being, and by extension, 
increased awareness of, and perhaps even action to ameliorate social problems. 
However, such increased consciousness has not led to wide-spread action and 
revolution. Feelings of anxiousness have become even more normalized, or perhaps 
experienced at such a rate that it has become debilitating and thus suppressed. This 
again calls attention to the lack of effective organization that Lukács had emphasized, 
which is required for true revolution. For example, although the climate crisis has 
increased social consciousness of climate change, as it has induced widespread 
anxiety, there still has not been unified action to truly tackle the issue in an effective 
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manner. However, because I have argued that anxiety may function differently 
depending upon socio-historical circumstances, it can be argued that the type of anxiety 
that has emerged under current conditions does not actually allow for a break from the 
unified structure of reified consciousness. Consequently, reification is not pinpointed as 
the source of societal issues. As such, while anxiety has increased consciousness of 
social issues, like the climate crisis, it may be that it is suppressed and directed inward, 
as the individual feels burdened and powerless against the system, which again, breaks 
the dialectical relationship between subject and object. This emphasizes that not all 
instances of anxiety may result in consciousness, and that consciousness does not 
always lead to action, which parallels Heidegger’s claim that not all instances of anxiety 
lead to authenticity. Additional research is required to further unfold how anxiety 
functions under current societal conditions.  
Furthermore, it may be fruitful to demonstrate how anxiety may be defined in 
different ways and how it may produce social control rather than freedom. For example, 
Franz Neumann, who focuses on the anxiety through a psychoanalytic lens 
demonstrates how anxiety may lead to fascism, which undermines my claim that anxiety 
may have emancipatory potential. Neumann argues that there are two types of anxiety: 
true anxiety (Realangst), which is manifested by the threat of an external, concrete 
object,  and neurotic anxiety, which is “produced  [internally] by the ego, in order to avoid 
in advance even the remotest threat of danger.”552 Neumann argues that alienation 
(caused by alienated labour, in which humans are alienated from  external nature, 
themselves, and others)553 leads to an anxiety situation where libidinal energy is 
repressed, consequently leading to a libidinally charged identification of the masses with 
a leader.554 This identification is termed a Caesaristic identification and has historical 
consequences:  
Caesaristic identifications may play a role in history when the situation of 
masses is objectively endangered, when the masses are incapable of 
understanding the historical process, and when anxiety activated by the 
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danger becomes neurotic persecutory (aggressive) anxiety through 
manipulation.555 
Neumann asserts that when such caesaristic leader-identification occurs in the realm of 
politics, the historical situation is misunderstood, and instead a “theory of history 
characterized by false concreteness” emerges. 556 True anxiety (which is produced out of 
concrete material conditions, such as war) becomes transformed into neurotic anxiety 
and is overcome by identification of a leader, where the individual ego is sacrificed.557As 
Neumann states,  
The purpose of the theory is clear: potential anxiety, whose concrete 
significance still needs to be clarified – is actualized by reference to the 
devilish conspirators: family property, morality, religion is threated by the 
conspiracy. Anxiety easily becomes neurotic persecutory anxiety, which in 
turn can, under certain circumstances, lead to a totalitarian mass 
movement.558 
Heidegger would of course reject Neumann’s claims on the basis that the latter’s 
concept of anxiety does not belong to the ontological order of Dasein and is rather an 
ontic phenomenon (belonging to psychology), that has no place in Dasein’s grasp of 
authentic Being as a whole. Furthermore, because Neumann’s true anxiety arises from 
the threat of an external object, Heidegger would argue that Neumann is instead 
referring to fear not anxiety, which is manifested by a definite threat in the world.  
In addition to the connection of anxiety and politics that Neumann illuminates, the 
relationship between anxiety and more broadly, freedom, requires more investigation. As 
I mention above, Kierkegaard (as Vigillius Haufniensis), asserts that “[a]nxiety is the 
“dizziness of freedom””, which awakens freedom’s possibility, or the possibility to be 
able,559 which is similar to Heidegger who underscores anxiety’s role in manifesting 
Dasein’s “Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself.”560 
Although Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety and freedom differs from that of Heidegger’s, 
I have made connections between the two theorists that allow for a comparative 
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analysis. What is important to highlight in both of their discussions is the sense of 
responsibility that comes out of such awakened freedom. Although one may experience 
euphoria from the freedom to choose, there is, at the same time, a burden that comes 
out of choosing, because there is a fear of freedom, which for Kierkegaard is really a 
fear that one may sin.561 It is here that Erich Fromm’s Escape from Freedom may be 
applied. In this text, Fromm highlights the dialectical character of freedom. He suggests 
that while modern society has increased the individual’s sense of freedom, as they are 
now fully equipped to master nature and they are also afforded more political and 
economic freedom, such freedom is negative because it has isolated the individual and 
has made them anxious - they become uncertain of their place within the world and thus 
become aware of the meaninglessness of their existence.562 Fromm suggests that these 
strong feelings of isolation and uncertainty cause the individual to escape from this 
freedom.563 One of the forms of escape that Fromm describes is automation, which is “a 
compulsive conforming in the process of which the isolated individual becomes an 
automation, [and] loses his self.”564 Such automation cures one’s anxious feelings and 
they no longer feel alone since the individual conforms to social norms and becomes an 
automaton like those around them.565 Fromm’s account of automation is important to 
highlight because it demonstrates why one may adopt a contemplative attitude. 
However, Fromm also outlines the possibility of positive freedom. According to Fromm, 
positive freedom is grounded in the realization of the self through spontaneous activity 
and the “full affirmation of the uniqueness of the individual, along with the unification of 
[the individual] with nature and with [themselves]”, where “the individual is not 
subordinated or manipulated by any power outside himself.”566 While positive freedom 
requires that reification must overcome since it would abolish the subject-object dualism 
and will enable individuals to become recognized as unique, distinct humans, rather than 
abstract, identical commodities, the recognition of the mere possibility of such positive 
freedom may be enough to motivate the individual toward totality in order to overthrow 
reification and to disclose positive freedom as an actual possibility. There is an essential 
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link between anxiety and freedom, which warrants an additional discussion on the 
relationship between anxiety and freedom, and their historical specificity.  
Furthermore, my discussion has largely centered upon the concretization of 
Heideggerian anxiety. But because anxiety and authenticity are inextricably linked, a 
deeper exploration of the relationship between these two concepts, along with how 
authenticity may be concretized must be opened. I have already alluded to the form of 
authenticity that the Frankfurt School theorists adhere to: it is, in some manner, related 
to overcoming ‘inauthentic’ reification and related to the restoration of the dialectical 
process. However, authenticity’s emergence as a moral concept must be further 
investigated and compared to Heidegger’s ‘neutral’ definition of the term.567 Important 
contributions on this topic have been made by several thinkers, who explicitly tie the 
concept of authenticity to morality (and also to anxiety) in relation to society and culture. 
Among them is Charles Taylor, who roots the problem of authenticity in the first ‘malaise 
of modernity’,568 which is the problem of individualism.569 Taylor argues that with the 
collapse of a divine source to guide morality, an individual, subjectivist morality has 
developed under modernity. 570 This subjectivist morality leads the individual toward a 
path of self-fulfilment in order to discover one’s authentic true-self - to realize a 
potentiality that is solely my own.571 Part of this is due to the culture of narcissim that has 
arisen, in which self-fulfillment, or the path to ‘find out’ one’s true self. Therefore, 
authenticity becomes tied to one’s identity. This has undermined the fact that identity is 
shaped by social circumstances and the fact the “[m]y own identity crucially depends on 
my dialogical relations with others.”572 Furthermore, such an understanding of 
authenticity in relation to identity has contributed to the rise of the politics of recognition, 
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in which certain oppressed identities demand recognition.573 Taylor therefore 
problematizes the individualistic authentic ideal that has emerged out of modernity, 
which feeds into a culture of narcissism and instead calls for a search of the meaning of 
authenticity beyond the moral demands of the self. 574 This individual drive for 
authenticity reverts to a ‘soft relativism’, insofar as it is confined to personal opinions, 
actions, and values.575 It leads to a a thinking in which “I can define my identity only 
against the background of things that matter. But to bracket out history, nature, society, 
the demands of solidarity, everything but what I find myself, would be to eliminate all 
candidates for what matters.”576 
Lionel Trilling makes claims similar to Taylor, in that he ties authenticity to 
individual morality, though he argues that it is a heightened form of sincerity.577 What is 
important to highlight, and what is of relevance to my discussion, is that he pinpoints the 
search for authenticity to the anxiety that has arisen in modernity due to the mechanical 
principle, or the rise of the “machine”, which has depersonalized/dehumanized 
individuals, causing an erasure of the “self.”578 Charles Lindholm makes similar claims as 
he attributes the rise of the scientific revolution to the creation of anxiety, where salvation 
from anxiety may be attained by achieving a form of individual authenticity: 
Anxiety about the stability of the taken-for-granted resulted in intensified efforts to 
ratify the Western experience as somehow absolute and true. The result was a 
heightened concern with cultural and personal authenticity 579  
Furthermore, Lindholm is also an important figure to draw upon, as he explores the 
cultural development of authenticity in Art, music, travel/adventure, commodification, 
self, national identity (dance, food, nationalism) and he also underscores the two 
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(overlapping) modes of authenticity: geneaological/historical (related to origin) and 
identity or correspondence (content) .580 
The emergence of authenticity as an individual moral ideal, tied to one’s identity, 
along with the ways in which it serves to remedy anxiety that Taylor, Trilling, and 
Lindholm discover is extremely important to highlight  because it has important 
ramifications on the emergence of contemporary forms of identity politics. In my view, 
identity politics succumb to the same failures as Heideggerian philosophy that I have 
outlined above (at least taken on its own).581 While this warrants a completely new 
project, my thesis may serve as a starting point for such a discussion, which I will outline 
briefly, below.  
The term “Identity Politics” emerged from the Combahee River Collective’s 
(CRC) statement in 1977, which made important contributions to black feminism.582 It 
states:  
The focusing upon our own oppression is embodied in the concept of 
identity politics. We believe that the most profound and potentially most 
radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as opposed to working 
to end somebody else’s oppression. 583 
Even though the starting point of identity politics was grounded in individual identities,584 
the CRC focused on expanding the feminist principle of “the personal is political” by 
emphasizing the need to include an economic analysis, along with coalition building for 
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revolutionary action.585 Therefore, structural change, along with unification was key, 
which would result in the liberation of all.586 Similarly, Asad Haider perceives the identity-
based 1960s Black Panther Party as an successful form of identity politics, as it 
effectively mobilized and recognized that the struggle for black self-determination was 
intertwined with an anti-capitalist struggle.587 This is also the basic premise of Marxist 
feminism, which recognizes that the oppression of women is intertwined with concrete, 
material, social reality. 
Using identity politics as a form of empowerment and social liberation can be 
successful if asserted in the manner above, as there is an interrogation of  the material 
conditions of society that create oppression for certain identities in society. In Lukácsian 
terms, these orientations may be authentic because it focuses on how a collective group 
in society are able to gain consciousness of their specific powerless place within the 
objective capitalist structures of society. These forms of identity politics adhere to a form 
of authenticity that is beyond the individual, as it is not fetishized as a thing to be owned 
by the individual, neither is it accepted as an absolute. It breaks through reification.  
However, contemporary forms of identity politics appeal to a notion of authenticity 
that focuses on the individual subject in order to overcome a form of inauthenticity of the 
factical conditions that Dasein finds itself in. It focuses on the attainment and recognition 
of an ‘authentic’ identity as an end goal and is founded in the Politics of Recognition. 
Fukuyama highlights how the assertion of a separate identity has been created:  
[i]dentity grows, in the first place, out of a distinction between one’s true 
inner self and outer world of social rules and norms that dos not adequately 
recognize that inner self’s worth or dignity….But only in modern times has 
the view taken hold that the authentic inner self is intrinsically valuable, and 
the outer society systematically wrong and unfair in its valuation of the 
former. It is not the inner self that has to be made to conform to society’s 
rule, but society itself that needs to change588 
Furthermore, Fukuyama demonstrates that there are three facets to modern identity: 
first, identity has become related to thymos, which is rooted in the human desire for 
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recognition; second, a greater importance has been placed on the inner self rather than 
the outer self; and finally, it is related to a concept of dignity, which posits that everyone 
should gain recognition.589 This leads to a politicization of the self, as there is a demand 
for the inner self to become not only recognized, but also embodied in rights and laws. 
Crucial to this modern concept of identity is authenticity, where the inability to assert 
such authenticity leads to anxiety and alienation.590 In this regard, the search for the 
authentic self may be driven by a desire to overcome a form of anxiety.  
Though such an ‘authentic’ claim to identity is an important step for 
empowerment and may serve to alleviate a form of anxiety, too much emphasis on the 
subject results in ineffective political action, as the important, socio-historical structures 
of neoliberal capitalism are ignored. Without a materialist investigation to interrogate the 
concrete, socio-historical conditions that perpetuate the forms of oppression that identity 
politics wishes to abolish, the primacy of the subject prevails, just as it does in 
Heideggerian philosophy. Fukuyama, like Taylor argues that the culture of narcissism is 
to blame.591This is similar to how Heideggerian philosophy functions, insofar as the 
individual Dasein’s Being is prioritized, which maintains the primacy of the subject. 
Because identity politics has become narcissistic and/or places the burden on specific 
groups in society to fight for their ‘own’ issues, separatist politics arise. The importance 
of coalition building that once belonged to identity politics is abolished because instead 
of unifying and working with others, tense battles over asserting authentic identities is 
instead emphasized.592  Radical Women of Colour feminists of the 1970s have already 
asserted the problematic separatist ideology that arises out of identity politics.593 As 
Cherie Moraga states,  
I worry about the tendency of racial/cultural separatism amongst us where 
we dig in our heels against working with groups outside our own particular 
race/ethnicity. … But the making of a political movement has never been 
about safety or feeling “at home” (Not in the long run, anyway) Cultural 
identity – our right to it – is a legitimate concern and basic concern for all 
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women of colour. … But to stop there only results in the most limiting of 
identity politics: “If I suffer it, it’s real. If I don’t feel it, it doesn’t exist.”594  
Because the subject merely seeks inclusion and recognition of an injured identity 
within the existing societal framework, objective society is taken as an a priori, which 
again reflects one of Heidegger’s main flaws, in that he accepts the world as always 
already there, yet not to be transformed or changed. Instead, contemporary forms of 
identity politics operate under a model in which the subject expresses a need for solidity 
by becoming unconsciously, passionately attached to an identity.595 Therefore, the 
subject becomes preoccupied with choosing and owning an ‘authentic’ identity that it can 
claim on its own terms. As bell hooks argues, the politicization of the self is important but 
when it becomes the end goal, it becomes narcissistic, as the ‘personal’ in ‘the personal 
is political’ takes over.596 
Like Heidegger’s ‘neutral’ project, identity politics have become de-politicized or 
operate under a neutralized framework, as it has become solely focused on the 
individual and their attainment and recognition of an authentic, injured identity within the 
existing societal framework.597 bell hooks has already made similar arguments regarding 
the de-politicization of identity politics in Talking Back, published in 1988 where she 
criticizes identity politics for being too focused on the immediate concerns of one’s 
identity, which does not lead to a radical, critical consciousness of how one’s personal is 
connected to political reality.598 So while identity politics does focus on collective action 
by identity-based group in society, their demands are confined an individual specific 
identity, which does not lead to collective revolutionary action, as the possibility of 
unification is undermined. Therefore, like Heidegger, identity politics also appeals to an 
individualized sense of authenticity that one can claim as one’s ownmost, which results 
in a false concreteness that covers over the necessity to acknowledge the structural 
forces that contribute to oppression. This maintains the broken dialectic between subject 
and object and upholds the primacy of the subject.  
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Further, the pseudo-form of concreteness and empowerment given to identity-
based groups places the onus on the individual subject to make change. Like 
Heidegger’s Dasein, the individual becomes burdened and conceived of as a helpless 
entity, as it strives for the attainment of an authentic identity within a world that it has no 
power over. Similar to Adorno’s critique of Heidegger’s Dasein, a false sense of freedom 
is given to identity-based liberation groups as a structural analysis is not explored. 
The focus on the individual subject, along with the acceptance of the world as an 
a priori leads to the argument that, like Heidegger, contemporary forms of identity politics 
fail to account for the materialist conception of history, thereby operating under a falsely 
concrete framework. As discussed above, when identity politics was first introduced by 
the CRC, it focused on a feminist, anti-racist, and anticapitalist framework that moved 
beyond “the personal is political”, and also reinforced the importance of solidarity.599 The 
dialectical relationship between subject and object was thus asserted, as the subject 
was recognized as having influence over object and vice versa.  However, Keeanga-
Yamahtta Taylor argues that “Since 1977, [identity politics] has been used, abused, and 
reconfigured into something foreign to its creators.”600 Instead, focus has shifted to the 
attainment and recognition  of an ‘authentic’ identity that a group in society shares, 
without questioning the root of the problem. In other words, there is no interrogation of 
what drives this search for authenticity: how  do the objective structures of neo-liberal 
capitalism influence the subject? As Fukuyama states,  
Identity politics for some progressives has become a cheap substitute for 
serious thinking about how to reverse the thirty-year trend in most liberal 
democracies toward greater socioeconomic inequality. It is easier to argue 
over cultural issues within the confines of elite institutions than it is to 
appropriate money or convince skeptical legislators to change policies.601 
And while identity is real, it is also abstract and does not tell us how social relations have 
constituted it. Therefore, as Haider states, a materialist approach is required to move 
from the abstract to the concrete.602 
 
599 Combahee River Collective, 213-214.  
600 Taylor, Free, 8.  
601 Fukuyama, Identity, 115.  
602 Haider, Mistaken Identity, 11.  
124 
Furthermore, Haider argues that identity politics re-naturalizes capitalism 
because “to demand inclusion in the structure of society as it is means forfeiting the 
possibility of structural change.”603 Because of the inability to organize, ideology prevails, 
where the white bourgeois, masculinist ideal maintains its status as the ‘neutral’ 
identity.604 As Haider states,  
“[i]f [capitalism] is not questioned, people of color, along with other 
oppressed groups, have no choice but to articulate their political demands 
in terms of inclusion in the bourgeois masculinist ideal.”605  
This maintains the subject-object duality insofar as the subject seeks inclusion within an 
objective world that it is opposed to – that it did not create. When ideology takes over 
and no alternative is given (i.e. political organization), those who critique identity politics 
become subject to scrutiny because it appears as though they are speaking out against 
those specific struggles, which comes across as a denial of the agency of oppressed 
groups.606 Adorno’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity in Negative Dialectics 
is extremely relevant in this discussion, as he states,  
authenticity … will promptly recoil into positivity, into authenticity as a 
posture of consciousness – a posture whose emigration from the profane 
powerlessly imitates the theological habit of the old doctrine of essence.607 
Therefore, like Heideggerian philosophy, identity politics operates in the realm of 
idealism appealing to a notion of authenticity that is accepted as the absolute, end goal. 
The subject remains reified – it is fragmented and splintered under capitalist conditions. 
As Haider argues, identity politics has  become a “politics … reduced to the anxious 
performance of authenticity.”608 And as Haider states, “identity politics identity politics 
paradoxically ends up reinforcing the very norms it set out to criticize.”609 It is a one sided 
approach to overcome reification. In other words, identity politics attempts to overcome 
reification – though this attempt is confined to a subjective plane and as a result, it 
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remains within an objective reified framework. As Fukuyama rightly asserts, identity 
politics therefore threatens collective action. 610This is similar to Heidegger’s efforts to 
overcome vorhandenheit, which is merely a one-sided critique of reification, since 
isolation is only overcome in Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s concernful engagement 
with entities in the world like tools. Therefore, the form of authenticity that identity politics 
appeals to is as false and inauthentic as Heidegger’s is, because both, which seems like 
a response to reification, actually becomes entrapped within reification in itself. 
Despite the failures of contemporary forms of identity politics, Lukács, Haider, 
and earlier forms of identity politics demonstrates how identity politics may be 
reformulated to overcome reification. Though Haider does not mention reification in his 
text, he, like Lukács, focuses on a unified subject, as he seeks a construction of an 
authentic humanity, by focusing on an insurgent universality which is organized around 
class interests and explicitly opposed to the entire capitalist system.611 Opposition to 
capitalist society is required, otherwise, one remains entrapped within the realm of 
reified society, and as Audre Lorde states, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the 
master’s house.”612 Authenticity must be de-fetishized and while bell hooks calls for the 
use of confession and memory to “ [shift] the focus away from mere naming of one’s 
experience … [and] to talk about identity in relation to culture, history, politics, whatever 
and to challenge the notion of identity as static and unchanging”, it is extremely 
important to assert what Haider calls for: an insurgent universality.613 He states,  
Our world is in dire need of a new insurgent universality. We are capable 
of producing it; we all are, by definition. What we lack is program, strategy, 
and tactics. If we set the consolations of identity aside, that discussion can 
begin.614  
Unification will bring about the de-reification of society allowing for the re-establishment 
of the dialectical relationship between subject and object. With this unification, however, 
is the need for organized action. And while both Lukács and Haider demonstrate that 
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authentic social change is achievable, this is merely conceived of as a possibility. The 
notion of universal emancipation often seems like an impossibility and gives rise to what 
Haider calls a “melancholic sensibility.” A breakdown of the reified structure of 
consciousness is required along with effective, organized action is necessary.  
While I have outlined many additional topics of research above, it is nonetheless 
important to highlight how anxiety may function beyond Heidegger’s strictly ontological 
account in Being and Time. What is crucial to emphasize from my findings is that anxiety 
may manifest in a way that opens up consciousness of social being, which incite 
revolutionary action for social change. And although anxiety is not a common pathway 
for revolutionaries (unlike anger, for example), more consideration should be placed onto 
anxiety’s emancipatory potential. This is especially important to highlight amidst the 
current coronavirus pandemic, which has arguably increased the magnitude of anxiety 
that the subject experiences under existing reified conditions. If this is the case, we may 
be at a very crucial point in history, as such anxiousness may generate increased 
awareness of how the “they” conceals an understanding of how neoliberal capitalism 
affects social being. The question remains, however, as to where this consciousness 
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